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INTRODUCTION AND ABSTRACT 
Throughout the history of philosophy, cosmological 
theories have always deservedly enjoyed a position of 
special prominence. Of all recent cosmologies, or phi - 
losophies of Nature, perhaps the most comprehensive and 
satisfactory is that offered. by Alfred North Whitehead. 
Whitehead, always both mathematician and philosopher, 
enjoyed a full career as mathematician at Cambridge and 
London Universities before answering an invitation from 
Harvard University to a chair in philosophy there. His 
interests invariably carried him to the forefront of the 
advance, and his more technical mathematical works bore 
the imprint of a philosopher. His philosophy carried the 
marks of its birth in mathematics and the physical sciences. 
Although his Treatise on Universal Algebra (1898) won 
him an enviable reputation, it was his collaboration with 
Bertrand Russell in the first decade of the twentieth cen- 
tury on Principia Nathematica which proved his pioneering 
genius. In the middle of this decade, Whitehead offered 
to the Royal Society of London a memoir entitled "On 
Mathematical Concepts of the Material World." This memoir, 
which fell into oblivion, employed the symbolic technique 
of Principia Nathematica in solving the fundamental prob- 
lem of importance to cosmological theory. Given a set of 
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entities and a relation between those entities, Whitehead 
attempted to show the whole of Euclidean geometry to be an 
expression of the properties of the field of that rela- 
tion. Certain extraneous relations served to associate 
the axioms with the material world of the physicists, of 
which Whitehead offered seven alternative concepts. 
The first three volumes of Princiaá Mathematica had 
been published, and Whitehead had begun his work on the 
fourth, which was to have been concerned with the applica- 
tion of symbolic reasoning to the foundations of geometry 
and the problem of space. But by this time the scientific 
world had been captivated by the publication of the spe- 
cial and general theories of relativity by Einstein. 
These novelties naturally attracted Whitehead, who wrote 
several essays on the presuppositions of relativity. 
Whitehead was convinced that the principle and the method 
introduced by Einstein constituted a revolution in physi- 
cal science, but found his explanation faulty. 
A series of three important "Nature" volumes intro- 
duced the philosophy of "Nature" as conceived by Whitehead, 
using his own interpretation of the meaning of the new 
relativity. A powerful method of analysis, called the 
Method of Extensive Abstraction and having as its purpose 
the definition of spatial and temporal entities so as to 
avoid a circularity of reasoning was born at this period. 
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The third of the volumes was devoted 
entirely to the de- 
velopment of his own theory of relativity, to 
which the 
philosophically more satisfactory interpretation of 
rela- 
tivity could be readily applied. From his original 
pre- 
suppositions Whitehead offered four alternative relativity 
theories, one of which coincided with Einstein's, and two 
of which were attempts at a unified field theory. The 
fourth, a theory of gravitation, used a : hysical element, 
the "impetus," instead of an infinitesimal metric element, 
as Einstein had done. This theory proved to be empirically 
less satisfactory than that of Einstein. But Professor 
George Temple generalized this fourth theory by using a 
space -time of positive uniform curvature, and results more 
satisfactory empirically than those of Einstein followed. 
The philosophical advantages of Whitehead's relativity 
were retained. This result seems to invite a more careful 
consideration of Temple's generalization of ;Thitehead's 
relativity than has been obtained at present. 
But by this time Whitehead's speculations, which took 
as their restricted field the area of nature in which mind 
was irrelevant, began to concentrate on the enlarged field 
of cosmological theory in its points of contact with meta- 
physics. The most important discovery he believed he had 
made was that in this enlarged area, all the more special 
physical and extensive properties of nature were dependent 
for their existence upon process. 
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Now in his sixties, Whitehead accepted Harvard's in- 
vitation to a chair in philosophy. Within a very few 
years he returned to the United Kingdom to deliver the 
Gifford Lectures at the University of Edinburgh, in which 
the implications of adopting process as the central prin- 
ciple in the universe were systematically presented. 
One outstanding; feature of these lectures has been 
unfortunately ignored; it is a major and original sugges- 
tion of this thesis that the categoreal scheme of Process 
and Reality is really the axiomatic scheme of "On Mathe- 
matical Concepts of the Material World" generalized on the 
metaphysical level. An attempt at the application of the 
symbolic method to the axioms (categories of explanation 
and obligation) is made here. Thus the generalized prob- 
lem in Process and Reality becomes, "Given a set of onto - 
logical existents and the operation of creativity, what 
axioms regarding the operation of creativity will have as 
their result that the more specialized discoveries of the 
humanities and the sciences follow from the properties of 
those entities forming the field of creativity?" 
These lectures, although they offered a comprehensive 
metaphysical system justifying the operation of physical 
field theories, suffered under the misfa' tune that they 
were given at just the time when the quantum mechanics 
revolution was precipitated in the physical sciences. 
From the point of view of quantum mechanics, therefore, 
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the philosophy of organism does not supply a satisfactory 
cosmology within which it can operate. This is especially 
unfortunate in view of his possibly superior physical 
theory of relativity; possible points of expansion to al- 
low for quantum mechanics are indicated, although they do 
violence to the base of the philosophy of organism. 
As the chief exemplification of the metaphysical 
principles, Whitehead postulated a brilliantly conceived 
metaphysical God who was important in physical cosmology. 
It is suggested that this metaphysical God is, neverthe- 
less, inadequate to satisfy the demands of the religious 
conscience. 
Despite the originality of most of the elements intro- 
duced by Whitehead, a full understanding of his meaning 
and an appreciation of his novelties is possible only by 
referring his writings to their proper settings. Thus, 
the philosophy of organism is explained against the back- 
ground of the process philosophies of Bergson, Alexander, 
and Horgan. Because of its many similarities in respect 
to the setting of the cosmological problem and the essen- 
tials of the solution to the Timaeus, a special chapter is 
devoted to the correspondence between the two. Whitehead's 
relativity and philosophy of Nature requires an understan- 
ding of the development of the theory of relativity, the 
world- models of the relativistic cosmologies, and the at- 
tempts at a unified field theory. Similarly, the memoir 
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of 1905 is described in 
a more general back ground setting 
forth a broad picture of the state of geometry, 
physical 
science, and philosophy at the turn of the century. 
As a final reflection, certain presuppositions at the 
base of Whitehead's philosophy of organism are investiga- 
ted and evaluated. The points believed by the present 
writer to be especially vulnerable in the philosophy of 
organism are exposed. An experiment in suggesting the 
prospectus of an alternative system which might avoid the 
difficulties, and incorporate the advantages of, the phi- 
losophy of organism, is made with the warning that it is 
no more than a suggestion. 
Throughout the thesis, certain dominant strains of 
"Ihitehead's thinking can be detected: the importance in 
his mind of the axiomatic -deductive method in the sciences; 
the realization that prevalent habits of thinking need to 
be altered by new discoveries, but are resisted; the con- 
viction that the sciences must be ontologically centered; 
the faith in field theories; and the conviction that cos- 
mology must be the search for the forms in the facts; to 
designate the more outstanding convictions. 
PART ONE 
"ON IßA.THEXATICAL CONPTS OF THE NATERIAL WORLD" 
CHAPTER ONE 
BACKGROUND FOR 
"ON MATHEMATICAL CONCEPTS OF THE I'A`1`ERIAL WORLD" 
The stage on which Alfred North Whitehead's first 
essay in physical cosmology was to make its debut had been 
neatly prepared. Two issues of NatureI had announced that 
"On Mathematical Concepts of the Material World" would be 
presented at the first December meeting of the Royal Society 
of London in 1905. Geometricians already had arranged their 
axioms into consistent patterns, but had been experimenting 
with restating these axioms in terms of more primitive lo- 
gical elements. Physicists, upon extending their mechani- 
cal ideas of the natural world, were confronted by para- 
doxes which suggested that a broader cosmology was impera- 
tive. Whitehead, whose reputation as the author. of A Trea- 
tise on Universal Algebra had led to his election in 1903 
to Fellowship in the Royal Society, had prepared a paper 
extending and surpassing the axiomatic researches of the 
1. 1905 "Diary of Societies" Nature, 73, 120. 1905 "Diary 
of Societies" Nature, 73, 144. 
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geometricians. Furthermore, he was prepared to suggest a 
physical interpretation of his geometry which would pass 
through the horns of the dilemma regarding action at a 
distance by use of a powerful application of the field 
concept. 
Nature2 carried a tardy notice that the memoir had 
been delivered; the preface of the memoir was published3, 
and the entire memoir was printed in the L®fdon Philoso- 
hp ical Transactions.4 
But there followed few immediate words of commentary 
or criticisms, and later writers on similar subjects were 
apparently oblivious of the masterpiece that had been pro- 
duced; Whitehead had failed to deflect the course of phy- 
sics. Later, the memoir attracted some attention, and at 
least three men were convinced of the importance and merit 
of "On Mathematical Concepts of the Material World ": 
Sir Edmund T. Whittaker6, Victor Lowe7, and W. Ma.ys8. 
2. 1906 "Societies and Academies: London: Royal Society" 
Nature, 73, 454. 
3. 1906 Froceedinms of the Royal Society of London, A, 77, 
290 -291. 
4. 1906 Series A, 205, 465 -525. 
5. See Appendix B at the end of this Thesis. 
6. 1948 "Alfred North Whitehead" Obituary Notices of Fel- 
lows of the Royal Societ , 6, 284 -285. Sir Edmund- - 
hittTler .s constantly emphasized the importance of 
this memoir in supervisory conferences during the pre- 
paration of this thesis. 
7. 1941 "The Development of Whitehead's Philosophy" The 
Philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead, The Library-6r 
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A closer examination of the stage onto which the 
memoir emerged will help demonstrate the value of "On Ma- 
thematical Concepts of the Material World," 
Mathematical Investigations in the Axioms of Geometry 
The central problem which geometers were facing at 
the close of the nineteenth century was that of preparing 
a minimum set of basic definitions and axioms from which 
the rest of the theorems of geometry might be deduced. 
The whole point of minimizing the set of axioms is aptly 
suggested by Professor E. A. Milne's description of the 
operation as one of "deepening the axiomatic level. "9 
Having prepared a simple list of initial axioms, the 
geometer needed to demonstrate that these axioms were in- 
ternally consistent. The set of axioms must similarly be 
tested to be certain that the axioms were primitive, i. e., 
that no two or more might depend upon some earlier axiom 
Livid Philosophers, 3, 34 -46. 
8. 1950 "New Books: Whitehead's Philosophy of Time. By 
William W. Hammerschmidt" Philosob , 25, 180. The 
emphasis on the importance of the memoir for an under- 
standing of Whitehead's later works was further ex- 
pressed by Dr. hays in a personal conference with him 
in Manchester on 27 May 1950. 
9. 1944 "On the Nature of Universal Gravitation" Monthly 
Notices of the Royal Astronomical Societe, 104, 127. 
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for their validity. This search for the most basic state- 
ment of the axioms led to an investigation of the funda- 
mental notions of logic, and to definitions of order and 
sequence of entities in certain arrangements. 
Early in 1890 Mr. A. B. Kempe presented his "On the 
Relation between the Logical Theory of Classes and the 
Geometrical Theory of Points 
10 wherein he introduced the 
notion of betweenness as a basic geometrical definition, 
an idea seconded in 1919 by Bertrand Russell.11 "Between- 
ness is a linear relation involving three distinct enti- 
ties chosen from an infinity of homogeneous entities. 
Kempe suggested the symbolic form ab'c to denote this re- 
lation, which might be read, "Entity c lies between entities 
a and b." For the purposes of this thesis, this definition 
is the significant contribution of his memoir. The distri- 
bution of these linear triads throughout the system was 
defined by a set of four laws and a law of continuity. 
An additional sixth law assured that no two linear triads 
might have two non- equivalent entities in common. This 
sixth law implied the consequence that no two straight 
lines might intersect in more than one point, and excluded. 
Riemannian geometry. Unfortunately, Mr. Kempe became in- 
10. Proceedinis of the London Mathematical Soçiety, 21, 
17- -182. 
11. Introduction to Mathematical Philosopher, 39. 
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valved with the case where a = b, and thereby diverted his 
attention from a more productive treatment of the subject. 
He suggested, however, that any geometrical interpretations 
might follow readily from his "Base System." 
Henri Foincaré's famous La Science et I'rothése 
(1901) introduced some statements over which controversy 
has raged. Geometrical axioms are only disguised defini- 
tions; they are not experimental facts. 
12 These axioms 
must deal with homogeneous points in space, as contrasted 
with a non -homogeneous visual space where the points in 
the retina do not all perform the same function.13 The 
issue of homogeneity later served as one of the main areas 
of dissention between the relativity writings of Whitehead 
and the orthodox Einsteinian relativists. 
In December of the same year D. H. Moore presented to 
the American Mathematical Society a memoir, "On the Projec- 
tive Axioms of Geometry, "14 in which he contended it would 
be more desirable to use a finite linear segment as a basal 
element than to use a line of infinite length.15 Such a 
procedure would imply a geometry founded upon spatial intu- 
ition rather than a set of axioms, and all its ensuing di- 
12. Page 66, 
13. Ibid., 69. 
14. 1901 Transactions of the American Mathematical Society, 
3, 142 -158. 
15. Ìbid., 144. 
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lemmas of apprehension. Apparently unwilling to attack 
the epistemological problems involved, Moore proceeded to 
offer (on the grounds of convenience) a set of seven pro- 
jective axioms regarding lines and planes of infinite ex- 
tension, At a later date, however, Whitehead attempted, 
in his "Method of Extensive Abstraction," to found his 
geometry on a more epistemologically satisfactory basis -- 
not a geometry of space, but of events. 
In 1902 the first English translation of Professor 
David Hilbert's Göttingen lectures on The Foundations of 
Geometry appeared, and formed the definitive reference 
system for the axioms of Euclidean geometry. Hilbert of- 
fered the complete Euclidean system based on six groups 
of axioms including respectively (1) seven axioms of con- 
nection, (2) five axioms of order, (3) the parallel axiom, 
(4) the Archimedean axiom of continuity, (5) six axioms of 
congruence, and (6) an axiom of completeness. Each axiom 
was demonstrated to be independent of every other axiom 
by presenting a class of entities different from the 
points, lines, and planes of Euclidean geometry which 
satisfied all but the axiom in question, and which viola- 
ted that axiom. 
Oswald Veblen's "A System of Axioms for Geometry" fol- 
7 
lowed in 1903,16 and developed Kempe's work on betweenness 
to the point where it Poresented a system of eleven axioms 
and an axiom of continuity sufficient to produce Euclidean 
geometry. Veblen admitted that the non -Euclidean spatial 
notions of Bolyai, L"obatchewsky, Veronese, and others were 
equally suitable codifications, -7 although Poincaré had 
dismissed the conjecture as being only a verbal argument, 
and had suggested that all geometries could be transformed 
inter se.18 It is from the system of twelve axioms offered 
by Veblen that Whitehead began his investigation. Veblen's 
axioms Presupposed a class of homogeneous points and a re- 
lation of linear order; the only other assumptions being 
the validity of the laws of logical operations and counting. 
Unfortunately, Veblen's system labored under the defect that 
it dealt with an infinitude of static points, making the 
transition from geometry to the physical science of a changing 
universe difficult. 
His treatment, however, indicated explicitly how the 
set of axioms might be altered to allow the possibility of 
non -Euclidean geometries. Using a technique similar to that 
of Hilbert, Veblen demonstrated each of the twelve axiom 
16. Transactions the American ,athematical Society, 5, 
343-3T4':' 
z- _ -.T 
17. Ibid., 343. 
18, Clt 66. 
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to be independent. If there be but one class of objects 
for which all the axioms hold, the system of axioms is 
called "categorical." A system wherein it is possible to 
add independent axioms is called "disjunctive." By omit- 
ting the parallel axiom, the Euclidean system becomes dis- 
junctive, and admits the possibility of Lobatchewskian 
(hyperbolic) geometry.19 Although Veblen did not indicate 
the full possible treatment of Riemannian geometry, the 
omission of the parallel axiom and one other20 would pro- 
duce a set of axioms harmonious with Riemann's elliptic 
geometry. 
For three years Bertrand Russell had been engaged in 
preparing his The Principles of Mathe a.tics,21 a volume 
rich in thought about the logical foundations of mathema- 
tics and its relation to the material world. The major 
contribution of Russell's investigations to "On Mathema- 
tical Concepts of the Material World" was the suggestion 
of a method for incorporating the idea of change with the 
static geometrical notions.22 Indeed, Whitehead directly 
borrowed this suggestion and offered it as "Concept II," 
in contrast with the static classical "Concept I" in his 
19. Veblen, 22. cit., 347. 
20. The axiom tba t a straight line can be infinitely ex- 
tended. 
21. Published in 1903. 
22. Russell, The Principles of Mathematics, 468 -469. 
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1905 memoir. For purposes of comparison with Whitehead's 
other "Concepts" and criticism, the exposition of the com- 
plete Concept II will be reserved until the second chapter 
of this discussion. 
The question of the treatment of physical change in 
mathematical terms was, indeed, one of the advances of 
Russell's book. Change, he pronounced, must always in- 
volve at least two distinct entities (such as the points 
of space) and a triadic relation between those two entities 
and some of the instants of time.23 The condition that 
matter cannot be either created or destroyed was expressed 
by the axiom that each particle of matter had the entire 
range of time- instants of a single time- series for its 
field. Thus, no particle of matter could have any segment 
in its life history when an instant of time was unrelated 
to it. The assumption that a single time- series is suffi- 
cient to describe the physical operation of the universe 
was not seriously challenged until the advent of the rela- 
tivity era. The necessity of the existence of alternative 
time -series in the advance of nature received persistent 
emphasis at the hands of Whitehead in all his cosmological 
writings after the 1905 memoir. 
23. Ibid., 469. 
10 
Russell was somewhat wary, however, of reiterating 
the dictum that no two material particles could occupy a 
single point at the same instant of time, and that one 
particle of matter cannot occupy two points of space at 
the same instant of time.24 Yet, with respect to his sug- 
gestion that later became Whitehead's Concept II, he was 
careful to insure the very impenetrability of :ratter of 
which he was previously wary.25 
With respect to the relation of betweenness, Russell 
then suggested that the current view26 embodied sufficient 
conditions. The answer to the question as to whether the 
conditions were necessary was not so evident. There is 
the possibility that betweenness may be only a relation 
involving difference of vectorial sense.27 Such a sugges- 
tion involves, however, an additional axiom relating dif- 
ference of sense to sequential operations, as well as the 
additional definition of "sense." Whit4head did not in- 
clude a consideration of this possibility in his 1905 mem- 
oir. 
24. Ibid., 467. 
25. mu., 468. 
26. 11-s c, efined by Russell, betweenness is a relation of 
one term, xr, to two others, x and z, which holds when- 
ever x has to y, and y has to z, some relation which 
does not have to x, nor z toy, nor z to x. 
27. Ibid., 207 -208. 
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Kempe's system had by this time reached Professor 
Josiah Royce, the. American mathematician and philosopher. 
Attracted by the possibilities of expanding Kempe's be- 
tweenness relation to include the logical treatment of 
classes both in geometry and the exact sciences, Royce 
presented in 1905 his "The Relation of the Principles of 
Logic to the Foundations of Geometry. "28 Given a system 
( ) of homogeneous entities, Royce proceeded to demon- 
strate how the axioms of geometry might follow from the 
notion of betweenness. However, even betweenness is a de- 
rived notion, insisted Royce (in contrast to Kempe), and 
depends upon a more primitive relation called the 0 -rela- 
tion. The 0- relation is a polyadic relation which would 
express the manner in which any set of exhaustive, but, in 
their entirety, inconsistent, choices would stand to each 
other. Geometry then becomes the anatomy of a set of as- 
sertions that certain entities do, and certain others do 
not, stand to each other in the 0- relation.29 This enlarged 
definition of geometry compares favorably with those sug- 
gested at later dates by Whitehead. Aside from deriving 
geometry from the notion of the triadic betweenness rela- 
28. Transactions of the American Mathematical Society, 6, 
573 4 15 
29. Ibid., 360. 
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tion, Royce's memoir diverges from that of Whitehead, who 
had received the American transactions only after his own 
memoir had been completed. 0- relations and E- relations30 
were considered; the betweenness relation was examined31; 
and. Royce then showed how Veblen's twelve axioms of Eu- 
clidean geometry might follow from his own postulated six 
principles governing the operation of 0- collections. 
Royce's memoir is open to criticism as not accounting for 
the phenomena of a changing universe, as were all the pre- 
vious treatments except that of Russell. Neither was the 
case of the null class considered. Royce's paper, too, 
suffered the fate of obscurity which befell "On Mathemati- 
cal Concepts of the Material World," 
At this level of development in the axiomatic treat- 
ment of geometry, Whitehead's 1905 memoir appeared. It 
was followed in quick succession by two short companion 
volumes in 1906 and 1907. The first, The Axioms of Pro - 
jective Geometry, enjoyed a translation into French of its 
first chapter32; it is in this volume33 that Whitehead de- 
fined geometry as "the science of cross -classification." 
30. E- relations are relations of entities which do not 
stand to each other in the 0- relation. 
31. Whereas Kempe used ab'c to mean that "c is between a 
and b," Royc e used F c I ab . `- 
32. 1907-"Introduction logique a la geometrie" Revue de 
Metaph signe et de Morale, 15, 34 -39. 
33. Page 5. 
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A second novelty of the volumes is the consideration of 
the subject -matter as divided into projective and descrip- 
tive geometries, although Russell had previously suggested 
it.34 Depending upon whether two coplanar lines necessar- 
ily intersect or not, the geometry is called projective or 
descriptive respectively. 
A further innovation of Whitehead in the period in- 
volved in the production of the two tracts on geometry and 
the 1905 memoir was the assertion of the definitional na- 
ture of congruence. It mist be assumed that Hans Reichen- 
bach overlooked this contribution of Whitehead. Recently 
he said, "That the comparison of distances is also a mat- 
ter of definition is known only to the expert of relativ- 
ity. This result can also be formulated as the defini- 
tional character of congruence. "35 In The Axioms of De- 
scriptive Geometry, Whitehead supported the argument that 
congruence can be mathematically defined.36 
When considered as a unit, the two volumes on geome- 
try may perhaps be thought of as the appendix promised for 
A Treatise on Universal Algebra37, but which never ap- 
34. The Principles of Mathematics, 374. 
35. 19 "The F-hiilosophicalf gS ficance of the Theory of 
Relativity" Albert Einstein: Philosopher- Scientist, 
The Libralr of L ing Philosop ers, 7, 294. 
36. Pages 44 -48. 
37. Page 32. 
14 
peared as such. 
Veblen's "A System of Axioms for Geometry" had mean- 
while attracted attention, and in 1909, A. R. Schweitzer 
proposed38 the substitution of a dyadic relation39 whose 
only usefulness was the elimination of the triangle trans- 
versal axiom. Schweitzer, however, realized that his sys- 
tem introduced an unnecessary complication in expressing 
the existence of a point order abc.40 His paper ends on a 
note that is, without question, true of the systems thus 
far proposed: "... it does not seem possible to convert 
definitionally one system of axioms into the other and to 
retain that elegance which is peculiar to each individual 
standpoint. x,41 
Once moré the question of the independence of the ax- 
ioms arose, and several treatments appeared with no novel- 
ties of importance for this thesis. 
38. "Note on a System of Axioms for Geometry" Transac- 
tions of the American Mathematical Societe; 309 - e
39. aíK7S. That is, at and 8 are in the same point -order 
as are ^ and $ . 
40. It became necessary to say (abclR(ab as "a,b, and c 
are mutually related." 
41. Ibid., 314. 
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Physical Concepts of the Material World 
By the close of the nineteenth century the classical 
mechanical concept of the material world had reached its 
full flower. The corpuscular nature of matter had been 
almost conclusively established; the corpuscular nature of 
energy was discovered by Planck in 1900. 
But within the classical concept there lay many un- 
solved problems. The exact nature of the material atom 
was still a natter of conjecture; its relation to the 
ether was the topic of much heated comment and apparent 
paradoxes. The discovery of radioactivity upset the stat- 
ic equilibrium of the classical concept and rendered more 
doubtful the questionable meaning of potential energy 
within that concept. Experimental results unexplainable 
except by ad hoc hypotheses dotted the researches of the 
physical sciences. The unification of the corpuscular and 
the undulatory theories of light was still anticipated. 
Furthermore, the best of the theoretical physicists were 
urging a more stable groundwork for physics; among these, 
the names of Poincaré, Mach, and Poynting centered promi- 
nently in the years around the turn of the century. 
Indeed, the haunting insinuation that physics needed 
a happier basis on which to found its researches infected 
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many of the more creative physicists of the period. Nev- 
ertheless, the solutions offered were always couched in 
variations of the classical concept. Acknowledging roin- 
care's criticism of the classical concept, an unsigned re- 
view in the Philosophical Ta a.zine42 suggested that per- 
haps Poincaré did not suggest a better alternative because 
of the impossibility of doing so. But Whitehead was pre- 
pared, in his "On Nathematical Concepts of the material 
'R)rld," not only to codify the classical concept, but to 
offer several provocative alternatives to that theory. 
The foundation of the mechanical theory of nature 
rested on the atomic hypothesis of matter and Descartes' 
mind -body dualism. Sir William Thomson (Lord Kelvin) sug- 
gested in 186743 that Helmholtz's discovery of the law of 
vortex motion in a perfect fluid led him to think that 
vortex rings immersed in the perfect fluid, ether, were 
the only true atoms. This vortex motion, the Wirbelbewe- 
gung, persists throughout the life history of the ring, 
and might serve as the repository for the unalterable dis- 
tinguishing properties of matter. The presence of these 
unalterable properties supplied the only reason for the 
42. 1904 "Review of La Science et 
ical Magazine, (6, 7, 310. 
43. 
'1 Vortex Atoms" Philosophical 
15 -24. 
l'Hypothse" Philosoph- 
Ia.gazir.e, ( 4) , 34, 
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"monstrous assumption of infinitely strong and infinitely 
rigid pieces of matter. "44 Kelvin's subsequent discovery45 
that the equations for the propagation of laminous dis- 
turbances in a vortex -sponge are the sane es the equations 
for the propagation of the light vibrations in the ether 
supported his theory. Indeed, the theory entertained a 
high degree of creditability for many years. The obvious 
difficulty of explaining how sensibly ponderous bodies 
might be derived from a rarely constituted ether did not 
distract the attention of many readers. Again, by assum- 
ing the properties of matter as qualities reposing in a 
substratum, Lord Kelvin implicitly subscribed to the Car- 
tesian dualism. Whitehead formulated this concept mathe- 
matically in his 1905 memoir, but rejected it as being an 
unsatisfactory solution on the grounds of what was later 
to be his "fallacy of simple location." At a later date, 
he would have accused the theory of being an instance of 
the "bifurcation of Nature." Had the spin of the electron 
been discovered at this juncture, it is highly possible 
that the course of physics would have been deflected to a 
more serious consideration of the vortex -ring theory of 
44. Ibid., 15. 
45. 1887 "On the Propagation of Laminar Motion through a 
turbulently moving Inviscid Liquid" Philosophical 
Ma azine, (5), 24, 342 -353. 
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matter as the basic solution to the problem. 
Nevertheless, the "monstrous" corpuscular atomic the- 
ory advanced. Weber' s 6 electronic theory of the electric 
current (as opposed to the fluid theory) was more amenable 
to precise scientific experimentation. By 1895 Sir Doug- 
las Galton was prepared to declare that "electricity is 
closely connected with the vibrations which cause heat and 
light ... -- vibrations which may be termed the voice of 
the Creator calling to each atom ... to fall into its or- 
dained position ... in the harmonious symphony which we 
call the universe. 
"47 
Of the more philosophically inclined physicists of 
this period, Professor Ernst Mach of the University of 
Prague was the one who perhaps most completely antici- 
pated the later thoughts of Whitehead in an explicit man- 
ner. That everything in the physical universe, at least, 
is inextricably interrelated, and that any abstraction 
from this cooperation of the parts in order to study any 
given section of them must later be revised by reference 
to the whole, was a central doctrine promulgated by Mach: 
46. Cf. E. T. Whittaker (knighted in 1945). 1910 A Histo- 
ry of the Theories of Aether and Electricity from thé 
Aze of Descartes to the Close of the Nineteenth Cen- 
tury, 228. 
47. 1895 "Inaugural Address by Sir Douglas Galton, K. C. B., 
D. C. L., F. R. S., President" Nature, 52, 466, col. 2. 
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"Science can accomplish nothing by the consideration of 
individual facts; from time to time it must cast its 
glance at the world as a whole. "48 That such an interpre- 
tation continues to be considered valid in the scientific 
world is illustrated by the appeal made to it by Professor 
E. Finlay -Freundlich in a recent letter.49 A further ex- 
tension made by Mach of the necessary interrelationships 
of the parts of nature might easily have been included in 
any of Whitehead's metaphysical writings from 1925 until 
his death: "We must not forget that all things in the 
world are connected with one another and depend on one an- 
other, and that we ourselves and all our thoughts are also 
a part of nature." 
50 
A declaration of a less fundamental metaphysical prin- 
ciple, although extremely important to his scientific the- 
ories was that "Absolute time is an idle metaphysical con - 
ception "51 and an abstraction from the real nature of things. 
Again, this assertion was explicitly supported by White- 
head in his writings after the 1905 memoir, although in 
that paper absolute time was implicitly accepted. As with 
48. 1889 Die Mechanik in Ihrer Entwickelung, 
references tó 'phis work refer to the sec 
The first edition appeared in 1883. 
49. Letter from Professor E. Finlay- Freundli 
Chor, dated 1950 August 28. 
50. Mach, 22, cit., 209. 
51. Ibid., 209: 
433. Page 
and edition. 
ch to the au- 
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the notion of an inextricable interrelatedness in nature, 
Whitehead does not recognize the similarity of his own 
views and those of Tach in these two respects. 
Experimental physics in 1898 received more evidence 
in support of the corpuscular theory of matter; in that 
ye=,r J. J. Thomson found a definite electrostatic charge 
associated with an ion produced by Röntgen rays passing 
through a gas.52 
Six years later the same investigator developed an 
amazingly comprehensive mathematical explanation of the 
motions of certain numbers of negatively electrified cor- 
puscles enclosed in a sphere of uniform positive electri- 
fication.53 These electrons he supposed to be located at 
equal angular intervals around the circumference of a cir- 
cle within the sphere. In the case of four electrons, 
there would be a steady state when those four electrons 
were at the corners of a square. In the case of six elec- 
trons, it would become necessary to have five electrons in 
a ring around the middle one. When the negative corpus- 
52. "On the Charge of Electricity carried by the Ions 
produced by Röntgen Rays" Philosohical r.;aga.zine, (5) , 
46, 528 -545. 
53. J. J. Thomson. 1904 "On the Structure of the Atom; 
an Investigation of the Stability and Periods of Os- 
cillation of a number of Corpuscles arranged at equal 
intervals around the Circumference of a Circle; with 
Application of the results to the Theory of Atomic 
Structure" Philosophical Magazine, (6), 7, 237 -265. 
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ties were not confined to one plane they would arrange 
themselves in a series of concentric shells. A comparison 
with the periodic table of chemical elements was effected, 
in which it was assumed that the atomic weight was the sum 
of the masses of the corpuscles contained in a given atom. 
Thomson's analysis had the further advantage of providing 
an explanation of radioactivity. When the angular veloc- 
ity of the negative corpuscles decreased to reach a criti- 
cal value, the system was no longer in equilibrium, and 
this might cause an ejection of a part of the atom, as in 
the case of radium. Since the inquiry was purely of a 
scientific nature, the metaphysical question of beginnings 
and endings in such a system was ignored. Furthermore, it 
would seem to be necessary to postulate a degenerative 
tendency on the part of nature; the appearance of new gal- 
axies would be difficult to explain. The discussion, how- 
ever, foreshadowed the postulation of the Rutherford atom 
in 1911, and represented a valuable scientific inquiry. 
In the following year, 1905, J. Traube suggested54 an 
alternative theory which subsequent research rejected. It 
was one in which the material atom had no need of positive 
or negative corpuscles, but whose chemical and electrical 
54. "On the Space occupied by Atoms: The Theories of Th. 
W. Richards and J. Traube" Philosophical Magazine, 
(6), 10, 340 -352. 
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action was a function of the degree and placement of the 
contraction of the entire atomic corpuscle. 
Frederick Soddy, reviewing "The Present Position_ of 
Radioactivity, "55 implicitly accepted the Thomson hypothe- 
sis it talking of "the case of an electron revolving in an 
orbit within an atom. "56 He emphasized, however, that it 
was not yet known whether the electron itself possessed 
gravitational mass. 
In the same year James H. Jeans offered a suggestion 
that the electron might be successfully interpreted by 
reference to the line- spectrum.57 Indeed, that suggestion 
was ultimately brought to fruition by Niels Bohr in 1913 
in connecting changes in the energy levels of the atoms 
with the spectrum of the respective elements. 
The question of the constitution of the ether and its 
relation to material corpuscles was the second of the 
fields of investigation indicated for the end of the nine- 
teenth century. In order to convey action from one mate- 
rial particle to a point in space it was deemed necessary 
to have an intervening medium as a vehicle; this was 
called the "ether." Michael Faraday in 1846 suggested58 
55. 1906 Nature, 73, 285 -286. 
56. Ibid., 285, col. 1. 
57. 19u6 "On the Constitution of the Atom" Philosophical 
twine, (6), 11, 605. 
58. "Thoughts on Ray- vibrations" Philosophical I1 azine, 
(3), 28, 348 -349. 
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that the conception of an ether may be a meaningless ab- 
straction. "I do not perceive," he wrote, "in any part of 
space, whether ... vacant or filled with matter, anything 
but forces and the lines in which they are extended.i59 
He indeed carried this opinion to the extent of making a 
material atom the field of force surrounding a point -cen- 
ter. This treatment of matter as, in a sense, vectorial 
in nature, and associated with the lines of force, proved 
to be a challenge to Whitehead, although be made no refer- 
ence to Faraday in the 1905 memoir. Faraday's suggestion, 
however, may easily have been the germinating influence on 
what proved to be the mainspring of Whitehead's cosmology. 
Given any material atom or event, and treating it as exer- 
ting a vectorial influence throughout the continuum in 
which it is located, that influence must necessarily inter- 
act with other similar influences from similar sources. 
The result would lead to a cosmology similar to that sug- 
gested earlier by Mach. Whitehead, moreover, avoided the 
difficulty which Faraday's thought introduced. For in a 
system such as Faraday's, how can the "stuffiness" of matter 
be explained? 
A well- defined vortex -sponge model of the ether was 
59. Ibid., 348. 
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offered by Professor W. F. Hicksó0 in 1895. In this model 
cubical elements of fluid, each having a rotational circu- 
lation of its own, constituted the medium. Hicks, however, 
acknowledged the difficulty in explaining gravitation in 
the use of such a medium.ó1 Such a model was also de- 
scribed in Whitehead's 1905 memoir, and dismissed in favor 
of one of his own formulation. 
Larmor, challenged by the desire to account for the 
apparent existence of positive and negative charges on 
matter, postulatedó2 many nuclei of intrinsic strain in 
the ether, known as "knots." Those knots twisted in one 
direction were positive; those in the other direction, 
negative. The temptation to draw a comparison of Larmor's 
"strains" with any interpretation placed on general rela- 
tivity must, however, be resisted. By postulating struc- 
tural differences within the ether, then, Larmor avoided 
the difficulty of a dualism between ponderous matter and 
60. 1895 "Opening Address by Prof. W. M. Hicks, M. A., 
D. Sc., P. R. S., President of the Section" Nature, 
52, 472 -477. 
61. Ibid., 476 -477. 
62. 189 "A Dynamical Theory of the Electric and Luminif- 
erous Medium -- Part I" Philoso hical Transactions of 
the Rol Society of London, Á, 1 5, I, 719 -822. 
1775-"A Dynamical Theory of the Electric and Luminif- 
erous Medium -- Part II" Philosophical Transactions 
of the Royal Societ of Lon on, A, ,W6-743. 
n9 "Á Dynamica T eory of t.6 Electric and Luminif- 
erous Medium -- Part III" Philosophical Transactions 
of the R1 Society of London, A, 1gÓ, - 00. 
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the ether, as did Lord Kelvin. SimileIrly, it encountered 
the same difficulty of explaining how matter, many times 
denser than the ether, might be satisfactorily explained 
in terms of the lighter substance. Furthermore, the 
"knots" explained only the presence of a dualism in the 
observed electrical phenomena associated with raptter. A 
much more complex structure of the knots would be neces- 
sary to account for other physical Qualities associated 
with material particles. Likewise, it appears that in 
such a cosmological system, there is a relevant metaphysi- 
cal criticism. The natural universe would need to be of a 
tightly restricted form; novelties in nature would be dif- 
ficult to explain. Such a universe would be a block uni- 
verse, with its physical laws initially determined. 
Mendeléeff pronounced his opinion upon the density of 
the troublesome entity, ether. Its substance must, he 
counseled,63 possess an atomic weight of less than 5.3 x 
10-11 in comparison with the standard of oxygen as 16.64 
Such a figure would be necessary in order that the ether 
63. 1904 "Prof. Mendeléeff on the Chemical Elements" Na- 
ture, 71, 65 -66. The authorship of the article is 
A 
unknown. In response to a letter suggesting a textu- 
al criticism, the author signed the acknowledgment 
only as "The Translator." (1904 December 1 Nature, 
71, 102. 
64. In the same paper, Mendeléeff postulated the exist- 
ence of two other elements prior to hydrogen in the 
periodic table he so brilliantly fathered. 
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might escape the attractive force of the stars. 
perceiving the strained connection between matter and 
ether, S. H. roynting, in his inaugural address to the 
Mathematical and rhysica.l Section of the British Associa- 
tion, 
65 
expressed the hope that some day we would succeed 
in attributing to ether the work of gravitation. In terms 
of a space -time manifold around material bodies, and not 
in terms of ether, Einstein accomplished such a theoretical 
relation in 1915. 
Sir Edmund Whittaker has concisely summarized the 
fate of the theories of the ether: 
However, most of the solid and liquid ae- 
thers of the nineteenth century had one feature 
which in the end proved fatal to them, namely, 
they were constituted of identifiable structural 
elements whose position could be traced from mo- 
ment to moment, so that the phrase 'velocity 
relFtive to the aether' had a meaning, and con- 
sequently they were bound up with the principle 
that it is possible to define absolute velocity 
in space. With the advent of the theory of rel- 
ativity in 1905, this principle was seen to be 
erroneous, and the sea ;ph for a quasi -material 
aether came to an end. 
The discovery of radioactivity at the end of the 
nineteenth century posed another problem for the classical 
physicists. Rutherford in 1899 demonstrated67 that there 
65. 1899 Nature, 60, 472, col. 2. 
66. 1949 From Euclid to Eddington: A Study of Conceptions 
of the External Worl7, 96. 
67. "Urn um Radiation and the Electrical Conduction pro- 
duced by it" Philosophical mlagazine, (5), 47, 109 -163. 
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were two types of rays emitted by uranium; an x- radiation, 
which is readily absorbed; and a /3- radiation, which has 
great penetrating; powers. Becquerel subsequently associa- 
ted68 the 16- radiation with the discharge from a cathode- 
ray tube, and within a short time the o(-radiations were 
identified with a charged helium atom. 
Once again, Whitehead had prepared a concept of the 
material world which would admit of an interpretation of 
radioactivity, but the simultaneous publications of Ein- 
stein completely overshadowed Whitehead's contribution. 
Potential energy is again a concept not readily woven 
into the classical mechanical treatment of nature. Points 
of space and instants of time cannot furnish a suitable 
frame of reference for that sort of physical quantity. 
Poynting expressed69 a second hope that all the apparently 
distinct forms of energy (kinetic, potential, heat, light, 
chemical, etc.) might some day be satisfactorily related. 
"On Mathematical Concepts of the Material World," in 
the opinion of this thesis, supplied the raw material for 
attacking each of these problems. Whitehead himself in- 
spected the questions of the atomic nature of matter and 
its possible relation to any ether which might exist. For 
68. 1901 "Sur la radio -activité secondaire" Comptes Rén- 
dus, 132, 7.4 -739. 
69. Poynting, E. cit., 471, col. 2. 
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Whitehead, the notion of the existence of an ether at all 
was distasteful. Implicit within his system are potenti- 
alities for dealing with the other difficulties in the co- 
herence of the physical theories, The implications of in- 
troducing additional definitions to account for these phe- 
nomena will be discussed in the second chapter of this 
thesis. 
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Fhilosophical Concepts of the Material World 
Philosophical activity in the decade prior to "On 
T,?athematical Concepts of the Material World" exhibited the 
advantages to be gained by any metaphysics which was will- 
ing to accept the increased authority of the natural sci- 
ences, and to gather their fruitful researches under its 
wings. The receptive fortresses of the various realistic 
schools were preparing forces with every scientific dis- 
covery to deal a staggering blow to cumbersome idealisms, 
and, by popular connotation, to all idealisms. Indeed, 
each bit of progress in understanding the material world 
seemed to give an implicit boost to those who felt that 
all metaphysical speculation was, by its very nature, a 
time- beguiling exercise especially adapted to an evening 
of armchair pastimes. Those years had a share of the 
philosophers who, curious though uninitiated in the scien- 
tific disciplines, drew righteous scorn from the initiated. 
But, however threatening in appearance to philosophical 
thinking scientific inquiry seemed, it was beginning to 
bear promise of assistance in giving insight into some of 
the paradoxes of its mother, philosophy. Moreover, it ap- 
peared that a thorough housecleaning in the philosophy of 
science was in order. Thus, these years were the beginning 
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of the era, not yet finished, when both scientific theory 
and metaphysics were peculiarly prepared to derive tremen- 
dous benefit from a cooperative enterprise in the area of 
cosmology. 
Trobably the first philosophical inquiry of signifi- 
cance in this period was 7. H. Bradley's A22e.9.rance and 
P.ealii;,70 The importance of thin work lay, in the opin- 
ion of the present writer, not so much in the substantial 
positive contributions its pages contained, as in the fact 
that it precipitated a healthy discussion of the issues it 
involved, thereby accomplishing the author's avowed pur- 
pose. Adopting as his criterion of truth or reality the 
existence of non -contradictory experiences ,71 Mr. Bradley 
could indeed brand as "appearance," and not "reality," the 
phenomena of space, time, and even the "self." His two - 
edged sword of attack on space was used with equal dili- 
gence on the remainder of the "appearances" of our sense 
experience. Space cannot, he argued, be only a relation. 
Its parts are not relations, but extensive bits. The ge- 
ometry of a triangle, for instance, describes a precise, 
observable area; its angles describe an identifiable quan- 
tity, the aperture between the including sides of the fig- 
70. The first edition appeared 
lowed in 1897. 
71. A earance and Reality, 136 
work throughout this thesis 
ti on. 
in 1893; the second fol- 
. Page references to this 
will be to the second edi- 
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ure. But, on the other hand, space can be nothing but a 
description of relations. For the very angles of the sane 
triangle merely express the rel- tionship between the in- 
cluding sides of any given angle; its area is nothing more 
than a function of the degree of translation of any two 
angles (another relation). And the triangle itself is no 
more than the relation between three non -collinear points. 
Hence the phenomena of space had been weighed against the 
feather of truth and found wanting. 
Mr. F. C. S. Schiller, in explicitly attacking this 
technique of reduction 72 practiced by the "greatest of 
English sceptics, "73 asserted that apparent inconsistency 
in observed phenomena by no means branded those phenomena 
to the death of ultimate non -existence. Schiller offered 
as the preferable alternative starting with "harmony" as 
the criterion of truth.74 
It may, of course, be argued that in adopting such a 
criterion we _nry be violating the ultimate laws of the op- 
eration of nature, and thereby sentencing those harmonious 
speculations to final invalidity. Nature may be more or 
less a series of partly coherent and partly incoherent oc- 
72. 1903 "On Preserving Appearances" Mind, new series, 12, 
341-354. 
Ibid., 341. 
74. 'via., 344. 
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currences. The antithesis between coherence and incoher- 
ence has been hotly supported on both sides, with little 
success in the conversion of either side of the antago- 
nists. The argument revolves around the validity of the 
opponent's criterion of truth, and final judgment in favor 
of either is wisely suspended. The advocates of coherence, 
however, generally emerge slightly better from such an ar- 
gument, inasmuch as a stream of coherence usually is ini- 
tially assumed by the advocates of incoherence. 
Yet, to return to Mr. Bradley, an honest effort was 
made to reconstruct a meaningful account of human experi- 
ence in terms of a network of internal relations within 
an Absolute. Treading close, however, upon the very 
ground he had previously condemned, Bradley asserted that 
"reality must own and cannot be less than appearance. "75 
If the real have a character at all, it must be of such a 
nature as harmoniously to include everything phenomenal. 
Thus, Bradley introduced at this juncture the criterion of 
truth which Schiller had proposed. This harmony, with 
Bradley, must be effected through the Absolute, but this 
concordant structure is synthesized by "something beyond 
relations. "76 Such a harmony is not to be known directly 
75. Bradley, op. cit., 135. 
76. Ibid. , 214. --- 
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through mystical experience; that possibility had been 
slaughtered implicitly in the treatment of appearance.77 
It is likewise apparent that any of the usual categories 
of human thought are not applicable. To this attempted 
reconstruction, Schiller admonished, "The reality we have 
severed from its appearances we can never regain. "78 
What, then, could have been the cosmology implicit in 
A pearance and Realitzr? In what manner can the operations 
of nature proceed? The physical world itself, as a confu- 
sion of qualities and their relations, is mere appearance. 
And yet, it sees a scheme not brusquely discarded; it is 
"a necessary way of happening among our appearances. "79 
The distinctive essence of nature lies in its inde- 
pendence of the feelings and volitions of sely es.80 Here 
Bradley differed from hach. Yet, Bradley followed by in- 
sisting that outside of finite personal experience there 
is indeed no natural world at all,81 and "the addition of 
secondary qualities [to natural entities) ... in making 
Nature more concrete thereby makes it more real. "82 
Bradley's suggested approach for interpretation lay 
77. Ibid., 109. 
78. Schiller, 21. cit., 347. 
79. Bradley, 22. cit., 266. 
80. Ibid., 268. 
81. Ibid., 279. 
82. Ibzd. , 493. 
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in the distinction of varying degrees of truth and reality. 
No matter what the judgment, it enjoys only a certain de- 
gree of validity -- an assertion dangerous to the very 
foundations of his own dialectic, and yet one favored by 
Hegel. Bertrand Russell has suggested that even John 
Dewey (perhaps unconsciously) assumes the validity of the 
doctrine of degrees of truth and reality.83 The manner of 
attributing greater and lesser degrees of reality to phe- 
nomena rests completely on the crumbled renains of his ap- 
pearance. "Other things being equal, whatever spreads 
more widely in space, or 1-sts longer in time, is there- 
fore more real. "84 The laws of mathematics mist also be 
less true, since they are more abstract and consequently 
more removed from concrete reality. 
If a complete philosophy of world order were to be 
constructed on this scanty metaphysical groundwork, it 
would be that of postulating a universe of appearance a- 
gainst the background of the Absolute, the only wholly 
"real" standard by which judgments can be made. Relations 
within this system would then be of an internal kind, and 
there would be an emphasis upon "feeling" as a clue to 
their understanding. In respect to the emphasis upon 
83. 1946 A Histvry of Western Philosophy, 851-852. 
84. Bra.dl-e-y, 22. cit., 370. 
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feeling, 1lhitehead agreed with Bradley, although there was 
considerable divergence elsewhere. 
The world of "spirit" alone seems the only key to the 
solution of Bradley's enigma. Spirit is that quality or 
being most directly removed from lifeless nature. "Out- 
side of spirit there is not, and there cannot be, any re- 
ality, and, the more that anything is spiritual, so much 
the more is it veritably real. "85 
It is difficult to decide into exactly what philo- 
sophical category Bradley could be placed as a result of 
A tearánc,e and Reality. Materialism. is explicitly exclud- 
ed as a possibility. In the sense that realism may be de- 
noted by postulating the independent existence of entities 
other than the human. mind, Bradley is certainly that. 
Scepticism, although suggested by Schiller, seems to grant 
him hardly a fair trial. Although apparently all the usual 
paths of knowing something about the universe were closed, 
the very expression of a faith that there was some truth 
in human judgment in approximating reality excludes the 
sceptic's brand. The spirit of many of his statements, as 
exemplified in the preceding paragraph, tend definitely 
toward idealism. Bradley himself realized the difficulty 
of assigning any definite appraisal of his system in tern 
85. Ibid., 552. 
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of traditional schools of thought. His second engagement 
(with "Reality ") was definitely both in the direction and 
spirit of absolute idealism. 
Appearance and reality was closely followed by the 
Gifford Lectures delivered by Dr. Alexander Campbell Fra- 
ser in 1894 -1896. The series of lectures was designed to 
demonstrate the relative merits of theistic idealism as 
contrasted with pantheism, "panegoism," and especially ma- 
terialism. Dr. Fraser attempteü to demonstrate that the 
natural sciences could be more satisfactorily explained in 
the metaphysical framework of theistic idealism, or as he 
called it, "theism." The extent of the demonstration ap- 
parently consisted of (1) denying the possibility that 
conscious intelligence can be completely described in 
terms of material molecules or any other materialistic 
yardstick, and (2) suggesting that, on the other hand, a 
spiritual interpretation of all natural causative processes 
is as valid as any materialistic one. Actually a much 
stronger case for theism could have been constructed. 
The entire series of lectures was infused with the 
idea that the "basis of human life is surely found in the 
faith that the ever -evolving universe is charged with 
meaning and purpose. "86 The purpose, of course, was given 
86. Fraser. Philosophy of Theism, 1, 242. 
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meaning through its connection with God. 
The reasoning was in the typical theistic fashion: 
simple in style, moral in inclination, and buttressed by 
faith in God and His plan. Unfortunately, the theistic 
philosophers had still failed to produce a cosmology sat- 
isfactorily explaining the non - ideal portions of the uni- 
verse. 
In 1899 Professor Josiah Royce, the American mathema- 
tician and philosopher, whose work on the axioms of geome- 
try has already been discussed,87 was invited to offer a 
two -year series of the Gifford Lectures. Royce had been 
productive for some years in philosophy, and his position 
as a prominent absolute idealist was well established. 
For the purposes of his 1899 -1900 investigation, the 
relation of idea to external Being, Royce divided the 
philosophical field of investigation into four well- defined 
categories called respectively, realism, mysticism, criti- 
cal rationalism, and idealism. Realism was here defined 
as the philosophical tradition that held that there was a 
fundamental divergence between idea and physical experi- 
ence. More particularly, the essence of realism was the 
insistence of greater or lesser degrees of independence 
between idea and the experience to which it referred. The 
87. Pages 11 -12 of this thesis. 
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greater the emphasis on the independent existence of the 
two realms, the more decidedly realistic the doctrine. 
Mysticism was interpreted in the usual manner by :Waking 
direct spiritual experience the criterion of truth. Crit- 
ical rationalism is the name Royce applied to the school 
which suggested impersonal truths, such as energy, evolu- 
tion, or the unconscious, as the explanation of reality. 
Ordinarily such a tradition could be included as a realist 
one, but for Royce it diverged from realism in that here 
the idea of external experience was intimately interrelated 
with the source of the experience itself. The fourth al- 
ternative was that of idealism, here treated as absolute 
idealism, and was a definitive formulation of the usual 
absolutist doctrines. 
Attacking realism on the grounds that any independ- 
ence of idea and its associated experience would eventually 
imply the total independence ofthe objects themselves, 
Royce insisted that such a standpoint was totally contrary 
to the facts of ordinary experience. "I distinctly de- 
cline to admit," he challenged, "that, in our concrete ex- 
perience you can ever show me any two physically real ob- 
jects which are so independent of each other that no 
change in one of them need correspond to any change of the 
other. "88 All things are inextricably interrelated by 
88. Royce. The World and the Individual, 1, 125. 
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space, time, physical connections, and moral predicates. 
Total independence of objects in the external world would 
imply totally external relations and the postulation of an 
infinite series of intermediate external relations between 
any two relata, which even then could only at best roughly 
aL- proximate the true relation between them. 
William P. Montague replied to this criticism of re- 
alism89 by drawing attention to the fact that no realist 
would admit that the hyper -independence which Royce at- 
tacked actually exists. The independence of the realist, 
he insisted, was not what makes an object real, but is on- 
ly the means whereby our attention is drawn to its reality. 
Furthermore, this small amount of independence would by no 
means implicitly require totally external relations. Ap- 
parently Montague has found the real difficulty with 
Royce's argument against realism -- an improper appraisal 
of his adversary's actual assertions. It is for the very 
reasons which Royce has given that the realists do not in- 
habit that extreme position which lies beyond realism. 
Critical rationalism, whose spiritual _fatherhood 
Royce ascribed to Immanuel Kant,90 was described as the 
ontological interpretation which was current in the nine- 
teenth century, a period described as philosophically bar- 
89. 1902 "Professor Royce's Refutation of Realism" The 
Philosophical Review, 11, 43 -55. 
90. Royce. 2e. cit. 5.-- 
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ren by Professor Ritchie.91 One of the few technical sci- 
entific speculations Professor Royce discussed soon bore 
fruit opposite to that which he had prédicted: only the 
following year Planck established the corpuscular nature 
of energy.92 With respect to the relations between pure 
mathematics and physics, Royce declared their logical in- 
dependence early in the lectures.93 Such a statement was 
not only alien to the decision of Poincaré, who maintained 
that without material bodies in nature there would be no 
geometry,94 but also to the final conclusion of Whitehead's 
"On Mathematical Concepts of the Material World." 
In developing his own system of absolute idealism, 
Royce admitted, with the mystics, that whatever is must 
somehow be One. The mystical conception, however, fails 
to express sensed physical reality sufficiently well, and 
so absolute idealism must be tested for adequacy. 
Whatever is real must as such, Royce maintained, be 
the complete individual embodiment of the internal meaning 
91. 1950 November 14. Lecture to Senior Honours students, 
Edinburgh University. 
92. Royce had declared, op. cit., 241: "But nobody of any 
authority, I suppose, is yet prepared to maintain in 
any decisive way that the energy of the physical 
world consists of a collection of ultimate individual 
units or bits of energy, which retain their individu- 
al identity, and as individuals transfer themselves 
from one part of matter to another." 
93. Ibid., 9. 
94. La Science et l'Hytothése, 80. 
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of finite ideas. These complete embodiments may be known, 
not only by our own finite consciousnesses at any given 
moment, but constantly by a consciousness inclusive of our 
own, that of the Absolute. Thus the fundamental structure 
of the entire universe must be both teleological and con- 
scious. 
Such a system of absolute idealism, although firmly 
knit, must still be subject to the powerful counter- charge 
that it relegates to the Absolute, and hence to a region 
imperfectly known to finite conscious selves, an interac- 
tion between mind and body which is apparently dualistic. 
Further, it accounts for the seemingly independent exist- 
ences of finite human souls in a remote manner. Further 
yet, the necessity for considering the material universe 
to be conscious had not been proved, but only postulated. 
One of the technical problems precipitated anew by 
the scientific law of the conservation of energy was that 
of the interaction between mind and body. At this stage 
of its development, the relation of the mind -body problem 
to cosmology was extremely restricted. Whitehead's later 
works, however, attempted to solve the problem as a logi- 
cal consequence of the cosmology postulated. 
It appeared that, in order not to violate this con - 
servation of energy principle, a direct interaction be- 
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tween a substantially contrasted mind and body would be 
impossible. Leon M. Solomons95 followed by Frank Thilly96 
held that interactionism was indeed possible without vio- 
lating scientific principles. Some interactionists argued 
that there might well be a mental energy analogous to 
physical energy, and that the principle of the conservation 
of energy would then extend over a psycho -physical world 
as easily as over an exclusively physical realm. Other 
interactionists, such as Rehmke and Wentscher, held that 
extra- physical causes might be construed as releasing an 
undetected potential energy in the physical world.97 
Thilly himself was of the opinion that the physicists 
should be taken at their word in defining the principle to 
be valid in the material universe, and not extended with- 
out experimental evidence to the mental realm. 
But the obvious alternative of parallelism was no 
more attractive. If mental processes be assumed to oper- 
ate independently of physical processes, there is the ne- 
cessity for accounting for the empirical evidence provid- 
ing a positive correlation between the two. An attempt to 
95. 1899 "The Alleged Proof of Parallelism from the Con- 
servation of Energy" The Philosophical Review, 8, 
146 -165. 
96. 1901 "The Theory of Interaction" The Philosophical 
Review, 10, 124 -138. 
97. Ibid., 129. 
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codify this correlation by using the total external stimu- 
lus and the least sensible difference as logarithmically 
related elements was inaugurated by Weber and improved up- 
on by Fechner. This has been denominated the Weber- Fechner 
Law in psychophysics. 
Professor Ritchie, reviewing the value of the Weber - 
Fechner Law for the British Association in 1949, pointed 
to the fact that the law "states the relation between two 
physical quantities, namely total stimulus and least dis- 
tinguishable increment of stimulus; the 'psycho' part is 
assumed to be parallel, not found to be so. "98 
Robert Arnold conceived the solution of the mind -body 
problem in a new light, namely, that certain parts of the 
brain must act as external to mind.99 Such a solution, 
however, merely transferred the problem to another area 
and in no way offered a clue to resolving the difficulty. 
Whitehead himself later implicitly acknowledged the 
interactionist hypothesis to be the better, and the cen- 
tral problem of explaining how the interaction occurs was 
a direct consequence of his cosmology. The mind -body 
problem was ignored in the 1905 memoir, however. 
98. 1950 "The Relation of Body and Mind: Symposium; The 
Relation of Brain to Mind" The Advancement of Science, 
7, 50. 
99. 1904 Scientific Fact and Metaphysical Reality, 168. 
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The traditional cosmological problem of the nature of 
time had begun to assume a new importance in philosophy, 
and this was accelerated with the advent of relativity the- 
ory. The status of time in relativistic cosmology will, 
however, be postponed to a later chapter. 
Walter Smith, in speaking of "The Metaphysics of 
Time"100 in 1902, emphasized the Bradleian doctrine of de- 
grees of reality with respect to time: the present is real, 
the past and the future are unreal. Yet the time- concept 
embraces the idea of change as its most distinctive char- 
acter. The outstanding aspect of Smith's treatment is the 
attributing of a spatial character to time; when a succes- 
sion of events is thought of, they are arranged in a spa- 
tial order. This confused manner of thinking about time 
was not original with Smith, and was a favorite assertion 
with Bergson. The second notable aspect of Smith's treat- 
ment is that a given individual at one instant becomes an- 
other distinct individual at a later instant. In a sense, 
this became a statement about Whitehead's actual entities, 
but the statement must not be taken too literally. For 
Whitehead there was a new actual entity, but something of 
the antecedent entity was preserved in the new one. For 
Smith it was only in an absolute consciousness that these 
100. 1902 The Philosophical Review, 11, 372 -391. 
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various individual- instants coexist and are interrelated,101 
The question of the continuity of a given individual from 
instant to instant was by no means satisfactorily consid- 
ered. 
The following year Smith reiterated the Kantian no- 
tion of the subjectivity of space,102 and further asserted 
its evolution.103 Such an evolution is exemplified in the 
increasing natural perfection of the visual sense, and in 
the increasing refinement of abstract ideas. 
Bertrand Russell had also investigated the idea of 
spatial arrangement,104 and formulated both the absolute 
and relational theories. Time, on the other hand, must be 
of an absolute nature, and can be represented by a single 
one -dimensional series of instants.105 At a later date, 
Russell had been influenced by Whitehead to abandon not 
only instants of time as ultimate, but points of space and 
particles of matter as well, and to substitute for them 
logical constructions composed of events.l06 It is in- 
deed doubtful, as William James has suggested, whether an- 
101. Ibid., 387. 
102. 1903 "The Idea of Space" The Philosophical Review, 
12, 493 -510. 
103. Ìbid., 499. 
104. 1901 "Is Position in Time and Space Absolute or Rel- 
ative?" Mind, new series, lu, 293 -317. 
105. Russell, The Principles of Mathematics, 468. 
106. 1937 The rrinçipies of Mahematfcs, second edition, 
xi. 
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thing such as an instant of time is a component of direct 
human experience. 
In France, Henri Bergson had been, for over a decade, 
introducing a type of philosophy known as a "process" phi- 
losophy, destined to gather greater momentum in his later 
writings and to attract a wide circle of adherents. The 
Revue de Yetaphysique et de Morale of 1903 bore an article 
by M. Bergson107 which codified his metaphysical back- 
ground of this new philosophy. The dependence of this ar- 
ticle upon Natiere et Memoire and the Essai sur les Don - 
nees Immediates de la Conscience is apparent. The duty of 
metaphysics, thus conceived, was to demonstrate the nature 
of reality as it might be known, not through intellectual 
analysis, but through a direct intuition regarding its 
composition. As an example, the one reality directly 
known to us is that of our own personality flowing contin- 
uously through temporal durations. Bergson held that an 
intellectual analysis of this reality would fail to de- 
scribe it adequately. 
Instantaneous position in space is a mental abstrac- 
tion; a moving body is never really in any one of the 
points along its path. The most that can be said is that 
107. "Introduction a la Metaphysique" Revue de Metaphy- 
sique et de Morale, 11, 1 -36. 
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the body passes through them. 
All reality can be characterized by one predicate: it 
is constantly changing. Indeed, the inner life of a human 
being progresses according to a unity of direction. It is 
because of the similarity of this metaphysical character 
of reality with Bergson to that of the philosophy of or- 
ganism of Whitehead that only a passing summary of Bergson's 
cosmology is given in this chapter. A fuller discussion 
will appear in Chapter VII. 
Bergson's metaphysical system was one of those not 
investigated implicitly by Whitehead's "On Mathematical 
Concepts of the Material World." Curiously enough, White- 
head himself was to develop his later philosophy into one 
which had many points of similarity with that of Bergson. 
How such a cosmology developed in Whitehead will be discussed 
in later chapters. 
Robert B. Arnold, in an attempt to effect a liaison 
between science and idealistic metaphysics, emphasized not 
a dual nature of the universe, but a triple one, composed 
of matter, ether, and mind.108 The ether was conceived to 
represent an existent necessary background for individual 
material entities. The two, however, because of their 
close relationship, might be considered as of a single na- 
108. 1904 Scientific Pact and Metaphysical Reality, 235- 
261. 
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ture for purposes of contrast with mind.109 Nature itself 
was "atomically active, "110 but in its material aspect did 
not engage in a teleologically unified process. 
Thus, in 1905, mathematics was well prepared to re- 
ceive a precise statement of the direct relations of its 
own pure discipline to that of physics. Physics, having 
developed the classical theory to its mature embodiment, 
had observed phenomena unexplained within the framework of 
that theory. These phenomena, as well as some internal 
paradoxes in the classical system, made it evident that 
further sizeable advances might follow a more inclusive 
theoretical statement of cosmology. Philosophy had been 
repeating its age -old metaphysical battles, sometimes in- 
corporating, many times omitting (for science had become 
highly specialized), the suggestions of natural science. 
A cosmological scheme satisfactorily explaining these sci- 
entific suggestions could well have changed the growth of 
both natural science and philosophy for ages to come. 
Whitehead's "On Mathematical Concepts of the Material 
World," although. it promised these improvements, failed to 
produce any of these. 
109. Ibid., 252. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
"ON MATHEMATICAL CONCEPTS OF THE 1`2ATERIAL WORLD" 
Whitehead's "On Mathematical Concepts of the Material 
World" was submitted to the Royal Society of London, and 
was an essay in cosmology in so far as it defined certain 
relationships among certain postulated entitiew in an at- 
tempt to explain the operation of natural phenomena. Al- 
though the author explicitly asserted that the interest of 
the paper was primarily logical,1 here equated with mathe- 
matical, he exhibited certain cosmological preferences 
which later were to develop into significant portions of 
his philosophy. Special techniques in the analysis of 
physical laws and mathematical relations exhibited in this 
memoir later became the salient features of his mature 
cosmology. Both Sir Edmund Whittaker2 and Dr. Victor 
1. Alfred North Whitehead. 1906 "On Mathematical Con- 
cepts of the Material World" Philosophical Transac- 
tions of the Royal Societ of on A, 205, 465. 
For ease of reference- , his memoir will hereafter be 
designated MCEW in footnotes. 
2. Sir Edmund T. Whittaker, 1948 "Alfred North White- 
head" Obituary Notices of Fellows of the Royal Socie- 
ty, 6, 281 -296. This p5 nt Yìa.s been si.sf t77-em- 
phasized in supervisory conferences by Sir Edmund 
Whittaker throughout the preparation of this thesis. 
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Lowe` have emphasized the indispensability of the 1905 
memoir to an understanding of Whitehead's later writings. 
It will be a major assertion of this thesis that not 
only is a knowledge of "On Mathematical Concepts of the 
Material World" indispensable to a satisfactory under- 
standing of the cosmology of Whitehead, but that it is an 
ancestor in a direct line of the relativity writings of 
Whitehead and of Process and Reality. There have been ap- 
parently no publications giving a thorough consideration 
to this important assertion, and Sir Edmund Whittaker, 
Dr. Victor Lowe, and Dr. W. iays have been the only per- 
sons of whom this author is aware who have realized the 
importance of the 1905 memoir. Because this thesis is be- 
ing developed chronologically, the major part of the docu- 
mentation of the assertion will occur in Chapters vQ VI ; 
VIII, IX, and X. This chapter will be devoted to an expo- 
sition of the memoir, an indication of the parts which will 
assume later importance, and an assessment of the value of 
"On Mathematical Concepts of the Material World." 
If, Whitehead suggested, physical science in the fu- 
i,ure might be governed by a unified principle more inclu- 
3. 1941 "The Development of Whitehead's Philosophy" The 
Philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead, The Library or 
Living Philosophers, 77-T5477-- 
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sive than that which at that time was prevalent, the mem- 
oir might have added direct bearing on physical researches. 
It is the opinion of this thesis that the direct applica- 
bility of the precise findings of the memoir has passed the 
time of its potential usefulness. However, it is asserted 
that the method of "On Mathematical Concepts or the Mate - 
rial World" is highly pertinent to physics and to philoso- 
phy of the present and the immediate future. It is also 
suggested that the memoir could be profitably studied by 
both physicists and philosophers as a methodological model 
for their own speculations. More especially, inasmuch as 
it is asserted. that the memoir is indispensable to a full 
understanding of Whitehead's later works, it still has a 
pertinent message by way of providing increased under- 
standing of Whitehead's final philosophy. In short, it is 
suggested that "On Mathematical Concepts of the Material 
World" has suffered a totally unwarranted obscurity. 
The 1905 memoir was devoted to an extended considera- 
tion of seven ways of interpreting the material universe. 
The last of these seven provea to be so rich in sugges- 
tions that the interpretation developed was only an out- 
line of one possible case. The difficulties of expanding 
the possibilities lay in the correct choice or definitions 
regarding physical properties associated with elementary 
components of the physical world, and science had not yet 
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provided suitable raw material for application to the con- 
cept. 
One of the primary reasons for the failure of the 
memoir was the relative obscurity of a systematic notation 
for logical processes of thought. The first volume of 
Trincipia Mathematica was not to appear for several years,4 
and the reading of series upon series of unfamiliar sym- 
bols discouraged many who would be best qualified to sug- 
gest further developments to the cosmology. For "On Math- 
ematical Concepts of the Material World" was developed 
primarily in terms of the symbolism introduced by reano 
and improved by Whitehead and Bertrand Russell. The bulk 
of the clear text exposition is little more than an approx- 
imate transfer into verbal statements of the more precise 
findings or the symbolic statements. 
For ease of transformation of statements and direct 
reading of those statements, the Whitehead symbolism was 
far superior to any used by Kempe, Moore, Veblen, or 
Royce. Veblen's statement of the relation of "between- 
ness" approximated hitehead's codification,5 but was not 
developed beyond that simple statement. 
4. Volume I appeared in 1910. 
5. Where Veblen used `abc) to express the relation "a, b, 
and c are in that linear order," Whitehead emphasizes 
the relational aspect by using R ;(abc). 
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The paper considers a set of entities, homogeneous in 
nature, although not explicitly delineated as such; both 
Nempe and Royce have underscored the necessity for this 
presupposition of homogeneity. In later writings on rela- 
tivity themes, Whitehead repeatedly emphasized the neces- 
sity of spatio- temporal homogeneity for a rational cosmol- 
ogy. These entities need not be the points of Euclidean 
space, nor the material particles of classical physics. 
Indeed, in later chapters several alternative entities not 
considered by Whitehead, will be suggested as appropriate 
candidates. When, however, the entities consist of the 
points of Euclidean space, the problem receives its sim- 
plest form. Whitehead ignored a treatment using number 
sets as entities, although had he proved the independence 
of his axioms, would certainly have been forced to do so, 
as did Veblen, for example. Instead, Whitehead found the 
use of infinitely long rectilinear extensions the most 
fruitful for cosmology. 
These homogeneous entities form the "field" of a cer- 
tain polyadic (not necessarily triadic) relation called 
"R." Indeed, the classical treatment requires that R be 
triadic for an- expression of betweenness, but cases were 
developed by Whitehead where the terms of the relation R 
numbered four and five. 
Respecting the logical implications of these rela- 
60 
tions, certain axioms can be formulated. The problem of 
the memoir is, "Given a set of entities which form the 
field of a certain polyaic ... relation R, what 'axioms' 
satisfied by R have as their consequence, that the theo- 
rems of Euclidean geometry are the expression of certain 
properties of the field of R ? "6 
It is the suggestion of this thesis that the basic 
problems of cosmology can be expressed in words highly 
similar to this explicit problem of Whitehead: Given a set 
of entities which form the fields of certain polyadic re- 
lations R, what axioms satisfied by R have as their conse- 
quence, that the postulated physical relationships are the 
expression of certain properties of the field of R? De- 
rivatively, What is the nature of the entities, and What 
is the nature of R? also become intensely important to 
cosmological research. This formulation, of course, pre- 
supposes that an axiomatic, as contrasted with an induc- 
tive, procedure is being used. Throughout his writings, 
Whitehead showed a preference for the axiomatic method, 
and documented the results of that method with the indica- 
tions suggested by induction. The appraisal of the rela- 
tive merits of the inductive and axiomatic methods will be 
made in later pages of this thesis. 
Throughout Whitehead's memoir only three -dimensional 
6. PICNIrt , 465. 
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Euclidean space is considered; but non- Euclidean geometry, 
a favorite study of Whitehead, could admittedly have been 
erected upon a similar superstructure. This could be ac- 
complished by rendering the system of axioms disjunctive, 
as Veblen had suggested, or the properties of the funda- 
mental relation might be varied. 
The author, intent upon producing an interrelation 
between a universe of change and a spatial treatment of 
its entities, specified that the notion of time was indis- 
pensable. This sentence, in its entirety, might be used 
to characterize any of Whitehead's later works; there is 
an obvious debt to the 1905 memoir on this score, as on 
the use of the axiomatic method. 
Time must be conceived as a single dyadic serial re- 
lation, and must be included in the consideration of each 
concept. The entities forming the field of the time-rela- 
tion must be homogeneous instants of time. This consider- 
ation of time as a succession of instants is not a charac- 
teristic of Whitehead's later writings. The 1905 memoir 
is indeed the last place where Whitehead uses a single 
time- series to describe the advance of nature. 
The "material world" suggested in the title is de- 
fined to mean the set of relations and the entities which 
form the field of these i-elations. Here, for the first 
time, is a characteristic of Whit ehead's later philosophy, 
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the consideration of both the entities and the relations 
between them as being the universe. Hence, in Process and 
RealitZ, it is not just the actual entities and the eter- 
nal objects which :make up the universe, but also the pre - 
hensions, the propositions, the nexus, and the contrasts. 
Within this material world there are relations called "fun- 
damental relations," characterized by the fact that they 
are relations not defined in terms of alien entities, such 
as, for example, the percipient of an entity. Indeed, 
this specific relation of perceiver to perceived is ex- 
pressly denied as being of concern to the memoir.7 There 
is a complete absence of epistemological consideration 
with respect to the precise development of the concepts. 
Epistemological difficulties are suggested as powerful e- 
nough reasons to reject certain concepts, but the concept 
itself is developed independently of any percipient. 
The hypotheses respecting the functions of the funda- 
mental relations are called "axioms" of that concept of 
the material world. Whitehead was even now carefully de- 
fining words in a technical sense which conveyed a precise 
meaning not ordinarily agreed to be the specific denota- 
tion of the ward. 
Thus, the full meaning of a. "concept of the material 
world" is threefold: (1) the complete set of axioms, (2) 
7. MOW, 467. 
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the appropriate definitions of entities and the relations 
between them, and (3) the propositions resulting from the 
interaction between the axioms and the definitions. 
"Ultimate existents are defined to be the complete 
class of those entities which are members of the fields of 
the fundamental relations. Again, Whitehead avoided both 
an ontological and an epistemological bias in the memoir 
by denying any relation between his "ultimate existents" 
and those of the metaphysicians. It is necessary that in- 
stants of time be included among the ultimate existents of 
every concept. Despite the fact that Whitehead carefully 
excluded metaphysical implications from being attached to 
his ultimate existents, they nevertheless form the basis 
for the cosmology appropriate to any concept. The ulti- 
mate existents ofthe 1905 memoir became derived entities, 
rather than self -subsistent ones, in his relativity writ - 
ings, and remained so in all the later writings. 
When the class of ultimate existents is considered 
exclusive of the instants of time, the resulting class is 
to be known as the class of "objective reals." Again, 
there is to be no metaphysical connotation to be attached 
to such an entity. The distinction between ultimate exis- 
tents and objective reals is a novelty of Whitehead's 
thought, although perhaps foreshadowed by Bertrand Russell.8 
8. 1903 The principles of Mathematics, 468. 
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Possible applicants for inclusion in the class of ob- 
jective reals vary with each concept; they may be points 
of space, particles of matter, or9 linear objective reals -- 
the linear extensions considered as a unit. They may be 
combinations either of points and particles or1° of linear 
objective reals and corpuscles. In no case are all three 
applicants members of the class of objective reals in the 
concept. When two classes of objective reals are necessa- 
ry for a concept, that concept will be called "dualistic "; 
when one class only is the class of objective reals, the 
concept will be called "monistic." "Ocean's razor," con- 
tinued Whitehead, "formulated an instinctive preference 
for a monistic as against a dualistic concept. "11 
There are two senses in which Occam's razor may be 
considered with reference to the 1905 memoir, one valid 
and one invalid. In the first sense, Whitehead had pre- 
pared a paper considering the mathematical concepts of the 
material world. In order to forge a more unified mathe- 
matical concept, it would be highly desirable to reduce, 
if possible, the class of objective reals to one class. 
Here the application of Occam's razor would be valid, for 
there would be no limiting factors other than the necessi- 
9. This "or" is to be considered in the exclusive sense. 
10. "Or" in the exclusive sense. 
11. MOW, 468. 
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ty for mathematical rigor. 
In the second sense, the memoir was concerned with 
mathematical concepts of the material world. The researches 
of physical science into the entities composing the physi- 
cal world by no means indicated that there should be but 
one class of objective reels. Indeed, despite hopes (sim- 
ilar to those of Poynti n312) of a unified material "ulti- 
mate," there was no near -conclusive evidence that such was 
the case. Physical science could by no means allow Occam's 
razor to remove any of its entities at that tine. In this 
sense, Whitehead's application of Occam's razor to the 
1905 memoir is metaphysically questionable, and empirical- 
ly invalid. 
There is evidence to believe that Whitehead was using 
Occam's razor in both senses. Possibly he meant it in the 
first sense, for the mathematical consideration in this 
memoir lor->ically preceded the physical applications. The 
concluding statement of the memoir leads to the belief 
that he was using it in the second sense as wells 
In regard to the simplification of the pre- 
ceding axioms, ... the ideal to be aimed at 
would be to deduce some or all of them from more 
general axioms which would embrace the laws of 
physics. Thus these laws should not presuppose 
geometry, but create it.13 
12. 1899 "Opening Address to Section A (Mathematics and 
Physics) of the British Association" Nature, 60, 470- 
474. 
13. MCiiw, 525. 
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In such a case, it would be the task of experimental phyx- 
ics, and not of Occamts razor, to decide upon the number 
of objective reals necessary for any given mathematical 
concept of the material world. Unfortunately, there has 
been no discussion of this ambiguous usage either in the 
memoir itself or in any of the commentaries known to this 
author. The suggested fate of the principle of 0ccam's 
razor in connection with the 1905 memoir is that it be 
dismissed entirely, and that the closing sentences of the 
memoir be considered as a more authoritative suggestion as 
to what number of classes shall compose the class of ob- 
jective reals. A philosophically more mature considera- 
tion of the problem appeared in Whitehead's writings of 
the relativity era. 
The class of fundamental relations is, in all con- 
cepts, exhausted by three mutually exclusive subclasses of 
relations: the time relation, the "essential relation," 
and any "extraneous" relations which may be integral to 
that concept. 
The essential relation is a single polyadic relation, 
based on the idea of betweenness for the first four con- 
cepts, and on a defined relation of "order" in the last 
three. From the essential relation alone, all the propo- 
sitions of Euclidean geometry were shown to follow, al- 
though other class relationships are implied as well. It 
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is in the sense that geometry is derived from a triadic 
relation of betweenness in the first concept that White - 
head's paper is similar to those of Kempe, Veblen, and 
Royce. The field of the essential relation varies with 
each concept, but may consist of all or part of the class 
of ultimate existents. 
The extraneous relations may number one or be of an 
indefinitely large number, depending on whether they are 
used to determine "kinetic axes" of reference for the de- 
termination of velocity or to locate the particles in 
space respectively. Kinetic axes will be discussed at the 
point where they are necessary for the concept. 
Because geometry had always been construed in the 
sense of the first concept, the classical dualistic con- 
cept (the objective Teals are points of space and parti- 
cles of matter), a new definition of geometrical proposi- 
tions was needed for the purposes of the 1905 memoir. "A 
proposition of geometry is any proposition (1) concerning 
the essential relation; (2) involving one, and only one, 
instant of time; (3) true for any instant of time. 
"14 
Thus, because condition (1) gave classical geometry an en- 
larged field of operation, many propositions involving 
classes and their relations became possible which do not 
ordinarily qualify as "propositions of geometry." It is 
14. TCTIAT, 469. 
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the opinion of this thesis that this definition of geome- 
try in the 1905 memoir is the immediate ancestor of White - 
head's more notorious later definitions of geometry as 
"the science of cross -classification "15 and as "the mor- 
phology of nexus. "16 It is further suggested that the 
less notorious, but equally suggestive, definitions of ge- 
ometry as "the doctrine of loci of intermediaries imposing 
perspective in the process of inheritance "17 and as "one 
chapter of the doctrine of Pattern "18 were likewise fa- 
thered in the mentioned passage in the 1905 memoir. These 
notions are similar in tone to Royce's statement that ge- 
ometry is the study of the implications of assertions that 
entities do, or do not, stand to each other in the 0 -rela- 
tion.19 
The Seven Mathematical Concepts of the Material World 
Of these seven concepts, the first four consider 
points of space as the basic geometrical entities; the 
15. 1906 The Axioms of Projective Geometry, 5. 
16. 1929 Process and Reality, 461. 
17. 1932 "Objects and Su j ects" Philosophical Review, 41, 
143. 
18. 1941 "Mathematics and the Good" The Philosophy of Al- 
fred North Whitehead, The Library of Liví ÌhiiThso- 
phers, 671. 
19. 1905 "The Relation of the Principles of Logic to the 
Foundations of Geometry," Transactions of the Ameri- 
can Mathematical Society, 6, 360. See also pages 11- 
12 of this thesis. 
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last three, linear objective reals. Accordingly, they are 
named "punctual" or "linear," as the case may demand. 
Concept I, the first of the punctual concepts, is de- 
scribed as dualistic; the class of objective reals are 
subdivided into points of space and particles of matter. 
Here the field of the essential relation consists of the 
points of space only; these spatial points would be con- 
sistent with an absolutistic view of space. The essential 
relation itself is triadic. Its symbol, R ;(abc) is de- 
fined to mean "the homogeneous points of absolute space 
a, b, and e, are in the linear order (or the R- order) 
abc "20 
Tunctual lines and punctual planes thus become class- 
es of the points of space, as do the figures of geometry. 
No quantitative distance ideas are introduced, since they 
can be obtained by definition and the use of projective 
metrics. A similar treatment of distance is employed in 
the remaining six concepts. 
The axioms of geometry are enunciated in the form 
given them by Veblen, and are twelve in number. I Hp R21 
20. MCN , 476. Whitehead's statement appears in italics, 
however, as do all his definitions in.the 1905 memoir. 
21. To be read "the first hypothesis respecting R." For 
the complete symbolic statements of the various con- 
cepts, see Appendix A at the end of this thesis. 
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asserts that entities exist which satisfy R ;(abc). II Hp R 
and III Hp R are axioms of order; that the points of space 
involved in the relation are distinct is assured by IV Hp R. 
In this manner Whitehead avoided the troublesome difficul- 
ty encountered by Kempe and Royce when the two end- points 
of a segment are identical. In 'Whitehead's memoir an im- 
provement over the axiomatic statements of Veblen is ap- 
parent; Whitehead's axiomatic statement of II Hp R, for 
instance, when translated from its stated symbolic form, 
reads, "If a, b, and c are each op ints, and the point orue_ 
abc is also given, then order cba is implied. "22 Veblen 
had considered this possibility, for it had been suggested 
to him by R. L. IZoore, one of the pre- publication readers 
of "A System of Axioms for Geometry, " ?3 but had discarded 
it. The additional hypothesis, "if a, b, and e are points," 
appears in subsequent axioms in Whitehead's, but not Veb- 
len's, treatment. 
V Hp R secures the condition that a straight line can 
be infinitely extended, thereby (in conjunction with the 
parallel axiom) excluding Riemannian geometry. VI Hp R 
states the relationships necessary if points on an exten- 
ded line segment were to be mutually related. VII Hp R 
22. MCM`J, 478. (Italics not Whitehead's.) 
23. Veblen, oL. cit., 344 note. 
71 
establishes the existence of points not on a straight line, 
making triangles (in the ordinary sense) possible. VIII 
Hp R is the triangle transversal axiom; IX Hp R secured 
that Euclidean space is of at lease three dimensions. 
Space was then limited to three dimensions by X Hp R. 
Cantor's second axiom of continuity24 of points on a line 
is XI Hp R, and the twelfth axiom was the Euclidean paral- 
lel axiom in an exceptionally precise form. From these 
twelve axioms, Veblen had shown the whole of Euclidean ge- 
ometry deducible,25 and Whitehead had accepted his treat- 
ment as adequate.26 In the development of all the subse- 
quent concepts, it will be established that the proposi- 
tions of geometry can be deduced from the axioms of that 
by demonstrating that the twelve axioms of Concept 
I follow from the axioms of the later concepts. 
In Whitehead's two volumes which appeared in close 
succession following the 1905 memoir, Veblen's axioms and 
the customary Concept I were presupposed to the exclusion 
of even a passing notice of the linear concepts.27 
Having completed the exposition of his axioms, the 
author launched upon what Victor Lowe has correctly called 
24. Cf. Bertrand Russell, The Principles of Mathematics, 
296ff. 
25. Oswald Veblen, 2. cit., 343 -384. 
26. NOW, 469 note. 
27. 1906 The Axioms of Trojective Geometry, 1 -2. 1907 
The Axioms of Descriptive Geometry, 2, 7. 
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Whitehead's "first criticism of scientific materialism. "28 
For, in Concept I, the instants of time did not enter into 
the field of the essential relation. Neither were the 
particles of matter included in the essential relation. 
Consequently, an indefinitely large class of extraneous 
relations became necessary in order to connect the three 
classes of ultimate existents: that of triadic relations 
stating that a particle of matter occupied a point of 
space at an instant of time. "Thus the classical concept 
is not only dualistic, but has to admit a class of as many 
extraneous relations as there are members of the class of 
particles. "29 In addition to its unwieldiness, such a 
concept labors under the difficulty that its universe is 
an unchanging one, whóse structure needs to be reappraised 
at every new instant of time. This problem continued to 
be one of the central problems throughout the later works 
of Whitehead, and scientific materialism, alias Concept I, 
was repeatedly the target of this criticism. 
The axioms respecting the essential relation in Con - 
cdpt II are identical with those of Concept I. The con- 
cept itself was suggested by Bertrand Russell,30 and is a 
simplification of the classical dualistic concept. The 
28. Victor Lowe. 1941, óp. cit., 35. 
29. MCMW, 480. 
30. 1903, óp. cit., 468. 
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simplification occurs in the field of the extraneous rela- 
tion, which becomes dyadic, holding between a point of 
space and an instant of time. The particles of matter 
have completely disappeared, and Concept II becomes monis- 
tic. Absolute time and absolute space are again assumed. 
"The only relevant function is to establish a many - 
one relation between all instants of time and some points 
of space, and the actual material point ceases to be im- 
portant. "31 The condition of impenetrability is insured 
by the statement that the logical product of any two rela- 
tions must have no members. Whitehead immediately coun- 
tered by asserting that in such a universe it would be 
necessary for a percipient to sense abstract relationships 
or this world "would appear to labour under the defect 
that it can never be perceived. "32 
In the case of Concept II, Whitehead thus implicitly 
rejected the consequent cosmology on epistemological 
grounds. The possibility of such a cosmology was revived 
in 1938 by Sir Arthur Eddington, who asserted, "We observe 
only relations between physical entities. "33 
The third and fourth concepts are called IIIA and 
IIIB, inasmuch as the mathematical development of both is 
31. Bertrand Russell. 1903, Ibid., 468. 
32. MOW, 480. 
33. The Philosophy of Physical Science, 31. 
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identical. It is only in the physical interpretations 
that Concepts IIIA and IIIB diverge. The concepts are 
Leibnizian in the sense that the points of space are not 
absolutely located.34 Thus, the points of space are not 
members of the field of the essential relation; in their 
place moving particles of ether are postulated. The in- 
stants of time also enter the field of the essential rela- 
tion, which must consequently be tetradic: R ;(abct).35 It 
follows that the concept is monistic. 
It is conceivable that an alternative dualistic con- 
cept introducing particles of matter as another class of 
objective reals might be postulated. In such a case, it 
would be necessary to treat the particles of matter as 
members of the field of an indefinitely large number of 
extraneous relations. The complexity resulting from loca- 
ting particles of ether with respect to particles of mat- 
ter would, however, hamper the usefulness of such a con- 
cept. Furthermore, the controversial relation between 
natter and the ether would arise. Accordingly, not even a 
passing remark expanding such a concept appeared in the 
memoir of 1905. 
34. It is interesting to note that at this period, White - 
head's knowledge of Leibniz's writings was not from 
Leibniz himself, but through the interpretation of 
Couturat. Whitehead. 1941 "Autobiographical Notes" 
The Philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead, The Library 
of Living Philosophers, 3, 10. 
35. "The particles of ether, a, b, and c, are in the par- 
ticle -order abc at the instant t." 
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It is, however, useful to compare this possibility 
with the cosmology developed by general relativity. In 
such a case, not particles of ether, but point- instants 
would become the ultimate existents for the concept. Fur- 
thermore, the time -relation would, of necessity, surrender 
its autonomy to an enlarged fundamental relation. This 
new fundamental relation would then order point -instants 
in a fashion outlined by Einstein. The irreconcilable area 
of divergence would revolve around the necessity for a non- 
homogeneous space -time in general relativity, and the as- 
sumed homogeneity of Whitehead's moving particles of ether. 
The concept would be dualistic, inasmuch as there would be 
a need for material particles. A further discussion of 
relativistic cosmology would diverge from the purposes of 
this chapter, so a fuller consideration of Whitehead's 
theory of relativity will appear in Chapter VI of this 
thesis. A possible treatment of relativity in terms of 
"On Nathematical Concepts of the "Material World" will also 
be attempted in the unit on the relativity writings. 
The geometrical axioms of Concepts IIIA and IIIB are 
those of Concept I, except that the essential relation is 
tetradic; Euclidean geometry necessarily follows. For 
consistency, Whitehead introduced the additional hypothe- 
sis, "if t is an instant of time," into the antecedent 
clauses of the existence axioms, I, VII, and IX Hps R. A 
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thirteenth axiom was added to secure that the particles of 
ether persist throughout the entire time series, but this 
had no effect on the geometrical reasoning. 
In order to postulate an absolute frame of reference 
at each instant for the definition of velocity and accel- 
eration, a set of mutually perpindicular "kinetic axes "36 
was constructed. Hence only one tetradic extraneous rela- 
tion between the mutually perpindicular lines and an in- 
stant of time was necessary to describe motion.37 
With respect to the physical interpretation of Con- 
cepts MA and IIIB, two alternative developments are pos- 
. Bible. Concept IIIA may be defined to be that concept in 
which the same objective reals (the same particles of 
ether) continue in the same type of motion. Lord Kelvin's 
vortex ring theory of matter, where each particle persis- 
ted in its Wirbelbewegung is a possible direct application 
of Concept IIIA. The sponge model of the ether suggested 
by Trofessor Hicks, in which each particle of ether per- 
36. A term suggested by W. N. Macaulay. 1897 "Newton's 
Theory of Kinetics" Bulletin of the American Mathe- 
matical Society, 3, 371, and adopted bÿ Whitehead. 
37. WEIT head made a further attempt at a memoir which 
may have been pertinent at this point. It was repor- 
ted as having been communicated in abstract by Dr. 
Hobson and was titled, "On the Properties of Hyper - 
space, in relation to systems of Forces, the Kinemat- 
ics of Rigid Bodies, and Clifford's Parallels." The 
only reference the author has seen to this paper is 
in 1889 Proceedings of the London Mathematical Socie- 
ty, 30, 164. Inouiries to the London Mathematical 
Society and to Trinity College, Cambridge, show that 
the memoir is not on file at either place. 
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sisted in its own rotational motion, is a second applica- 
tion. Similarly, Larmor's knots, characteristic of the 
particles of the ether, readily lend themselves to an 
analysis under Concept IIIA. 
With Concept IIIB Whitehead suggested a novel inter- 
pretation of the universe. Here the persistence of motion 
lies with a unit of volume, but not necessarily of the 
same particles of ether within it. Thus each particle of 
ether does not have a characteristic motion which contin- 
ues throughout its life- history. 
Concept IIIA would have been extremely attractive to 
theoretical physicists of Whitehead's day, but the memoir 
attracted no attention. 
The difficulty with these two concepts, as with the 
theories of the ether which were prevalent, is that it is 
questionable whether apparently solid matter can be de- 
fined satisfactorily in terms of rarely constituted ether. 
Furthermore, they suffered under the presumption of an ab- 
solute spatial and temporal frame. On other grounds, 
Whitehead implicitly rejected both these concepts in favor 
of the final concepts to be developed. 
The remaining three concepts, called linear concepts 
with respect to the fact that the objective reals have 
properties associated with a straight line considered as a 
unit, were all Leibnizian in the same sense as those con- 
78 
cepts IIIA and IIIB. 
A point of potential criticism applicable to the 
three "Leibnizian" concepts is that, although a relational 
theory of space is adopted, an absolute theory of time is 
utilized. Such criticism would be necessitated with the 
admission of a four- dimensional space -time manifold. At 
this time, however, Whitehead was not prepared to offer 
such a manifold. Furthermore, in order to define motion, 
it was necessary to introduce the kinetic axes, and these 
presupposed the existence of an absolute time- series. It 
may be questioned whether these axes do not also introduce 
a preferred space -frame as well. Even in his relativity 
writings, Whitehead was reluctant to abolish absolute time 
completely. It was primarily on the argument that, for 
any observer, in some sense an absolute temporal succes- 
sion was necessary to define motion satisfactorily, Whitehead 
rejected a completely relational theory of time both here 
and in later writings. 
In the final three concepts, points are derived from 
classes of linear objective reals. Projective geometry 
had defined the point as a class of straight lines, but 
such an analysis Whitehead rejected on the grounds that a 
descriptive point was implicitly postulated in the projec- 
tive analysis. There is thus the necessity for the intro- 
duction of a new definition of a point in terms of linear 
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objective reals which does not depend on a prior assump- 
tion of the existence of that point. Two possible defini- 
tions are suggested: the Theory of Interpoints and the 
Theory of Dimensions. Although H. C. Brown drew attention 
to the excellence of these two theories,38 even this sec- 
tion of the memoir attracted no notice. Ten years after 
the publication of "On Mathematical Concepts of the Mate- 
rial World," Whitehead called the definition of points an 
"unwritten chapter of mathematics. "39 
It is instructive to note that the problem of the 
definition of points from other elements without involving 
a circularity of reasoning was one which was persistently 
attacked throughout most of Whitehead's later writings. 
Nowhere else, however, was the analysis explicitly that of 
the 1905 memoir. The primary reason for this fact, in the 
opinion of this thesis, is not that Whitehead considered 
the method of definition offered in this memoir to be in- 
trinsically defective. On the contrary, he referred on 
several occasions to this memoir as giving one possible 
method of solving the problem.40 Rather, the reason is to 
38. 1907 "Review: 'On Mathematical Concepts of the Mate- 
rial World" Journal of Philosoahy, Psychology, and 
Scientific Method , 4, -70-r2. 
39. 1915 "Space, Time, End Relativity" Proceedings of the 
Aristotelian Society, nea series, 16, 107. 
40. Ibid., 107. 1916 "La Théorie Relationniste de l'Espace" 
Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale, 23, 435. 1920 
"Einstein's Theory: An A_lter.nstive Suggestion" The 
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be found in the fact that the problem was later tackled in 
terms of "abstractive sets," whose elements are directly 
concerned with satisfying the demands of epistemology. 
The fifth and sixth concepts, named by Whitehead IV A 
and IV B, proceed under a mathematical development the 
same for both, and diverge only in the function of the ex- 
traneous relations. These two concepts depend for their 
demonstration on the Theory of Interpoints. 
In Concepts IV A and IV B the interpoints41 are the 
points themselves. The Theory of Interpoints derives its 
name from the fact that linear objective reals intersect, 
but that this intersection can be described without pre- 
supposing the descriptive intersection -point. The same 
linear objective reals do not always intersect each other 
in the same order in successive instants. Thus, an inter - 
point is an entity derived from the linear objective reals 
of which it is the common subclass. This thesis concurs 
with the opinion of Dr. Victor Lowe that this Theory of 
Interpoints is the germ of Whitehead's renowned "Method of 
Extensive Abstraction. "42 The later method will be dis- 
cussed in Chapter V of this thesis. 
(London) Times Educational Su lement, Number 252, 83. 
41. "Interpoints" is the abbreviate form of "intersection - 
points." 
42. 1941 22. cit. , 39. 
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In Concepts IV A and IV B the field of the essential 
relation is the entire class of linear objective reals and 
all the instants of time. The essential relation itself 
is pentadic: R;(abcdt).43 Fourteen axioms are required to 
establish the possibility of Euclidean geometry in Concepts 
II A and IV B. 
I Hp R is an axiom expressing the persistence of the 
linear objective reals throughout the time series; II Hp R 
establishes the existence of the time- series. The presence 
of these two axioms is again an indication of the preoccu- 
pation of Whitehead in showing a world of change mixed 
with a world of permanence. III Hp R provides that a 
linear objective real cannot intersect itself. IV, V, and 
VI Hps R of these two concepts are directly comparable 
with II, III, and IV Hps R of Concept I. VII Hp R estab- 
lishes the membership of any linear objective real in the 
class of interpoints on that linear objective real, while 
VIII Hp R establishes a n axiom regarding the ordering of 
interpoints on any objective real. IX Hp R of these two 
concepts repeats V Hp R of Concept I. The remaining 
axioms, X through XIV Hps R of Concepts N A and N B are 
directly comparable with VIII Hp R through XII Hp R of 
Concept I. 
43. Read, "the linear objective real a intersects the 
linear objective reals, b, c, and-d, in the order bcd 
at the instant t." 
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Concept N A is the dualistic alternative possible 
under the preceding development. Instead of a particle of 
matter, however, Whitehead postulated a 'corpuscle" or 
volume with some special property defining its relation- 
ship to the motion of the linear objective reals which may 
pass through it. A division of the corpuscles into posi- 
tive end negative entities then becomes a probable physi- 
cal interpretation. Consequently, an indefinitely large 
class of triadic extraneous relations are needed to locate 
a. given moving corpuscle with a moving in1erpoint et an 
instant of time. In addition, the single tetradic extra- 
neous relation setting up kinetic axes for the purposes of 
defining velocity and acceleration is necessitated by the 
moving interpoints. It would be imperative to establish 
laws of motion for the corpuscles and for the linear ob- 
jective reels, with the possible condition that these two 
sets of laws 1y conceivably interact. Under such a con- 
cept it would be possible; to dispense with the ether as 
the conveyer of the lines of force between corpuscles, 
since the linear objective reals could accomplish such a 
task. This concept is not greatly superior to the classi- 
cal dualistic Concept I, but its incorporatio.í of motion 
into the field of the essential relation between linear 
entities rendered it closer to the physicists' require- 
ments than any preceding concept. 
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Concept Iv B is monistic, a condition secured by 
abolishing the material particles associated with a cor- 
puscle. Instead of the triadic extraneous relations of 
Concept IV A, the extraneous relations of Concept IV B 
become dyadic, holding between an interpoint and an in- 
stant of time. The tetradic relation furnishing the kine- 
tic axes is also necessary. This concept, by abolishing 
material particles from the class of ultimate existents, 
invites the same epistemological difficulties incurred in 
Concept II. Although Whitehead ignored any physical con- 
cepts consonant with Concept IV B, it might be noted that 
Faraday's notion of the lines of force might be readily 
associated with the linear objective reals. 
The seventh of the mathematical concepts of the ma- 
teri ̂.l world, labelled Concept V, was really the justifi- 
cation for preparing the r erloir. That concept depends 
upon both the Theory of Interpoints and the Theory of Di- 
mensions for its exposition. It has been mentioned that 
in Concepts Pr A and IV B the interpoints were the points 
themselves. The possibility that the interpoints were on- 
ly a part, rather than the whole, of a point, leads to an 
extension of the analysis of the basal concept of a point. 
As was noticed in Concept lIT A, it we necessary in the 
physical interpretations to subdivide the corpuscles into 
negatively and positively charged entities. If, then, a 
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point be composed of some entity in addition to the inter - 
point, stich a bifurcation might be rendered less arbitrary. 
Accordingly, Whitehead investigated the properties of 
classes of linear objective reals further, and developed 
his Theory of Dimensions in the hope of obtaining a con- 
cept more readily associated with the supposed nature of 
the physical world. 
The Theory of Dimensions thus investigates the inter- 
relationships among classes having certain properties. 
The development of this theory along with that of Concept 
V m_?.y be an indication of the lines along which the pro- 
jected fourth volume of Trincipia Mathera.tica would have 
proceeded. Writing of the projected fourth volume at 
Whitehead's death, Lord Russell reported that 
A good deal of this was done, and. I hope still 
exists. But his increasing interest in philoso- 
phy led him to think other work more important. 
He proposed to treat a space as the field of a 
single triadic, tetradic, or pentadic relation, 
a treatment to which, he said, he had been led 
by reading Veblen.... And generally a space of 
n dimensions as the field of an (nt1) -adic rela- 
ti on. 44 
The property of the linear objective reals considered 
by Whitehead is that of "homaloty." Homaloty in this 
sense is readily comparable with; and is an extension in 
44. 1948 "Whitehead and Trincipia Nathematica" T-"ind, 57, 
138. 
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meaning of, geometrical "flatness." "A class of straight 
lines is flat, when it is a necessary and sufficient cmn- 
dition for membership that a straight line meets two mem- 
bers of the class, not at their point of meetin7. "45 It 
follows then that planes and spaces (as line -loci) are 
flat. In terms of defined horrialoty- subclasses, of "homa- 
loty- brimes," and " homaloty -equivalences," the definition 
of the " homaloty- dimension number" emerged. Prom this 
definition of the homaloty -dimension number the condition 
appears that for Euclidean geometry, the homaloty -dimension 
number must be three. Thus a geometry of more than three 
dimensions is excluded from Whitehead's memoir. It must 
be observed that when properties of linear objective reels 
other than flatness or homaloty are considered, the dimen- 
sion number is not necessarily three. 
The seventh of the mathematical concepts offered by 
Whitehead, Concept V, is a monistic Leibnizian46 concept. 
For the field of the essential relation it possesses the 
class of linear objective reals, as well as the instants 
of time. As with Concepts N A and IV B, the essential 
relation is pentadic, and is read as in the two previous 
concepts: R ;(abcdt). 
"Homaloty- points" and "homalotyy- pl,^nes" in Concept V 
45. MOM, 493. 
46. Leibnizian in the same sense as Concepts IV A and 
IV B. 
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are the products of complex definitions; geor!etrical points 
and geometrical punctual planes are special classes "asso- 
ciated with" corresponding classes of linear objective 
reals. The relation between the homaloty- points and 
- p1,Pnes and punctual points and planes rested on the fact 
that they had certain linear objective reals in common. 
One or more interpoints are always associated with a horna,- 
loty- point, but the converse is by no means true. The 
part of a point which does not possess an interpoint, the 
"nonsecant" part, derives itsexistence from subclasses of 
lines having no interpoints themselves, but which are mein - 
bers of classes of lines which had interpoints. Hence 
either interpoints o_r47 nonsecant parts might constitute a 
point. 
The axioms of this concept number seventeen due to 
the dependence of the concept on both the Theory of Inter - 
points and the Theory of Dimensions. 
I Hp R establishes the duration of the linear objec- 
tive reals throughout the instants of time. II through 
VI Hps R of Concept V, being interpoint hypotheses, are 
equivalent to III through VII Hps R of Concepts IV A and 
N B. VII and VIII Hps R define the relation of inter - 
points to points described in the preceding paragraph. 
47. "Or" in the inclusive sense. 
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IX, X, and XI Hps R establish the homa.loty property as a 
geometrical property. XII Hp R defines the relations be- 
tween intersecting planes in space. 
With XIII Hp R the Euclidean parallel axiom received 
a new form, apparently never before or since expressed in 
such a concise manner. Because of the great freedom in 
the definition of nonsecancy, that notion is not available 
to define parallelism. Similarly, to use the notion of 
non- intersection would be to introduce a dangerous ambiguity 
in the special sense of the word "intersection" used in 
Interpoint Theory. The term "cogredience" is therefore 
adopted to express the means whereby universal preservation 
of the order of points on lines in perspective is effected. 
This property of cogredience is indeed only a property of 
parallel lines in Euclidean space. A cogredient point 
then becomes the common member of the class of linear ob- 
jective Teals cogredient with another linear objective 
real, including the linear objective real itself. `Then, 
and only when, the space is considered to be three- dimen- 
sional Euclidean space, these cogredient points are mem- 
bers of the complexly defined ho_maloty- points. The 
Euclidean parallel axiom could then assume the simple form: 
"the cogredient points are homaloty- points. "48 XIV, XV, 
and XVI Hps R are the axioms treating of the point -order 
48. I1D1 W, 512. 
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of homaloty- points; XVII Hp R is the axio..of sp ̂ ti ̂1 con- 
tinuity. Ten pages of symbolic demonstration sufficed to 
show the axioms co ̂ parable to those of Concept I. 
In addition to the Essential reletion and the ti-Tie- 
relation, the single "kinetic axes" extraneous relation 
completed the concept. 
Because of the rich range of physical interpretations 
possible under Concept V, Whitehead devoted several para - 
graphs to a suggested application consonant with the theory 
of the lines of force and the then contemporary advances 
in sub.molecu.lar research. 
It has been noted that in Concept V points partook of 
a dual nature: an interpoint part and a nonsecant part. 
Depending upon the combinations present in any point, five 
primary types of points were possible: (1) no interpoints, 
a nonsecant part; (2) one interpoint, no nonsecant parts; 
(3) one interpoint, a nonsecant part; (4) many interpoints, 
no nonsecant part; (5) many interpoints, a nonsecant part. 
The case having no interpoints and no nonsecant parts 
disappeared, because it was not then a point. 
Whitehead accordingly suggested that volumes, or cor- 
puscles, containing an excess of interpoints ; Night be de- 
fined to be positively charged. Those corpuscles containing 
an excess of nonsecant parts would accordingly be negative. 
A simple definition might follow to identify a point of 
type (1) with a negative electron and a point of type (2) 
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with a "positive electron. "49 persistence of the existence 
of either kind of electron then becomes a matter of defining 
that persistence and relating it to the continuity of mo- 
tion axiom. 
Consonant with the researches of Sir J. J. Thomson, 
Whitehead suggested, then, a corpuscle -atom. consisting of 
e large positive (interpoint) electron and a finite number 
of small negative (nonsecant) electrons. The field of 
force of charged positive or negative electrons then be- 
comes a. direct function of the number of linear objective 
reals shared in co7nlon by the point and the positive or 
negative "electric points." 
There is an indirect suggestion that the property of 
gravitational mass might in some way be correlated with 
the number of electric points. Then, following hypotheses 
relating the motion of linear objective reals end the mo- 
tion of the electric points, a satisfactory theory of 
gravitation and electromagnetism might follow. The rela- 
tivity which Whitehead suggested could be easily interprëted 
as an example of the technique suggested in this paragraph, 
although Whitehead did not, at the time, mention the like- 
ness of technique. 
The objections to Concept V are all of the nature of 
49. MCN;J , 524. 
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the question, "How ?" These are precisely the points indi- 
cated by Whitehead as needing special attention. Einstein 
had answered his own "How ?" as he proceeded with later re- 
finements, but Whitehead did not return to consider the 
specific problems raised by his linear objective reals. 
Indeed, Concept V was e.pirically imperfect, but it was 
highly suggestive. Terhaps the largest "How ?" that could 
have been raised in 1906 was that of correlating physical 
qualities with the properties of the points made up of 
nonsecant and interpoint subclasses. The question is only 
intensified when quantum mechanics is taken into account, 
and raises a question about the fundamental presuppositions 
as well. Apparently the only response to the challenge is 
the simple, yet unsrtisfying one, "By successive defini- 
tional approximations." 
There seem to be two primary problems with regard to 
employing linear objective reals as a key to cosmology: 
that of their ontological status, and that of their 
epistemological status. The ontological problem is acute 
for metaphysicians and asks, "Do the linear objective 
reals have the importance placed upon them here by White- 
head?" The problem is raised again in the philosophy of 
organism with regard to Wlaitehead's emphasis on prehen- 
sions. 
In the second place, is anything like a linear 
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objective real a component in experience: do they have any 
perceptual significance? Whitehead nowhere indicates an 
answer to this question, either positive or negative. Ter- 
baps he would at the time have accepted the later answer 
with regard to prehensions- -that perception arises from 
prehensions. But there is no reason to suppose that this 
is the case. 
One possible solution suggests itself. In some sense 
the hornaloty- points must be significant for a percipient. 
The solution must lie in the direction of assuming that 
because of the participation of the linear objective reals 
in the homaloty- point, they thereby construct a meaning- 
fulness which does not attach to the linear objective 
reals themselves in any more than a potential sense. The 
significance for a percipient must then be tra.nsynittéd 
along or by the participating linear objective reals. If 
and when these once -participating linear objective reals 
later participate in a complexly defined . perceptual point, 
they are observed by a percipient. Hence perception would 
in its operation be a process similar to physical interac- 
tion. The mind -body problem then reduces itself to be a 
direct consecuence of ontology; this is directly suggested 
in Process and Reality. 
The similarities of "On Mathematical Concepts of the 
Material World" to the 1927 Gifford Lectures, Trocess and 
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ße^lit , are so stri',ing as to support an Lrportant asser- 
tion of this thesis that Trocess and Reality assumes added 
meaningfulness when considered as a metaphysical generali- 
zation of "On Ma.them: tical Concepts of the 'aterial World." 
As will be demonstrated throughout the chapters on the 
Thilosophy of Organism, the discussions of those lectures 
are so similar in nature to the present memoir, that they 
might be described as the 1905 memoir brought into meta- 
physics. 
Concept V may yet prove useful as a possible unirier 
or recent physical researches. Several cases irariedi7tely 
suggest themselves as rewarding exposition. 
Case I. Assume the validity of the essential rela- 
tion, the time relation, and the extraneous relation of 
Concept V. Assume further that they are existentially 
valid. Identity the various submolecular "elegy entary par- 
ticles" with certain types of the rive kinds of points 
postulated by Whitehead. Such an identification would 
make an electron a dynamic point of type (1), the pure 
nonsecant point. Define the positron to be a dynamic 
point of type (2) . A proton becomes a moving point or 
type (5), where there is an excess of interpoints over the 
appropriate number of nonsecant parts by one. Mesons are 
defined to be moving points or type (5) carrying an excess 
of interpoints or nonsecant parts, as the case may demand. 
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The neutron is a moving point of type (5) wherein there is 
an equivalence. of the ,appropriate number of interpoints 
and nonsecant parts. Neutrinos are moving points of 
type (3), consisting of an interpoint part and a nonsecant 
part. Appropriate laws respecting the numbers of inter - 
points and nonsecant parts which may exist in a stable 
configuration in a point then become. necessary. Cor- 
puscles become volumes, with each of which may be associa- 
ted a point or points of the appropriate type and density 
of electric charges. With respect to this property 
linear objective reals passing through corpuscles, certain 
qualities responsible for the various types of energy (in- 
cluding mass) need to be postulated. Variations in the 
configuration of the linear objective reals may become the 
condition responsible for having one type of energy rather 
than another. These configurations would be, as the gene- 
ral case, unstable. As the relative positions of the 
linear objective reals sought a more stable arrangement, 
certain types of energy would be released. Conversion 
from one form of energy to another is made possible. This 
would be ecuivalent to asserting an interaction between 
the laws of motion of the linear objective reals and the 
laws of motion of the various "points" involved. 
Case II. Assume the validity of the fundamental re- 
lations. Consider the Theory of Interpoints, the Theory 
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of Di ensions, and the geometrical treatment of Concept V 
as an ideal case which the physical universe tends to ap- 
proach. Define the basic submolecular entities in a r,an- 
ner similar to that of Case I. The properties of a linear 
objective real are, however, altered when that linear en- 
tity existentially passes through a corpuscle. This al- 
teration may be of the nature of a deflection from the 
ideally linear locus. There is, then, a resulting; dis- 
torted configuration of interpoints from the ideal norm 
dictated by Concept V. The gravitational field is a con- 
sequence of this distortion, and persists as the distor- 
tion is passed along the linear objective real. Other 
types of energy are identified by certain structural 
aberrations, and are convertible in terms of degree and 
type of variation from the ideal stable configuration of 
linear objective reals. This case is subject to the same 
sort of empirical criticism to which. a Flatonic descrip- 
tion of cosmology would be liable. Its verifiability 
would seem to be impossible, although ideally it would 
satisfy the demands of predictability. 
Further cases also suggest themselves. The exposi- 
tion of those cases depend, however, on the development of 
later chapters of the thesis, and will be postponed until 
the appropriate stages of progress have been reached. 
As a cosmological essay, "On T ,thematical Concepts of 
the :Material World" had several suggestions of value. In 
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the first place, it gave a first approximation to the 
problems, methods, and solution of 1hitehead's later cos- 
mological works. It is the first expression of faith (sub- 
sequent to Universal A1 ebra) in the power of "systems of 
thought" as contrasted with piecemeal investigation o" par- 
ticular problems. It also serves, as will be seen in 
Tart Three of this thesis, as a. basis for a fuller under- 
standing of Trocess and Reality. The memoir represents an 
invective against the classical absolute concept of the 
Iaterial world. Another was suggested by Whitehead him- 
self: it disentangles "the essentials of the idea of a 
material world from the accidents of one particular con - 
cept. "50 
The ontological question of the relation of any of the 
seven concepts to existence is ignored.51 Later, in The 
Axioms of _rojective Geometry, Whitehead offered a possible 
clue in the direction of solving this problem.52 He de- 
nied the efficacy of the ontological argument in deciding 
the validity of an existence theorem for any concept. 
Similarly, an inductively produced argument from physical 
science has no significance for the existence theorem. In 
arranging such an argument in syllogistic form, there is a 
glaring undistributed middle term. The alternative proof 
50. Mar, 465. 
51. rC nv , 467. 
52. Pages 3-4. 
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suggested by ".vb.itehead is linked with the independence of 
the a.Xio: s in any concept. When a cate orical set of 
axioIs has been established, the very proof of their inde- 
pendence would establish a proof f the existence theore!1 
for the appropriate disjunctive set of the axion.s. This, 
however, does not constitute an ontolortic al existence 
proof. 
One important current of thinThin,_r de:- onstratëd in this 
memoir and assumed a central position in all Ihitehe.d's 
1 -.ter work was that of asserting the mutual dependence of 
natural elements. Whitehead's writings ay be considered 
to be a persistent underlining of the belief that the na- 
tural universe was essentially intelligible and coherent 
in its open- tions. In this particular bitehead agreed 
with Arnold, who had also said that natural entities must 
be mutually interrelated.53 IIe disagreed with Arnold's 
extrapolation denying a unified process to the natural 
universe.54 
Because of the logical nature of the 1905 memoir, its 
contents could be readily assi_Alnted into almost any 
philosophical system, with the exception of classical ma- 
terialism. For Bradley, the memoir could represent that 
necessary way of ha penin.g among our appearances. 1155 
53. 1904 3cientific Fact and '=Tetnphysic^..1 Reality, 228, 243. 
54. Ibid. , 164, ry50,7. 
55. .Bradley, on. Jci..t. , 266. 
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,;here was too much of a_ ace , tL:_e , and matter o -allow it 
to be a description of -Reality.- 
raser might have acceted ..On ._atheinatical ncei:ts 
of the ï:.ateria1 Aorld" as an explanation of the workings 
of the material universe and as a secondary _dic. .,ion of 
the coherent structure of a theistic universe., indeed, an 
argument for the existence of uod from the orer of nature 
might well have arisen from its fruits. 
it seems probable that _ oyce :could have classified 
the memoir as an example of the fruits of critical ra- 
tionalism, lloyce, it will be remer.:bered, had declared that 
"pure science has no logical dependence on physics. "56 in 
ihitehead's paper, however, the implication is that both the 
laws of physics and the axioms of pure geometry at least, 
might be derived from some more primitive set of laws. 4-hite- 
he d set about the tas*, and his works of the relativity era 
and the philosophy of organism constitute his answer. 
by using appropriate definitioLs regarding tige rela- 
tion of perception to the structure and behavior of ulti- 
mate existents, there would be the possibility of an 
interactionist epistemology. here is only a superficial 
case for parallelism. 
it has been observed that his treatment of time was a 
56. the .world and the individual, 1, 9. 
98 
concurrence with Russell in expressing an absolutistic 
frame of reference for that entity. There is a discrepancy 
in wanting absolute time and relational space, as will be 
demonstrated in the following chapters on relativity. 
Because of the "instantaneous" nature of time, the 
process of Bergson would be implicitly rejected in the 
theory as presented. However, appropriate alterations in 
the class of ultimate existents and the nature of the 
time -process would make Concept V useful in a Bergsonian 
world. 
Whitehead had, then, in a memoir which he himself 
considered one of the best pieces he had ever done,57 ac- 
complished a theoretical unification of the laws of 
physics for which Poynting had, six years previously, 
hoped.58 Whitehead, in 1905, theoretically reconciled the 
theories of space and the theories of matter which Einstein 
accomplished in a different, but far more complete, manner 
in three successive major stages. 
It will become increasingly apparent with the discus- 
sion of 4-Jhitehead's later works, how important "On Mathe- 
matical Concepts of the Material World" was in the de- 
velopment of later Whiteheadian cosmology. 
57. Victor. Lowe, 22. cit., 34. 
58. Toyntinlr, 22. cit. , 471, col. 2. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF RELATIVISTIC C0SMOLOGY 
The name symbolizing the unification of physical 
science is not that of Whitehead, but of. Einstein. Born 
in Ulm in 1879, Albert Einstein had also doubted the suf- 
ficiency of Newtonian principles to bear the burden of 
physics. One of the most glaring inadequacies of Newtonian 
principles lay in the explanation of experiments designed 
to investigate the motion of matter (especially the earth) 
through the postulated ether. 
Albert Michelson narrated the results of his Potsdam 
experiment attempting to find the absolute velocity of the 
earth through a stationary ether.' The expected difference 
in the times of the journeys of two rays of light respec- 
tively parallel and perpendicular to the direction of the 
motion of the earth was so small as to fall within the 
limits of observational error. Thus the results of an 
1. 1881 "The relative motion of the Earth and the Lumini -- 
ferous ether" American Journal of Science, (3), 22, 
120 -129. It is interests g to note that this experi- 
ment was financed by Alexander Graham Bell. 
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earlier experiment by Fizeau were confirmed, and Michelson 
suggested that his small positive residuals could be ig- 
nored. 
Michelson repeated his experiment in collaboration 
with Edward W. Morley in 18862, and again in 1887.3 On 
both occasions the results confirmed earlier experiments 
and violated the only theoretical explanation known. Only 
very small positive residuals could be found. The same 
experiment and similar ones, repeated by other investiga- 
tore at a later date, resulted in the same way. 
Sir Oliver Lodge, investigating this paradox, care- 
fully reviewed the theoretical relation between the earth 
and the ether4. As a material body advanced through a 
stationary ether, it caused a condensation of that ether 
in front of itself. This ether streamed through the pores 
of the body with a diminished velocity, and then evaporated 
to its original state behind the body. Admitting that 
a Fitzgerald hypothesis that matter contracted in the 
2. 1886 "Influence of Motion of the Medium on the Velocity 
of Light" The American Journal of Science, (3), 31, 
377 -386. 
3. 1887 "On the Relative Motion of the Earth and the Lu- 
miniferous Ether" The American Journal of Science, (3), 
34, 333 -345. 
4. x$94 "Aberration Problems. -- A Discussion concerning 
the Motion of the Ethe i near the Earth, and concerning 
the Connexion between Ether and Gross Tatter; with 
some new Experiments" Philosophical Transactions, (A), 
184, 727 -804. 
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direction of its motion was possible, Lodge nevertheless 
considered the suggestion not proved. Insisting that as- 
tronomical aberrations were consistent only with the view 
that the ether stream must remain unaffected by matter, 
Lodge asserted the complete independence between ether and 
matter. However, Michelson's repeated experiments appeared 
to be consistent only with the theory that the ether near 
the earth must be relatively stagnant; and no really deci- 
sive conclusion was apparent. 
The highly respected Dutch physicist of this era, H. 
A. Lorentz, offered an ad hoc hypothesis by way of expla- 
nation of the Michelson -Morley experiments, and reiterated 
it6 when various other investigators tried different 
methods of finding the velocity of the earth relative to 
the ether. 
The explanation asserts that (with Fitzgerald), when 
any particle moves with a velocity v, its length in the 
direction of motion is contracted by an amount (024 re- 
where c is the velocity of light in vacuo. Thus a 
spherical electron would become an ellipsoid flattened by 
the amount / in the direction of its motion. The diameter 
5. 1920 "Der Interferenzversuch Michelsons" reprinted in 
Das Rela.tivitátsprinz, 1 -5. The hypothesis origina- 
ted, however, with Fitzgerald. 
6. 1920 "Elektromagnetische Erscheinungen in einem System, 
das sich mit beliebiger, die das Lichtes nicht er- 
reichender Geschwindigkeit bewegt" reprinted in Das 
RelativitgtsprinZip, 6 -25. 
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of the earth in the direction of its motion would be cor- 
respondingly shortened by two and one -half inches. This 
hypothesis would indicate the futility of any experiment 
of an optical nature to detect any traces of the earth's 
motion through the ether, since those effects would be 
exactly compensated by the contraction of the matter 
forming the apparatus. Accordingly, in order to relate 
two uniformly moving systems, the equations known as the 
Lorentz transformation were introduced. Consider a coor- 
dinate system K' moving with a uniform. velocity v along 
the x -axis with respect to the coordinate system K. Then 
the values x, 2, z, t of system K are related to the com- 
parable values x', 21, z', t' of system K_' according to 
the transformations proposed by Lorentz: 
x' 3 (x -vt) 
y' y 
z' z 
t' (t- vx /c2) 
In June, 1905, six months before Whitehead presented 
"On Mathematical Concepts of the Material World" to the 
Royal Society, Einstein submitted his special relativity 
theory to the world.? It produced a revolution in physical 
'r. "Zur Elektrodynamik bewegter Körper" Annalen der a: 
sik, (4), 17, 891 -921. 
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theory which soon gained the support of nearly all the 
physicists. Two assumptions suggested by experimental 
evidence sufficed to provide the groundwork of this axio- 
matic attempt to describe the operation of physical phe- 
nomena. (1) Any light -ray moves in a stationary system of 
coordinates with the same velocity, whether emitted by a 
stationary or moving source. (2) The Principle of (Spe- 
cial) Relativity asserts that "the laws by which the states 
of physical systems undergo change are not affected, 
whether these changes of state be referred to the one or 
to the other of two systems of coordinates in uniform 
translatory motion. "8 This principle implies that the 
hitherto fundamental invariants (mass, length, time) no 
longer had an absolute significance, but were merely an 
expression of the relation of things in the external world 
to some specified observer's station. Physical invariants 
would then be the physical laws, but not the quantities of 
mass, length, and time. Furthermore, the principle asserts 
that any recognition of absolute velocity is impossible. 
Sir Edmund T. Whittaker appropriately named such a prin- 
ciple a "Postulate of Impotence. "9 
But Einstein was by no means the originator of the 
8. Ibid., 895. 
9. 1949 From Euclid to Eddingto_n: A Study of Conceptions 
of the External Worn; r, 58. These were the Tarner Lec- 
tures for 1947. 
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idea underlying the principle of relativity. In an address 
to the International Congress of Arts and Sciences in 1904, 
Henri Poincaré had emphasized its importance as u funda- 
mental postulate.10 
It was Iinkowski who gave Einstein's theory its final 
mathematical form, a contribution insufficiently acknow- 
ledged by many later writers. Minkowski suggested11 the 
welding of space and time into a four -dimensional spatio- 
temporal continuum; a point of space (x, y, z) at an in- 
stant of time (t) would then become a "world- point" (Welt - 
sunk') (x, y, z, t). In order to maintain an equivalence 
of units, the t- component is multiplied by the critical 
velocity e. Thus, the measure of the separation of two 
events, called the interval (de), is expressed by the re- 
lation 
ds2 n dx2dy2dz2-c2dt2. 
Since the relative largeness of the last compound term 
usually causes ds2 to be negative and less meaningful, the 
10. 1905 "The Principles of Mathematical Physics" The 
Monist, 15, 5, 9 -12. Translated from the French by 
George Bruce Halsted. 
11. 1909 "Raum und Zeit" Fah -sikalische Zeitschrift, 10, 
104 -111. Cf. G. BurniiEon Brown: "Äs éarTy as 1713 
Lagrange suggested that mechanics was a four-dimen- 
sional geometry, with time as the fourth dimension." 





The stream of events in the whole universe, continued 
Minkowski, thus becomes the description of the world -lines 
( Weltlinien) generated by the world -points. In this way, 
he expressed the hope that "physical laws might find their 
most perfect expression as reciprocal relations between 
these world- lines.i12 Such a possibility proved so at- 
tractive that much of current physical cosmology is an ex- 
pression of its implications and possible interpretations. 
The idea has also rooted itself in philosophical cosmology. 
A further generalization of Newtonian physics implied 
in the Special Theory of Relativity was that the apparent 
mass of a moving body is 8 times the mass at rest. This 
assertion provided theoretical confirmation of a finding 
that the apparent mass of moving electrons is greater than 
that of stationary ones. Accordingly, Einstein pronounced 
that if a. body radiates energy L, its mass diminishes by 
the amound L/c2.13 Consequently, the mass of a body is 
nothing more than a specialized form of energy, to be 
related by the expression 
e = me2. 
12. Minkowski, 21. cit., 104. 
13. 1920 "Ist die Trägheit eines Körpers von seinem Ener- 
giegehalt abhängig ?" reprinted in Das Relativit4te- 
rinzi , 53. 
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The highly respected principle of the conservation of mass 
was shown to derive its authority from the more primitive 
principle of the conservation of energy. 
It is well to notice that after this stage of develop- 
ment, some of the adherents of special relativity (notably 
E. A. Milne) chose a path diverging from that which Ein- 
stein followed, and have produced cosmologies which rival 
Einstein's for supremacy. Indicating this diversity of 
opinion regarding the next step in relativity theory, Sir 
Arthur Eddington in 1920 repeated a statement that more 
than two hundred different theories of gravitation had 
been offered.14 Few of these had attracted attention, 
primarily because no critical experimental verification 
was suggested. 
In several successive stages Einstein approached the 
formulation of his General Theory of Relativity, in which 
he examined the phenomena of gravitation in terms of the 
geometry of the world -lines. As early as 190815 Einstein 
had recognized the generalization necessary for his theory 
of gravitation, and in 1911 that principle was proposed16 
14. Space, Time, and Gravitation: An _Outline of the 
General Theory of Relativit , 64. Eddingn's state- 
ment is uñTocumenté . 
15. Albert Einstein. 1949 "Autobiographisches" Albert 
Einstein: Philosopher- Scientist, The Library of 
Living Philosophers_, 7, 66. Translate yy Paul Arthur 
Schilpp, op. cif., 67. 
16. Albert Einstein. 1911 "über den Einflusz der Schwer- 
kraft auf die Ausbreitung des Lichtes" Annalen der 
Physik, (4), 35, 905. 
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as being responsible for a red -shift in spectral lines and 
the deflection of light passing through a gravitational 
field. However, not until 1915 was it held to explain the 
operation of a gravitational field. 
The special theory had shown that the inertial mass 
of a physical system was a direct function of its energy 
content. And experimental evidence had shown that iner- 
tial mass was, to a high degree of accuracy, equal to 
gravitational mass. The blending of the two statements 
led Einstein to the conclusion that the phenomena of 
gravitation could not be simply explained within the 
framework of special relativity. The apparent necessity 
for a suitable gravitational principle was a less re- 
stricted axiom, which has received the name of the "Prin- 
ciple of Equivalence." This principle asserts that a 
gravitational system of limited extension can be considered 
as equivalent to a system which is accelerated relative to 
an inertial system. 
In expounding the implications of the Principle of 
Equivalence, Einstein declared that "the general laws of 
nature are to be expressed by equations which hold good 
for all systems of coordinates, that is, are co- variant 
with respect to any substitutions whatever. "17 This 
17. 1916 "Die Grundlage der allgemeinen Relativitlttstheo- 
rie" Annalen der Physik, (4) , 49, 776. 
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implies that the equations of the laws of physics must ap- 
ply to systems in any kind of motion: accelerating (in- 
cluding rotating) as well as the special case (hence the 
name "special theory") of uniform translatory motion. 
The generalized expression for the interval (ds) be- 
tween two events, in space of any curvature and of any 
number of dimensions can be described as 
ds2= gikdxidxk, 
where the indices i and k assume all integral values from 
1 to n, and gik is a symmetrical covariant tensor and a 
function of the structure of the continuum involved. At 
the same time gik replaces the gravitational potential.18 
For four -dimensional space -time, ten distinct gik's are 
possible (since a symmetrical gik- gki). It is a peculiari- 
ty of gik that it is not independent of the distribution 
of matter; consequently near matter the four- dimensional 
continuum deviates from the ideal case of uniform struc- 
ture. Whitehead considered this a matter of interpretation 
and violently disagreed. On the Einsteinian interpreta- 
tion, at a very great distance from matter the uniformity 
reappears. Therefore, the propositions of Euclidean 
geometry are not valid in the neighborhood of matter, and 
18. As early as 1914 Einstein had recognized the useless- 
ness of a purely scalar gravitational potential. 
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a non -Euclidean continuum must be adopted. When a particle 
moves through the four -dimensional space -time, it follows 
the path of greatest interval- length between the two 
events, called its geodesic. When the particle moves with 
the velocity c, the special case where ds2= 0 arises, and 
that geodesic is appropriately known as a "null geodesic." 
It was a consequence of special relativity that only a ray 
of light can travel with the critical velocity e. Accor- 
dingly, rays of light are postulated to travel along the 
null geodesics. 
The continued presence (after transformations) of de- 
rivatives of gik in the interval equation implies that a 
gravitating (accelerating) field is present. To account 
for the vanishing of those derivatives would be to account 
mathematically for the presence of the gravitational field. 
It is found that when a function of the derivatives of gik, 
the mixed Riemann-Christoffel tensor, 
BP,, a. =0 
the removal of the gravitational fields has described a 
completely flat space -time of any number of dimensions. 
The condition simulates that of an Euclidean world con- 
sidered to be at an infinite distance from all matter and 
all forms of energy. 
By contracting BPS the condition 
GAY =0 
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appears, which holds in non -Euclidean, as well as Euclidean 
sp -]ce. By contrast to the world of B o ° 0, this world 
is one remote from, but in the neighborhood of, matter, 
light. or electromagnetic fields. 
Since, even in general relativity, the effects found 
of the gravitational field are due to the presence of pon- 
derable matter, a thorough consideration of the law of the 
gravitational field entails an accounting for this effect. 
Einstein suggested the equation 
G, - fi, ,G=- T1 
as best qualified to describe the law. The additional 
tensor T vaccounts for the energy density of the electro- 
magnetic field and of ponderable matter, while fit is a con- 
stant :related to the Newtonian gravitational 
One of the interesting consequences of the general 
theory is that gravitation occupies a pre -eminent place 
among natural phenomena in that the ten gik's defined the 
metrical properties of a field at the same time that they 
were responsible for the gravitational properties of that 
field. 
The new gravitational law was easily interpreted in 
the light of Hilbert's principle: "all physical happenings 
in the Universe are determined by a scalar world- function 
bp being, in fact, such as to annul the variation of the 
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integral n b dxOdx1dx2dx3. "19 The interpretation of 
the general theory that gravitation represents the attempt 
of the universe to straighten itself out was a natural one. 
The most significant prediction of the theory arose 
from its description of the laws of planetary motion. 
Newtonian physics described, with reasonable accuracy, the 
motion of all the planets except that of Mercury. The ob- 
served advance of Mercury's perihelion was 574" per centu- 
ry; after accounting for the perturbations from all possible 
sources, a residual advance of 42.9" per century remained 
unexplained. Many popular commentators on relativity have 
mistakenly assumed the 42.9" to be the entire advance of 
Mercury's perihelion. 
Leverrier, who had predicted the appearance of the 
planet Neptune from the residuals in the motion of Uranus, 
postulated a pl: net interior to Mercury. Later this ex- 
pected planet had been christened Vulcan. Einstein's 
theory, however, accounted for the 42.9" advance without 
the necessity for postulating an undiscovered planet.20 
Corrections for other planets are smaller: 
Venus 8.6" per century 
Earth 3.8" per century 
Mars 1.35" per century. 
19. Sir Edmund T. Whittaker. 1927 "The Outstanding Prob- 
lems of Relativity: Presidential Address to the 
British Association for the Advancement of Science, 
Section A." 
20, Einstein, 22. cit., 804, 822. 
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The case of Venus falls within the limits of observation, 
and Sir Arthur Eddington suggested that it may represent a 
real discordance within the theory.21 The case of Mars 
represented a slight improvement, however.22 The additional 
amount of advance contributed due to the effect of solar 
axial rotation is of little consequence: in the case of 
Mercury it amounts to only 2.62 x 10 -4 times the amount of 
the advance of the perihelion.23 
A second consequence of importance arising from gene- 
ral relativity is its prediction of an observable effect 
of the action of a gravitational field on a ray of light 
passing through that field. Because of the deflected path 
of the geodesics around a gravitating body, a ray of light 
from an infinitely distant source would be deflected to- 
ward the center of the gravitating body by an amount pro- 
portional to the strength of the field. This would cause 
the light -source to appear to be displaced in an outward 
direction from the gravitating body. In the case of a ray 
of light passing the edge of the planet Jupiter, such a 
deflection would amount to 0.017 ", far below the range of 
21. Arthur S. Eddington. 1923 The Mathematical Theo of 
Relativity, 90. 
22. Arthur S. Eddington. 1918 Report on the Relativity 
Theory of Gravitation, 52. 
23. W. de Sitter. 1916 "On Einstein's Theory of Gravita- 
tion, and its Astronomical Consequences, I" Monthly 
No times of the R1 Astronomical Society, 7777. 
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experimental verification.24 In the case of a ray of 
light grazing the sun, however, Einstein predicted a de- 
flection of 1.74 ", a value entirely within the range of 
observation.- 
95 
The simple Newtonian deflection was half 
this value, and the divergence between the two predictions 
promised another opportunity for confirm Lion of the 
general theory. Fortunately, the opportunity of a total 
eclipse offered itself on May 29, 1919, and two photo- 
graphic expeditions set out, one to Sobral in North Brazil 
and the other to the Isle of Principe near the Cameroons 
coast. The African plates gave fairly good confirmation,26 
averaging 1.98"1:0.12". However, the first results from 
Brazil cast their weight greatly in favor of the Newtonian 
estimate. But seven plates from Brazil, when measured, 
gave an average value of 1.61 "t 0.30 ". The evidence was 
good, but not conclusive. Accordingly, the observations 
of an eclipse at the Lick Observatory in 1922 promised to 
be decisive. The results gave excellent confirmation of 
the predicted values. The Malayan eclipse of May 1929, 
however, yielded results ranging from 2.0" to 2.2 ". The 
Australian results were re- examined, and were found, upon 
24. Arthur S. Eddington. 1917 "Einstein's Theory of 
Gravitation" Monthly Notices of the Royal Astronomi- 
cal Societe, 7,380. 
25. r ñstein, 22. cit. , 821. 
26. Arthur 3. Eddiñton. 1920 Space, Time, a - nd Gravita 
tion ----- 
-, _ _ 
An Outline of the General Theory o Relativity, 
117 
calculation, to read 2.2", Although the results are 
closer to the general theory's prediction than to the New - 
tonian amount, they cannot be construed as giving definite 
experimental confirmation of Einstein's theory. Professor 
E. Finlay- Freundlich has also expressed this doubt.27 
One unfortunate difficulty in effecting a thoroughly 
satisfactory observation on this critical point is that 
data on stars whose distance from the sun exceed 7.5 solar 
radii are almost valueless.28 And the case is that the 
number of stars falling inside this region is very small, 
and they are not symmetrically arranged. 
The third phenomenon which might confirm general rela- 
tivity was proposed by Einstein in 1911.29 On the basis of 
the Equivalence Principle (here introduced for the first 
time), he predicted that spectral lines of sunlight, as 
compared with corresponding lines from terrestrial light 
sources, would be displaced toward the red end of the 
spectrum by the amount 2.12 x 10-6 . In 1917 St. John 
examined the spectral lines of cyanogen and found them not 
27. 1950 August 28. Letter to the author. 
28. E. Finlay -Freundlich and W. Ledermann. 1944 "The 
Problem of an Accurate Determination of the Relati- 
vistic Light Deflection" Monthly Notices of the Royal 
Astronomical Society, 104, 44. 
29. " er den Einflusz der Schwerkraft auf die Ausbreitung 
des Lichtes" Annalen der PhysiL, (4), 35, 905. 
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appreciably deflected30; some were even displaced toward 
the violet. Calcium vapor also gave disappointing results, 
and observations on iron gave but one -third the predicted 
value.31 A further very slight reddening of spectral 
lines on the sun's limb with respect to its center was ex- 
pected (the limb effect), and appeared. However, other 
causes than the relativity effect may have been responsible.32 
Commenting on the present stage of the investigation 
of the red -shift of the spectral lines of the sun, Profes- 
sor Finlay- Freundlich observed, 
...up till now, it has not been possible to 
prove convincingly that the solar lines show a 
general shift as predicted by the theory of 
relativity. 
It is even very unlikely that this possi- 
bility of a verification of the theory will be 
successful at all in the future, since there are 
various comp 
" 
ink; effects which are difficult to 
disentangle. 
And, with respect to a similar effect which should be 
in evidence in stellar lines, he further warned: 
The statistically derived general red -shift of 
the B- Stars, called the K -term which more than 
30 years ago I had interpreted as gravitational 
effect also does not give an unambiguous proof 
in favour of the theory of relativity, because 
also this effect has turned out to be of a very 
complex nature; it is, for instance, strongly 
30. Charles E. St. John. 1917 "The Principle of 
Generalized Relativity and the Displacement of the 
Fraunhofer Lines toward the Red" The Astrophysical 
Journal, 46, 254. 
31. IETA , -261. 
32. Ibid. , 265. 
33. 1950 August 28. Letter to the author. 
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indicative of the rotation of the galaxy, respec- 
tively of the orbital motions of the stars in 
the galaxy. 
Tne quoted red shift of the lines in 
the spectrum of Sirius's companion is quantita- 
tively extremely inaccurate and trios not avail- 
able for a quantitative test of the theory. 
To sum up, it is true that a.11 observations 
of the sun and stars seem to indicate the exis- 
tence of an effect as predicted by the theory of 
relativity, but to separate this effect clearly 
from other overlapping shifts apears at present 
rather hopeless.3 
Other less critical effects are implied by the theory. 
In 1920 the Russian Fokker found that general relativity 
implied the addition of a very small amount of time to 
that required in the precession of the equinoxes. 
A further correction to astronomical calculations 
arose with respect to the advance of the perigee of the 
moon. The value predicted from general relativity is 1.94" 
per century, an amount below the observational limit. 
With respect to possible confirmation of this prediction, 
Eddington warned, "There are well -known irregular fluctua- 
tions in the moon's longitude which. attain rather large 
values, but it is generally considered that these are not 
of a type which can be explained by any amendment of 
gravitational theory. "35 
In his Presidential address to the British Association 
34. 1950 August 28. Letter to the author. 
35. 1923 The Ntherratieal Theory of Relativity, 99. 
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in 1927, Sir Edmund T. Whittaker- summarized three addi- 
tional and less obvious consequences of Einstein's theory. 
The deflection of light rays around gravitating bodies may 
be so pronounced in certain cases that the light ray will 
be permanently held by the attracting body, which it would 
airrroach spirally and asymptotically. 
Again, if there be any electrified particle at rest 
in a. varying gravitational field, that particle must emit 
radiation. 
A third consequence of the theory must be that every 
particle must have an impermeable ring -fence surrounding 
it. Writing on this aspect of the problem in 1949, J. L. 
Synge used a theoretical test -particle to bomb another 
particle.36 He found that, after suitable transformations, 
the test particle would reach the velocity of light as it 
reaches the center of the bombarded particle. Hence, with 
r=.0 as the center of the particle, the "passage of a test 
particle through the singularity r ®0 may be uniquely de- 
fined. "37 Thus, even in general relativity, the ring - 
fence can be penetrated. 
Immediately following the publication of the general 
36. 1950 "The Gravitational Field of a Particle" Pro - 
ceedi s of the Roil Irish Acad, (A) , 53, 83 -114. 
37. I 1OS 
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relativity theory, two large- scale movements in theoretical 
physics gathered momentum. The first, the construction of 
a cosmological scheme based on general relativity, flowered 
quickly. The second, the search for a unified field theory 
to account for the phenomena of electromagnetism as well 
as those of gravitation, proceeded more slowly under the 
ominous shadow of quantum mechanics. 
The Cosmological Yodels 
Investigating his original laws of the gravitational 
field, 
Einstein objected that these equations still possessed a 
solution when the universe was considered devoid of pon- 
derable matter. In order to remedy the situation he in- 
troduced 38 a term containing what became known as the 
"cosmological constant." The introduction of this arbi- 
trary constant,, which depends upon the existence of a 
"world -matter" filling all space, gave the equations the 
new form: 
Grp -2g, (G-2)) ° - 
The new addition to the theory implied that the 
38. 1917 "Kosmologische Betrachtungen zur allgemeinen 
Relativitätstheorie" Sitzungsberichte der Königlich 
Preussischen Ala demie der Wissenschaften Berlin , 
151. 
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world -matter, when considered on a large scale, would be 
uniformly distributed in a spherical srace.39 Eddington 
has urged the objection that there is the theoretical ne- 
cessity for assuming far more matter to exist than astro- 
nomical observations justify.40 That space is spherical 
in its nature implies that a ray of light passing along 
the outer boundaries of the universe will eventually re- 
turn to its point of origin. Furthermore, as de Sitter 
explained,41 ideally the image of the opposite side of the 
sun at an earlier time should be visible at the point an- 
tipodal to the sunts position. That such a phenomenon is 
not discoverable may, however, be due to the absorption of 
the light rays along the journey. When generated throughout 
an infinite stretch of time, the universe might be repre- 
sented as a cylindrical world in four -dimensional space - 
time. Because of the variable curvature of space -time, 
such a cylindrical world would represent, in its sphericity, 
only a rough approximation. Considered, therefore, in its 
spatial extensions, the universe would be of finite extent. 
In its temporal extension, however, it would be endless; 
39. Ibid., 149. 
40. 1920 S ace, Time, and Gravitation: An Outline of the 
General Theory of Relativity, 162. 
41. 17177-11-6n Einstein's T tory of Gravitation, and its 
Astronomical Consequences: III" I+Ionthly Notices of 
the Royal Astronomical Society, 
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there would be no uniquely defined moment of creation or 
termination of the cosmos. In a sense, therefore, a sepa- 
ration of time from space has been re- introduced. The 
passage of a particle through this spatio-temporal continuum 
would be defined by its world -line, and would produce a 
groove -lile track in its route. This world -model further 
carries the implication that once the distribution and the 
laws of motion for each particle are given, the entire 
past and future of the world- model are absolutely deter - 
minable. It must be remembered, however, that this world - 
model is arbitrarily restricted by excluding electromag- 
netic fields. 
Silberstein rejected Einstein's abandonment of the 
original infinitely large homaloidal world,42 and further 
insisted that Einstein's new cylindrical world led to the 
conclusion that every homogeneous body can have only a 
spherical shape.43 
The Dutch astronomer, de Sitter, was most outspoken 
against the cylindrical world. In a memoir coming soon 
after Einstein's innovation, he demonstrated a solution of 
the new equations which would hold even though no matter 
42. 1918 "Planetary I notion in Space -Time of any Constant 
Curvature according to the generalised Principle of 
Relativity" Monthly Notices of the Royal Astronomical 
Society, 78, 366. 
43. 1918 "Bizarre Conclusions derived from Einstein's 
Gravitation Theory" Monthly Notices of the Royal As- 
tronomical Society, 717766. 
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existed.44 The necessity for the cosmolo = :ical constant 
was removed, but the new matterless de Sitter world was 
nevertheless retained as a cosmological model. 
The de Sitter world can be represented as an empty 
four -dimensional continuum of space and imaginary time 
forming a spherical surface. When real time, however, is 
adopted, sections of the continuum form a four -dimensional 
hyperboloid. Both this and the Einstein cylindrical world 
are steady -state cosmological models. 
Followers of reach, however, rebelled at the thought 
of a world without matter, and totally rejected the empiri- 
cal possibility of the de Sitter world; apparently this is 
the reason for Einstein's refusal to accept the solution. 
A further interesting cosmological model is one in 
which Xço, and the world -model is static and spatially 
homogeneous. Such a model has been suggested by Kurt 
Gödel,45 and would be known as a rotating universe. One 
of the amazing properties of such a universe would be that 
it would be theoretically possible to relive past experien- 
ces and to affect those experiences so that they would 
44. 1917 "On Einstein's Theory of Gravitation, and its 
Astronomical Consequences; III" Monthly Notices of 
the Royal Astronomical Society, 77, 3 -28. 
45. 1949 - 11A Remark AboutThe Relationship Between Rela- 
tivity Theory and Idealistic Philosophy" Albert Ein- 
stein; Philosopher- Scientist, The Librarr o- f Lívina 
Philosophers, 7, 560 -561. 
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happen in a way different to those which had previously 
occurred. A red -shift of distant nebulae would not appear 
unless the rotating universe were also expanding. Empiri- 
cally, this theory seems impossible; it is, however, an 
interesting case. 
In 1939 G. C. McVittie resumed the defense of the hy- 
perbolic universe of infinite extent. The only postulate 
which will dismiss a hyperbolic universe in general rela- 
tivity, he affirmed, would be that there are large quanti- 
ties of unobservable matter in the universe.46 Such a 
postulate would mean the introduction of an experimentally 
unverifiable ad hoc hypothesis -- always an unwelcome stranger. 
Meantime, Sir Arthur Eddington, who had been respon- 
sible for a considerable part of the relativity literature, 
had begun to investigate the more philosophical problems 
rooted in relativity. Possibly under an influence of 
Whitehead,47 Eddington emphasized the fact that the notion 
of a point -event is the fundamental concept in relativity. 
He diverged from the ir,Thiteheadian thesis, however, in 
46. "Observation and Theory in Cosmology" Proceedings of 
the Physical Society of London, 51, 536. 
47. ;Thiteheá3ls contribution to the symposium, "Time,, 
Space and Material, Are they, and if So, in What 
Sense, the Ultimate Data of Science," in which he em- 
phasized the primacy of the event, was published in 
the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume II: 
Problems orS- ciince and Philosphi , in 1919. J te- 
head's more comprehensive An Enquiry Concerning the 
Principles of Natural Knowledge, appeared the same 
year. Eddington's contribution is dated 1920 (see 
footnote 48). 
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asserting that it was an indefinable concept and beyond 
the range of human understanding .48 
Because of the close interrelation of matter and 
space -time in general relativity, Eddington suggested that 
the presence of "mind" in the universe may be more funda- 
mental than was generally supposed. 
I am almost inclined to attribute the whole re- 
sponsibility for the laws of mechanics and 
gravitation to the mind, and deny the external 
world any share in them. So far as I can see, 
all that Nature was required to furnish is a 
four -dimensional aggregate of point -events; it 
should be possible to pick out a set of entities 
which would serve as point -events, however badly 
Nature had managed things in the external world. 
For the use made of point - events the mind alone 
is responsible.49 
By 1938, Eddington had developed this concept to the 
philosophy of "Selective Subjectivism," based upon his in- 
terpretation of relativity that physical hypotheses had to 
some extent been replaced by epistemological principles. 
Using these principles, Eddington presented an overwhelming 
case for his fundamental thesis. The basic equations of 
physics, in which quantum mechanics plays a large part, 
he formed from four dimensionless natural constants, one 
of which was his famous cosmical number --the number of 
elementary particles in the universe. These constants he 
48. 1920 "The Meaning of Matter and the Laws of Nature 
According to the Theory of Relativity" Mind, new 
series, 29, 147. 
49. Ibid., 155. 
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believed to be capable of unambiguous a priori predic- 
tion.50 His reconstruction of ordinary physical constants 
on the basis of these natural constants gave surprisingly 
close approximations to their observed values. 
Eddington's scheme rests on the assumption that the 
various species of elementary particles investigated by 
physical science are only subspecies of a set of essentially 
similar fundamental particles. This assumption is not 
completely justified on the physical level, but it is 
nevertheless an assumption which Whitehead also chose to 
defend in his philosophy of organism. But in comprehen- 
siveness, Eddington's cosmological system rivals any that 
physical science has been able to derive. It also has the 
signal advantage of drawing equally from relativity theory 
and quantum mechanics, an advantage not to be lightly dis- 
missed. 
Meantime Hubble had found that the other galaxies are 
receding from that one in which the solar system is located 
with a velocity roughly proportional to their distance 
from it. The immediate conclusion is that the universe 
A 
must be not of a static nature, but expanding. Lemaitre 
showed the cylindrical world to be unstable: upon the in- 
troduction of a disturbing force, the Einstein world would 
begin to contract or to expand. Lemattre showed that upon 
50. The Philosophy of Physical Science, 58. 
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expanding, the Einstein universe would ténd to distribute 
its material content, approaching a zero density as a 
limiting case. It is, of course, possible that the Ein- 
stein universe may begin to contract after reaching a 
limit of expansion. 
The question of the curvature of cosmological models 
was also drawn into question. Although Einstein had been 
convinced that the flat space -time of special relativity 
could not form a suitable stage for the operation of 
gravitation, others (including Whitehead) were less doubt- 
ful. Many were dissatisfied with the non- homogeneity of 
space -time in general relativity; others believed that the 
accounting for the conservation of angular momentum was 
accomplished by an unnatural means. 
With respect to using flat space -time, it was estab- 
lished that if the tensor gik is only the gravitational 
potential, and if an additional tensor yik, describing the 
metric of flat space were supplied, then Einstein's 
general relativity could be validly interpreted in flat 
space -time. The improvements in the resulting theory are 
primarily formal. A more straightforward formulation of 
the laws of conservation of energy and momentum is pos- 
sible. In general relativity of flat space -time, the ten- 
sor gik, unhampered by the metric tensor Ìik, 
produces the 
alteration of the local velocity of light rays. This dis- 
tinction is one which is entirely absent from general 
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relativity. Because of the presence of two contrasting 
tensors, there may be the further possibility of supplying 
an explanation of the small positive residuals in the 
Michelson - Morley experiment. 
Dirac, rejecting positive and negative curvatures of 
space as undesirable, adopted flat space in 1938.51 A 
basic assumption was that the dimensionless constants of 
nature discussed earlier are not fixed, but vary roughly 
in proportion to the age of the epoch. 
A. Fapapetrou, in adopting flat space -time in 1947, 
was concerned with general relativity's treatment of the 
conservation of angular momentum.52 He declared that only 
by restricting the gik and introducing the flat -space 
metrical tensor y ik, could angular momentum be satisfac- 
torily explained. 
Professor George Temple in 1925 presented a paper53 
which he claimed could be responsible for all the predic- 
tions usually regarded as crucial tests of special and 
general relativity. He assumed the independence of flat 
space and time, in violent contrast to orthodox relativists. 
51. P. A. M. Dirac. 1938 "A new basis for cosmology" 
Proceedings of the Royal Society of London, A, 165, 
205. 
52. 1948 "Einstein's Theory of Gravitationand Flat Space" 
Proceedings of the Irish Academ , A, 52, 11 -23. 
53. "On Mass and Enemy" Proceeiñgs oche Physical So- 
ciety of London, 37, 269 -281. 
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Three further postulates were introduced: (1) Newtonian 
dynamics is valid, again a violent contrast, (2) Maxwellian 
electrodynamics is valid, and (3) the crucial and most im- 
portant postulate that "variations in the potential energy 
of a body...are always accompanied by proportionate changes 
in its mass. "54 The hypotheses were of such a nature as 
to be attractive to the experimental physicist, but the 
memoir attracted little attention. The additional advance 
of 42.9" per century to the perihelion of Mercury followed 
from the Temple postulates; so did the deflection of a ray 
of light in a gravitational field. The shift of the 
Fraunhöfer lines, however, was calculated to be twice the 
amount predicted by Einstein, thus representing a more 
pronounced divergence from observation than the overesti- 
mate of general relativity. A point of improvement, how- 
ever, lay in the production of formulas coinciding with 
those arising from the Bohr -Sommerfeld theory of the fine - 
structure of hydrogen and ionized helium, and with those 
describing the action of electrons in an electromagnetic 
field. Eddington, who heard the reading of the memoir, 
suggested the most likely criticism of the theory; that it 
represented the addition of arbitrary material to classi- 
cal theory.55 Nevertheless, it signalled an appreciation 
54. Ibid., 269. 
5.5. 1925 Proceedings of the Physical Society. of London, 
37, 281. 
131 
of Poynting's ideal of describing the sensible in terms of 
the sensible. 
"It has become clear," Sir Edmund Whittaker pronounced, 
"that General Relativity does not stand alone but is a 
member of a family of theories that have many features in 
common. In this family the most serious rival to Ein- 
stein's theory is E. A. Milne's Theory of Kinematic Rela- 
tivity. " 
56 
Kinematic relativity was first given a full exposi- 
tion by E. A. Milne in his 1933 Aberystwyth Lectures.57 
Insisting that the current relativistic cosmologies implied 
basic conditions which were contrary to observational evi- 
dence, Milne suggested a totally new beginning. Existing 
relativities implied that matter must be annihilated or 
destroyed within the experience of any observer. A modi- 
fication of the laws of geometry with the curved spacé- 
time solutions implies a corresponding modification of the 
laws of the gravitational field and vice versa. A different 
geometry exists for each possible gravitational system. 
The fusion of space and time obscures the undeniable fact 
of the passage of time. It is necessary to assume as a 
physical fact the constancy of the velocity of light in 
56. 1950 Book Review of Al bert Einstein: Philosopher - 
Scientist, Scientific American, 152, 7. - 
57. Published in 1935 under the title, Relativity, Gravi- 
tation, and World- Structure. 
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vacuo. The universe must consist of a finite number of 
particles. All these conditions, which were representa- 
tive of the necessary conclusions of orthodox relativistic 
cosmology, Milne held to be either artificial distinctions 
or directly contrary to experience. 
Abandoning the notion of the homogeneous distribution 
of natter in the universe on the grounds that motion would 
thereby be rendered impossible, Milne adopted as his "Cos- 
mological Principle" a postulate to replace homogeneity. 
The cosmological principle asserts that two observers on 
equivalent particles in a given system will give coin- 
ciding descriptions of that system. A comparison with 
Hubble's "sample principle" suggests itself. The sample 
principle asserts that two equivalent portions of the sys- 
tem will exhibit the same general characters. The exten- 
sion of the sample principle to a description by equivalent 
observers of the entire system can then be identified with 
the cosmological principle. Consonant with this, Milne 
constructed a simple kinematic world -model adopting a flat 
space, in which all the particles in the universe were al- 
ready in existence.58 Although accepting the theory that 
galaxies are receding with a velocity proportional to their 
distance from the observer, he charged that the interpre- 
tation that space itself is expanding is meaningless. It 
58. E. A. Milne. 1935 Relativir, Gravitation, and 
World- Structure, 9. 
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is simply a question of describing; the actual motions of 
astronomical bodies. 
In kinematic relativity, two time -scales are of im- 
portance: t -time and'r -time. The clarification of this 
distinction is due to Milne. Time expressed in terms of á 
is the Newtonian time -scale, used for simplicity in phy- 
sics; the age of the universe and its volume, according to 
an ordinary T- clock, are infinite. The second time- scale, 
however, is that marked out by atomic processes, e. g., 
radioactivity. The relation between the two times may be 
expressed by the equation, 
r= t0 log (t /t0)+ to, 
where t0 is the present age of the universe on the t- scale, 
about 2 x 109 years.59 It is in terms of t -time that 
Kinematic relativity displays its most interesting fea- 
tures. 
Around any given observer the universe will always 
appear spherically symmetrical; every particle is sur- 
rounded by other particles. The particle -density around 
each particle will be locally homogeneous,60 but will tend 
to increase as the radius of the included area increases. 
The universe itself will have a radius r m ct, where t is 
59. E. A. Milne. 1944 "On the Nature of Universal Gravi- 
tation" Monthly Notices of the Royal Astronomical So- 
ciety, 104, 134. 
60. A condition whose validity is questioned by Shapley. 
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the age of the universe in the appropriate time- scale.61 
Furthermore, at this outer boundary, the particles will be 
advancing radially outwards with the speed of light. Be- 
cause of this critical speed at the boundaries, they will 
never be reached by any particle not travelling with that 
speed. At the outer boundaries of the universe (r=ct) the 
density will tend to infinity. Consequently, the total 
number of particles, their total mass and energy, will all 
be infinite, although the volume is of finite, but ex- 
panding size. It is a consequence of this condition that 
the laws of gravitation will be independent of Einstein's 
cosmological constant. By virtue of its infinite number 
of particles, it presents a contrast to Eddington's ex- 
panding universe of a constant finite number of particles. 
It is because the quanta of light emitted earlier 
will have a decreased frequency that the red -shift of the 
solar or stellar spectra might be expected.62 Thus, an 
empirical result predicted by Einstein as a result of one 
condition appears also in kinematic relativity, but with a 
wholly different justification. 
The density at any place in the universe will diminish 
as a function of time, since every particle is in uniform 
61. 2 x 109 years. 
62. E. A. Milne. 1944 "On the Nature of Universal Gravi- 
tation" Monthly Notices of the Ryal Astronomical So- 
911tr, 104, 134. 
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outward motion. There is, however, no ultimate state of 
the universe as a whole, although the system is, in a 
sense, deterministic. 
Considering the condition tr.0, Milne found that his 
system, in common with the other expanding models, would 
reduce to a point. However, he explicitly declined to ac- 
cept Le_nattre's hypothesis of a super-radioactive atom at 
t ° 0.63 The origin of the contents of the universe may 
possibly be attributed to a First Cause. But, he warned, 
"once we have added a First Cause, our system sets no 
limit to the further activities of this First Cause, for 
we have left room for unending experiments in -volution. "64 
Einstein's rejection of his strongest rival relativity 
theory is based upon disagreement with the scope of Milne's 
fund9mental principles. Specifically directing comment 
upon kinematic relativity, Einstein wrote, 
Concerning vZilne's ingenious reflections I can 
only say that I find their theoretical basis too 
narrow. From my point of view one cannot arrive, 
by way of theory, at any at least somewhat reli- 
able results in the field of cosmology, if one 
makes o use of the principle of general relati - 
vity.6u 
63. Ibid., 340. 
64. Ibid. , 139. 
65. 1949 "Remarks Concerning the Essays Brought Together 
in this Co- operative Volume" Albert Einstein: Philoso- 
2her- Scientist, The Librar, oTLi iil s'ophers, 7, 
684. Translated by Pau rt iür Sc íípp. -y__ _..__...__ 
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`;i. H. McCrea, also adopting flat space and time, has 
defended the steady -state theories particularly with re- 
spect 'so the creation of new r ntter in terms of the spon- 
taneous emergence of hydrogen atoms. In McCrea's steady - 
state solution, he extended the cosmological principle to 
include the time -dimension, arriving at the "perfect cos- 
mological principle. "66 Accordingly, a constant density 
of world- matter can be accomplished by balancing the crea- 
tion of new matter with a recession constant describing 
the expansion of the universe. 
Summarizing the importance of relativity, Einstein 
has written, 
The eminent heuristic significance of the 
general principle of relativity lies in the fact 
that it leads us to the search for those 
or equations which are in their general covariant 
formulation the lira lest ones op ssible; among 
these we shall have tó look for the field equa- 
tions of physical space.67 
The Unified Field Theories 
It was noted earlier ( pages 120 -121 of this thesis) 
that two problems attracted the physicists after the pub- 
lication of general relativity. The construction of 
66. 1950 "The steady -state theory of the expanding uni- 
verse" Endeavour, 9, 3 -10. 
67. 1949 "4utobiographisches" Albert Einstein: Philoso- 
pher- Scientist, The Library of Livinn Philosophers, 
7, 68. Translated by Paul Arthur Schilpp, 22. cit., 
69. 
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cosmological models has been considered; the problem of 
constructing a unified field theory therefore commands at- 
tention. 
That a successful unified field theory which will 
provide critical tests is seriously doubted by many physi- 
cists. Even severer doubts arise on the question of the 
possibility of reconciling relativity and quantum rnechenics 
as they now stand, but this second and extremely trouble- 
some problem will be postponed until the end of the chap- 
ter. But the justification for attempting a unification 
lies in the fact that without unification, the gravitational 
field is essentially conceived (by the orthodox relativists) 
as a geometrical field, and the electromagnetic field as a 
physical field. The bifurcation is undesirable. Unified 
field theories attempt to describe the electromagnetic 
field as a geometrical field as well. Whitehead would de- 
fend the attempt to unify on the basis of making them both 
physical fields. 
In order to prepare for the erection of a unified 
field theory, certain considerations involving the geomet- 
rical continuum which were of no concern in general rela- 
tivity, must be satisfied. The geometry of general rela- 
tivity, as well as general relativity itself, is strictly 
valid only in the absence of an electromagnetic field. 
When the geometrical continuum is further generalized, a 
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much broader conception of parallelism is possible, Rs was 
demonstrated in 1917 by Levi -Civita. In order to calcu- 
late the interactions of a physical field, it is necessary 
to describe the possible translations of the representa- 
tive vectors. Such a requirement can be accomplished by 
means of a "parallel transport," whereby the properties of 
the field are unaltered. By means of a generalized defi- 
nition of parallel transport in the affine geometries, a 
family of curves called loxodromes can be considered to be 
responsible for describing the action of the electromag- 
netic field. 
One of the earliest attempts to form a unified field 
theory was that at Edwin B. Wilson and Gilbert N. Lewis, 
published in 1913,68 and which Whitehead acknowledged to 
be a stimulus to his own relativity writings.69 Using a 
four -dimensional non -Euclidean geometry of space -time, the 
authors demonstrated the laws of electromagnetism and 
gravitation to be capable of simple interpretation in 
terms of this geometry. Congruence was defined in terns 
of parallel vectors, but the notion of a parallel trans- 
port was not yet presented. A novel aspect of the theory 
68. "The Space -Time Manifold of Relativity. The Non - 
Euclidean Geometry of Mechanics and Electromagnetics" 
Troceedi s of the American Academx of Arts and 
Sciences, 48, 389 -507. 
69. 1919 An Engüia Concerner the Principles of Natural 
Knowlédge, vii. 
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was the introduction of a four- dimensional vector, called 
the "vector of extended momentum." This new vector was 
defined to be the product of the unit tangent" to the 
world- line71 of a material particle and the mass72 of the 
particle. By asserting the conservation of extended mo- 
mentum, the conservation laws for momentum, mass, and 
energy follow. The fields arising from the vector of ex- 
tended ,momentum can be identified with the fields of gravi- 
ta t ional operation. 
oon after general relativity was published, Ernst 
Reichenbttcher submitted an attempt at unification, but 
found a difficulty in finding a natural division of entities 
which might account for a divergence of fundamental elec- 
trical particles.73 
But the first attempt at unification to attract con- 
siderable attention was that of Hermann \'Ieyl, who adopted 
the generalized geometry of Levi -Civita. From the geomet- 
rical structure Weyl showed that the Maxweliian equations 
followed naturally, 74 but in place of Einstein's simple 
70. A vector quantity. 
71. Called by Wilson and Lewis a (: )- curve. 
72. The scalar quantity determined by a person at rest 
relative to the particle. 
73. 1917 "Grundzuge zu einer Theorie der Elektrizitat und 
der Gravitation" Annalen der Ph sik, (4), 52, 134 -173. 
74. 1918 "Gravitation urn - 1'IeMiz tä " Sitzungsberichte 
der Preussischen Aki demie der Wise enscbaften -TBer ñ) ,. 
465 -480. 
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gravitational equations, a more complex form emerged. The 
difficulty of reconciling the existence of various kinds 
of elementary particles with the geometrical demands was 
still unsolved. In his definitive discussion on the rela- 
tivity theories arising from a series of lectures in 
Zürich in 1917, Wely suggested that in his own newly in- 
troduced "relativity of gauge" the fact that elementary 
particles have the same quantity of charge and mass is a 
consequence of the fact that they are "embedded" in a com- 
mon world.75 
But the decision of later writings is that the standing 
difficulty in the way of adoption of Weyl's, as of any 
other, unified field theory, is that it fails to designate 
some consequences in addition to the Maxwellian equations 
which may be tested for validity. Although they accom- 
plish their task of providing a unification of the laws of 
gravitation and electromagnetism, they fail to exceed the 
grounds already opened by the simpler general relativity 
and Naxwellian electrodynamics. 
Pour years later Weyl appended a note to republica- 
tions of his "Gravitation and Elektrizitat" the admission, 
"I do not believe that the problem of matter is to be 
solved by a mere field theory."76 
75. Space- Time -Material, translated by Henry L. Brose, 300. 
76. "Gravitation and Electricity" The Frinci2le of Rela- 
tivity, 216. 
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Weyl's work had attracted Eddington's acceptance, and 
in 1920 the latter scientist considered the marriage of 
gravitation and electricity to have been effected.77 
An even more generalized infinitesimal geometry was 
developed by Wilhelm Wirtinger, who disclaimed the need 
for the assumption of a metric geometry.78 One primary 
difficulty arising from such a geometry lies in its point 
of application to physical observation. It may, however, 
be a powerful method of analysis. 
One of the most recent unified field theories is that 
of T. Podolanski,79 in which the fundamental task of elec- 
tromagnetism is accomplished by raising the number of di- 
mensions to six. By restricting the connections of the 
six -dimensional manifold through the agency of a "struc- 
ture axiom" based on the parallel transport notion, he de- 
composed the continuum into a four -dimensional family of 
flat laminations. The interpretation therefore follows 
that the world of "events" takes place in the four- dimen- 
sional spaces normal to the laminations. Because of this 
77. 1920 Space, Time, and Gravitation: An Outline of the 
General Theory of Relativity, 174. 
78. 19- 22 "On a General Infinitesimal Geometry, in Reference 
to the Theory of Relativity" Transactions of the Cam- 
bridge Philosophical Society, 22, 440. 
79. 1950 "Unified field theory in six dimensions" Pro- 
ceedings of the Royal Society of London, A, 201, 234- 
260. 
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four -dimensional immersion in the six- dimensional con- 
tinuum, two fields of inertial forces arise. One is de- 
fined to be responsible for the Maxwellian field, the 
other possesses negative energy capable of nullifying the 
singularities of the first. 
The use of a spatio- temporal continuum of dimensions 
higher than four has been popular, but it raises an addi- 
tional problem. Newtonian physics had asserted an abso- 
lute spatial reference frame and an absolute time -series. 
It was just this axiom which special relativity repudiated. 
Professor Carl Neumann in 1869 contended that some preferen- 
tial body must exist in the Newtonian mechanics with some 
absolute basis of reference, which he called the "Body 
Alpha." Professor William Wilson has recently suggested 
that relativity theories in which the world is embedded in 
a five- or higher- dimensional world, have, in effect, in- 
troduced a, new "Body Alpha." This new "Body Alpha" is 
nothing other than this n- dimensional (n) 4) world.80 
Professor Wilson has formulated the suspicion that was 
voiced by other mathematicians, philosophers, end physi- 
cists, that an absolute spatio - temporal frame was not 
really eliminated by rölativistic cosmologies. 
But Einstein's latest attempt (he discarded earlier 
80. 1950 "The Body Alpha: An Essay on the Meaning of 
Relativity" Science PIress, 38, 635 -636. 
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ones) rejects the belief that raising the number of dimen- 
sions is a useful solution. He has further tried using 
complex rather than real transformations of coordinates, 
and believes that to be of no immediate promise.81 
In this newest solution, finished late in 1949, 
Einstein proposed the substitution of the non -symmetrical 
gik 
for the symmetrical 
gilc 
of general relativity. Thus, 
gik = gik v 
where the bar under the covariant indices denotes a sym- 
metrical tensor, and the V indicates a real or purely 
imaginary skew -symmetric tensor. The substitution leads 
to the interpretation that "the electromagnetic field his 
to do with an anti -symmetric tensor. "82 
Three equations then suffice to give a system of at- 
tractive simplicity:83 
Rik a 0 
= 0 
81. 1949 "Autobiographisches" Albert Einstein: Thilosopher- 
Scientist, The Library of Living -Philosophers, 7, 90. 
Translated by Taul Arthur Schilpp, 21. cit., 91. 
82. Albert Einstein, op. cit., 90. Translated by Taul 
Arthur Schilpp, óp. cit., 91. Schilpp's translation 
is used in this quotation. Einstein's term, schief- 
symmetrischen, suggests that "skew- symmetric" would 
be a preferable translation. 
83. 1950 The Meaning of Relativity, fourth edition, 140- 
141. 
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In this system Rik =.0 replaces the field equation Goy, = 0 
of general relativity. gK, = 0 and (1 : 0 govern the 
laws of the parallel transport operation. A fourth condi- 
tion which may be added is that84 
V w. 1 - P 
expressing the fact that the vanishing of the absolute 
derivative of a tensor entails the vanishing of its asso- 
ciated tensor density. 
The full consequences of this new Einsteinian theory 
are not yet apparent. Professor Infeld has observed that 
Einstein's new theory is fully a unitary 
theory. In it only the field appears, no sour- 
ces of the field. The existence of matter will 
have to be deduced from the field equations by 
finding solutions that represent great concen- 
trations of the field. 
The question as to whether this new state of affairs is 
satisfactory lies open. Certainly Infeld's interpretation 
entails some consequences which philosophers, rightly or 
wrongly, will have difficulty in approving. 
Einstein appraised the probable significance of his 
new unified field theory as representing a "fair proba- 
bility of being found valid, if the way to an exhaustive 
description of physical reality on the basis of the con- 
tinuum turns out to be possible at all. "86 
84. Albert Einstein, loc. cit. 
85. Leopold Infeld. 1950 "On Einstein's New Theory" The 
American Scholar, 19, 431 -432. 
86. "Autobiographisches" Albert Einstein: Philosopher - 
Scientist, The Library of Living Philosophers, 7, 92. 
Translated 7-Paul Pau Arthur Sc pp, op. cit., 93. 
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Attempts to wed quantum mechanics to relativity have 
been few in number, and its possibility in terms of field 
theories has been, in most quarters, severely doubted. 
Some sort of unification must, however, be achieved if the 
two divergent branches of physical science are to describe 
a common universe. 
Eddington was one of the earliest to consider the 
problem and again applied his epistemological a-id axioma- 
tic methods. Assuming Dirac's linear wave equation of the 
electron to be an adequate description and the validity of 
Weyl's relativity of gauge, Eddington postulated a four - 
dimensional hypersphere of uniform curvature in an Euclidean 
space of five dimensions.87 It would then be this hyper - 
sphere which represented the physical continuum of events. 
A particle would not be modelled on classical lines, but 
would be a "conceptual entity whose probability distribu- 
tion is specified by a wave function. "88 
The possibility of unification of the principle of 
invariance with quantum mechanics appeared to be the cru- 
cial issue to Professor Max Born in 1938.89 It was ap- 
parent, he argued, that the molar gravitational laws could 
not be considered applicable to ultimate particles. 
87. 1936 Relativity Theory of Protons and Electrons, 55. 
88. Ibid. , 8. 
89. 193 "A suggestion for unifying quantum theory and 
relativity" Proceedings of the R2yal Society of Lon- 
don, A, 165, 291 -303. 
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Professor Born then defined a metric tensor k1 of a 
subatomic p- space, and presented equations analogous to 
those of general relativity: 
pk l - . (p+ 2 yX °), k1= -k Tkl 
The corresponding model would be a closed hyperspheric mo- 
mentum space. 
Dirac's cosmological essay mentioned earlier (page 
129 of this thesis) contained an interesting note with re- 
spect to the problem now at hand. General relativity, he 
reasoned, could not be expected to be valid in the cosmo- 
logical model he had proposed since the gravitational "con- 
stant" would vary with the cosmic epoch, as the other 
natural constants would.90 
In the application of relativistic methods to quantum 
phenomena, with the exception of particles with zero spin, 
no really valid appraisal of its position can be made, as- 
serted M. H. L. Pryce.91 Yet he attempted a unification 
of the special theory and quantum mechanics on the grounds 
that perhaps a definitional approach may be fruitful. 
Again, the continuum adopted was that of flat space -time. 
It is not clear that Einstein's new theory will have 
90. 1938 "A new basis for cos]ology" Troceedings of the 
Royal Society of London, A, 165, 206. 
91. 1948 "The mass - centre in the restricted theory of 
relativity and its connexion with the quantum theory 
of elementary particles" Proceedings of the Royal So- 
ciety of London, A, 195, 69. 
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solutions which might correspond to the "elementary parti- 
cles" of quantum mechanics. Nor is it apparent how field 
theories, based as they are on a continuous, deterministic 
foundation, will be able to explain the discontinuous ac- 
tions of elementary particles in a world where it seems 
that true indeterminism has reign. 
Since his earlier excursion into producing a unifica- 
tion of the two apparently divergent branches of physical 
theory, Professor Born is more inclined to accent the sta- 
tistical nature of physical laws. In his 1948 Waynflete 
Lectures, he said of the belief in the harmony of nature, 
This belief has played a. considerable part 
in the development of theoretical physica --re- 
member Maxwell's equations of the electromagnetic 
field, or Einstein's relativity- -but how far it 
is a real guide in the search of the unknown or 
just the expression of our satisfaction to have 
discovered a significant relation, I do not ven- 
ture to say.92 
Sir Edmund T. Whittaker has pointed out that "The appeal 
of Relativity has been further weakened by the growing 
doubt as to whether continuous differential equations in 
four -dimensional space -time can possibly provide a solu- 
tion of some of the problems of quantum theory. "93 
Professor Rosenfeld opined, "...if we choose to 
92. Natural Philosophy of Cause and Chance, 124. 
93. 1950 Review of AlbeT EEinsteiñ Phhflo opher- Scientist, 
Scientific American, 182, 58. This doubt has been 
further emphasized by Sir Edmund Whittaker throughout 
supervisory conferences, 1949 -1951. 
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indulge in dreams of formal beauty, we must realise that 
we cut ourselves off from the 'solid ground of Nature.' "94 
But Professor Einstein, the fsther of relativity and 
a substantial contributor to the foundations of quantum 
mechanics, is convinced that the attempt must continue in 
terms of field theory. 
94. 1950 "Professor Einstein's Dilemma" The Listener, 44, 
824. The article is the script of a broadcast in the 
Third Programme by Professor Rosenfëld. 
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CHATTER FOUR 
THE DATA AND T THODS OF RELATIVITY 
Thysical science, cognizant of the boundaries of its 
specialization, has always given the warning to philoso- 
phers that scientific reality may not necessarily be the 
metaphysical reality they are seeking. Metaphysicians, on 
the other hand, have as one of their objects, the unifica- 
tion, if any be possible, of the results of the more de- 
tailed inquiries into the nature of the universe, including 
entities not considered by the natural sciences. There is 
then the investigation of whether any metaphysical status 
is to be attached to the elementary data of those sciences. 
Even if no ultimately real status attaches to those data, 
do they hold any implied suggestions for metaphysical 
method, of which analogy is one of the chief constituents ?1 
There is also the possibility, which must be seriously 
considered, as to whether the whole of metaphysics might 
not be the summation of the self- criticisms of all the 
1. The method of analogy has been one which Thomi s is have 
consistently adopted in metaphysics. Probably the 
most exhaustive and fruitful non -Thomist inquiry into 
the use of analogy in metaphysics has been that or 
Professor Dorothy M. Emmet. 1945 The Nature of 'Meta- 
physical Thinking. 
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more special sciences.`' The problem will be considered in 
greater detail in Chapter XIII. 
When, therefore, science itself rejects, or at the 
very least, throws serious doubts upon its fundamental da- 
ta of venerable antiquity, netaphysicians must, of neces- 
sity, be actively interested in the new implications. 
The revolution which had been brewing for a quarter 
of a century had reached active expression in the rela- 
tivistic writers. Tinkowski was certainly among the first 
to realize that the die had been cast. His 1908 address 
to the Assembly of German Natural Scientists and Physi- 
cians in Köln was the occasion of the famous prediction: 
"Henceforth space by itself, and time by itself, are 
doomed to fade away into mere shadows, and only a kind of 
union of the two will preserve an independent reality. "3 
Minkowski's "independent reality" must not be interpreted 
to mean "independent metaphysical reality." It is certain 
that for the majority of the relativistic physicists there 
was a totally new frame of reference for their calculations. 
On the question of the metaphysical meaning of the new 
2. For an excellent discussion of this possibility see 
Professor Herbert Dingle's James Scott Lecture to the 
Royal Society of Edinburgh for 1948. 1949 "The Nature 
of Scientific Philosophy" Troceedinrrs of the Royal So- 
ciety of Edinburoh, A, 62, 400- 411. Sir Edmund T. 
Whittaker has indicated his agreement in large part 
with Dingle's thesis, in a supervisory conference, 
1951 February 19. 
3. 1909 "Raum und Zeit" Physikalische Zeitschrift, 10, 104. 
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space -time, perhaps Samuel Alexander was the first to com- 
ment. Alexander considered that independent reality to 
have been conclusively established in a metaphysical sense, 
and erécted his famous philosophical system on this iden- 
tification. Total Space -Time, the synthesis of all per- 
spectives of space -time holds, therefore, an absolute sig- 
nificance.4 From the realm of Space -Time there was a "ni- 
sus" towards self- transcendence; successive stages of 
realization were, for the level immediately transcended, 
"Deity." Alexander's work will receive more careful con - 
sideration in Chapter VII. 
In spite of his unguarded ascription of independent 
metaphysical reality to space -time, Alexander nevertheless 
performed for post -relativistic philosophers a task compa- 
rable in meaninfulness to that of Bradley a little over a 
decade earlier. In no sense does that mean that the views 
of those two writers is to be identified. Furthermore, 
the 1916 -1918 Gifford Lectures formed the first metaphysi- 
cal attempt in the "grand style" which England had produced 
for many years. Despite a highly questionable initial 
groundwork, then, Alexander had performed a valuable ser- 
vice for metaphysics. 
4. Space, Time, and Deit , 1, 91. Reference is to pagi- 
nation í= ñ th.e 192vis ed) edition. The first edi- 
tion appeared in 1920. 
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In 1919 a symposium headed by Alfred North Whitehead 
considered one of the questions of fundamental importance 
for philosophers and physicists in the new era; In what 
sense (if any) are time, space, and material the ultimate 
data of science? Inasmuch as the unique contributions of 
Whitehead on relativity and their implications will be 
considered in the following two chapters, only a summary 
of his 1919 memoir will be of importance at this juncture. 
His fundamental thesis at this stage of his development 
was that events are the fundamental physical data.5 Time, 
space, and material are only abstractions from this new 
fundamental entity. 
With the assertion that time, space, and material are 
abstractions from fundamental physical data, Sir Oliver 
Lodge agreed.6 However, he insisted, that does not make 
them any less real; they represent the most convenient 
means of explaining force and motion, which he held to be 
the primary data of science.7 The choice of the word 
"force" is an unhappy one, and the substitution of the 
word "field" might have been desirable. However, in view 
5. "Symposium: Time, Space, and Material, Are 
if So, in What Sense, the Ultimate Data of 
Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 
lems of Science and Philosophy, 44 -57. 
6. 1919 "Sympos m; Time, Space, and IIateria.l, 
and if So, in What Sense, the Ultimate Data 
Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 
lems of Science and Philoso hhr, 58. 





of Science ?" 
II: Prob- 
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of the fact that Lodge held no brief for the principle of 
relativity at that time,8 perhaps he deliberately avoided 
the use of the word "field." Apparently he still thought 
ï 
in terms of his own 1894 memoir on "Aberration Problems," 
for he concluded, "I conceive that ultimately all the pro- 
perties of the material universe will be expressible in 
terms of the fundamental and omnipresent ether of space. "9 
Here, then, was a scientist of note who insisted that 
relativity had by no means necessitated a rejection of the 
fundamental physical data. 
Tne contribution of Yrs. Adrian Stephen was couched 
in terms which Bergson might have used. The concise and 
pointed thesis was that "material is the ultimate datum 
for science, and space is an a priori form imposed upon 
those objects. With time science is powerless to deal. "10 
In reviewing Mrs. Stephen's paper, Broad suggested a word 
of praise which could scarcely be better worded: "Mrs. 
Stephen does Bergson better than Bergson himself. "11 
The theory that conceptions of space, time, and ma- 
terial are rooted in complex physiological processes in 
8. Ibid., 62. 
9. Ibid., 66. 
10. Stephen. 1919 "Symposium: Time, Space, and Material, 
Are They, and if So, in What Sense, the Ultimate Data 
of Science ?" Aristotelian Society, Supplementary 
Volume II: Fro - of Science and Philosophy, 87 -88.. 
11. 1920 "Critical Review" Mind, new series, 29, 233. 
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the percipient alone was maintained by Henry Head.12 It 
is perhaps not too much to expect that some day a precise 
sensual pattern -physiological correspondence may some day 
be made, but then the problem of the external world remains 
unsolved. Even if the present data of time, space, and 
material are physiologically defined entities, the added 
news of this conditioning throws no further light on the 
extra- percipient entities which science would then describe. 
Necessary though it may be to remember that physiological 
processes are inextricably associated with perceptions, 
there seems to be no resultant indication of a clarifica- 
tion of the nature of the "external" world. 
The implied result of the relativity writings was that 
time, space, and material, in their classical significance, 
were not the ultimate data of science. Time and space, as 
independent and absolute reference frames, had been 
abolished. When dealing with terrestrial mechanics, it is 
true, the classical forms of analysis still represented 
the sil- :plest ones. However, it was understood that the 
classical forms were not strictly correct. 
As fused space -time, in which the two formerly inde- 
pendent frames could be treated homogeneously, they served 
12. 1919 "Symposium: Time, Space, and Taterial, Are They, 
and if So, in What Sense, the Ultimate Data of 
Science ?" Aristotelian Society, Supplementary 
Volume II: Problems of Science and Philosophy, 77. 
161 
to eltplain the operation of the gravitational field, and 
promised to throw light on the operation of the electro- 
magnetic field. By explaining the operation of fields, 
therefore, the metric of space -time could stake a stronger 
claim to being "ultimate data." than its absolute space- 
and-time counterpart. Nevertheless, irregularities in the 
spatio- temporal continuum merely indicated the presence of 
discrete entities, on whose nature the continuum did not 
shed any light. Space -time could only hope to explain the 
interaction of the effects apparently produced by tl enti- 
ties with which its irregularities were associated. In 
the sense, then, of providing a descriptive framework for 
physical effects, space -time could present a reasonable 
claim to being an ultimate datum of science. 
The metaphysical reality or space -time is highly 
questionable, and perhaps no really satisfactory answer 
can be expected. Consider, however, events happening in 
the physical universe.. The events are defined to be hap- 
penings or persistences in a four -dimensional hyper- 
volume of space -time. If there is to be anything meta- 
physically real as a result of relativity theory, it must 
be these various happenings. But this means the postula- 
tion of something in addition to the space -time metric: 
the material particles themselves, or the source of the 
field. The rel ̂,ti on of space -time to these happenings is 
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not one of contributing to their being qua a happening, 
but as valuable only in the sense ofaefining the boundaries 
or the operations of the effects of these happenings. Ac- 
cordingly, a space -time would have at most only a deriva- 
tive metaphysical status that would not qualify for admis- 
sion to the level of reality. That thing which does the 
"eventing" would seem to be more real. This notion will 
be more highly developed by Whitehead in his philosophy of 
organism. 
On the question of material as an ultimate datum of 
science, relativity had a few corrections to present to 
classical physics. By finding mass and energy to be 
interrelated, two previously independent (though associa- 
ted) entities were united. Concerning the ultimate nature 
of "material" relativity had little news of consequence. 
The crucial question lay most likely at the feet or quan- 
tum mechanics. For relativity, material, with its gravi- 
tational ana electromagnetic connotations, had given way 
to the concept of "particle," and more precisely, "event - 
particle." There were reasons to believe that material in 
the new sense of "event -particle" was to be considered, one 
of the ultimate data of physics. Furthermore, so far as 
the new physical revolution was concerned, a monistic 
hierarchy among these particles would be preferable to a 
pluralistic one. 
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Of the various philosophical analyses derivative from 
the introduction or relativity theory, by far the most 
comprehensive and significant was that of Whitehead. His 
former collaborator on Principia Mathematica, however, had 
many useful notes to suggest. 
Analyzing the problem in i 27, Bertrand Russell ex- 
pressed the opinion that electrons, protons, spatial enti- 
ties, etc., were really complexes of events; the events 
were metaphysically more primitive.13 This statement must 
be regarded as replacing a view of a dozen years before to 
the effect that a theory of matter requires both space - 
corpuscles and time- corpuscles for its exposition.14 
In classical Newtonian physics, both space and time 
had an absolute significance; there was one external frame 
of space and time which had a preferential status. The 
advent of the relativity theory denied this absolute sta- 
tus of space and time. Units of length and time were no 
longer rigidly defined. A measuring rod suffered under a 
contraction with increased velocity, and there was no rea- 
son to assume that any measuring rod was at rest. The 
special theory of relativity had assured the relative na- 
ture of measurements, and both length and time-extension 
depended on the observer's station. 
13. The Analysis of Natter, 9. 
14. 1915 "The Ultimate Constituents of flatter" The ITonist, 
25, 403. 
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Furthermore, because no observer h5.d the power to 
designate his own or any other special reference frame as 
"at rest," no one or combination of spatio- temporal frames 
could place a legitimate claim to being the "absolute" or 
even the "preferred" frame of reference for the universe's 
operation; Professor Neu_ iann's "Body Alpha" revived by 
Professor Wilson could not exist. 
It will be helpful to distinguish between the space - 
time metric of relativity and the absolute space and time 
(or space- time) which is used to suggest a description of 
the size a.nd the temporal activities of the universe. The 
latter might be referred to as "cosmolovical space and time 
(or space- time)." 
The abolishing of all absolute significance of 
spatio-temporal frames was an act which met with open dis- 
trust in the camps of the metaphysicians. In the first 
place, if there is a metaphysically real world, why should 
there not be one description of it which should have a 
"cosmological space- time" significance? It may be true 
that an observer within the system would be subject to the 
spatio - temporal laws of relativity. That, however, might 
not mean that the total event which is the universe at a 
given duration of time does not describe an absolute event 
which is capable of having definitely delineated cosmo- 
logical boundaries. The radii of the Einsteinian and the 
de Sitter universes had been calculated, and were expressed 
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as absolute spatial functions. _urthermore, the universes 
moved along a time -axis, although infinite in extent. 
Milne's kinematic relativity explicitly asserted the 
unique nature of the time experience,15 and offered two 
time -functions and two spatinl descriptions of the extent 
of the universe. If, then, the physical cosmologies advo- 
cated by the relativists best prepared to suggest them, in 
essence referred the universe to a cosmological spatio- 
temporal demarcation, why should philosophers believe that 
relativists had really taken their own views on space -time 
seriously in the last analysis? 
Kurt Göde1 has recently criticized the non -empty cos- 
mological models on the ground that the local times of all 
observers do merge into one objective cosmological time.16 
His own negative -X solution, he urged, are not subject to 
this criticism. Einstein, in considering Gödel's suggested 
solution, admitted the existence of the problem in his own 
mind at the time of the construction of general relativity, 
and admitted the truth of the troublesome identification 
which Gödel criticized.17 
15. 1943 "The Fundamental Concepts of Natural Philosophy" 
Proceedings of the ,Royal 222i2IL of .Edinburgh, A, 62, 
16. 1949 "A Remark About the Relationship Between Rela- 
tivity Theory and Idealistic Philosophy" Albert Ein- 
stein: Philosopher -Scientist, The Library of Living 
Philosophers, 7, 560. 
17. 1949 "Remarks Concerning the Essays Brought Together 
in This Cooperative Volume" Albert Einstein: Philoso- 
pher- Scientist, The Libraa 77-1111124. Thilosophers, 
7, 687 -688. 
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It is therefore not surprising to find Alexander, in 
his Gifford Lectures, saying of relativity that It leaves 
us Space -Time in itself as a total from which perspectives 
are selections; and therefore in that sense absolute and 
independent of observers. "18 
1 erby S. slier likewise discovered in 1920 what he 
thought to be a logical contradiction at the base of rela- 
tivity. Miller believed the principle of relativity to be 
capable of exposition in two forms. One form is the prin- 
ciple asserted "absolutely ": "The principle of relativity 
presumes actual space to change with the expansion of a 
solid. "19 When asserted "relatively" the principle sim- 
ply states the relativity of "our criteria of magnitudes, 
not of space itself. "20 Because the perception and mental 
visualization of space are, in effect, of a fixed nature, 
Miller believed that the principle of relativity could not 
be asserted "absolutely," but only "relatively." 
This argument is a réstatement of the philosophical 
desire to preserve an absolute space -time, and is deriva- 
tive from an understandable confusion of the statements of 
relativity. In the first place, as Miller conceived the 
absolutely asserted principle of relativity, he was stating 
18. Space, Time, and Deity, 1, 91. 
19. 112O "The Logical Necessity of a Constant in the Con- 
cept of Space" The Journal of Philoso, Psychology 
and Scientific Meth53777, 438. 
20. TEM., 438 -439. 
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not the principle of relativity (either special or general), 
but a notion derivative from the cosmological models of de 
Sitter, Einstein, and most of the exponents of expanding 
universes, with the notable exception of Milne. It is 
true that the metric of space -time in general relativity 
varies with the size of the irregularity around that met- 
ric. However, it was not the larger size, but the greater 
concentration of mass, in the companion of Sirius which 
was held to be responsible for the greater deflection of 
light rays grazing its surface. 
Indeed, it was, one of the points of dissention intro- 
duced by Milne's kinematic relativity that space -time it- 
self did not expand. The expansion of space -time, he in- 
sisted, was a meaningless assertion. It was only the con- 
centrated bits of matter at the surface of the sphere 
which moved radially outwards, causing an enlarged universe. 
Indeed, every particle inside the kinematic universe was 
directed outwards from the center of that universe, but 
the metric did not expand as a consequence.21 
It cannot, of course, be denied that Milne did re- 
introduce a meaningfulness for an absolute interpretation 
of cosmological space and time with his kinematic universe 
in t -time, and with the preferred t0 of 2 x 109 years. It 
21. E. A. Milne. 1935 Relativity, Gravitation, and 
World -Structure, 131. 
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may further be added that the majority of the cosmological 
models as they stand seem to be as easily pictured in an 
absolute background of space -time or (in kinematic models) 
space and time, as within a totally relativistic frame. 
Sir Edmund Whittaker has pointed out that in Mi.lne's 
system there is no way for an observer to locate himself 
in the universe with reference to this cosmological space - 
frame. To this type of postulate he has given the happy 
name, "Postulate of Impotence. "22 This particular postu- 
late of impotence has been extended to include the further 
impossibility of telling exactly where the observer is lo- 
cated in the time -scale. Other postulates of impotence 
suggested by Sir Edmund Whittaker might be added as being 
basic to current cosmological theory: that of the impossi- 
bility of detecting absolute uniform translatory motion of 
a system from within that system, and that of the impossi- 
bility of a continuous identification of an electron. 
Such postulates, in the opinion of this writer, represent 
a tremendous addition to cosmologic -,l theory, and could be 
profitably examined by metaphysics.23 Metaphysics itself 
(if it be distinct from Dingle's wciences- summation) seems 
22. 1949 From Euclid to Eddington: A Study of Conceptions 
of the External World, 59. 
23. Professor A. D. ßjtchie, using this reference, engaged 
in just such an exercise in the Senior Honours class 
in Logic and Metaphysics at Edinburgh University, 1951 
February 23. The conclusion reached is substantially 
identical with that of this thesis. 
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to have certain Postulates of Impotence which it might be 
helpful to codify. 
Of course, certain postulates would qualify for in- 
clusion only in certain systems. But others seem to have 
an air of persistent unattainability in any system. Among 
possible applicants for inclusion may be (1) the impossi- 
bility of attaining a perfect metaphysical description of 
the universe, (2) the impossibility of perfect knowledge 
devoid of subjective experiencing, (3) the impossibility 
of demonstrating the justification for the metaphysical 
elementary constituents (substance, organisms, the Given, 
or whatever they be) in any given metaphysical system, and 
(4) the impossibility of experiencing other people's ex- 
periences. 
One of the more telling criticisms of orthodox rela- 
tivistic cosmology has been that it introduced a questionable 
interchangeability of space and time. This criticism is 
not peculiar to philosophers, and was one of the difficul- 
ties leading to kinematic relativity. Bergson's entire 
philosophical work is evidence that, for Bergson at least, 
the flowing time was an undeniable constituent of human 
experience. The independence of time in some sense from 
space was one of the points of divergence between White-. 
head's philosophy of nature24 and that of some of the 
24. See especially Whitehead. 1920 The Concept of Nature, 
49 -73. 
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relativistic cosmologies. Milne further asserted that, 
for observational experiences, each individual adopts a 
"world -wide" Newtonian time- scale.25 Eddington also 
sensed this difficulty and at one ti ,ne26 introduced a pen- 
tadic coordinate system which he felt accounted in some 
way for the uniqueness of time. Of these five mutually 
perpindicular coordinates, no more than three could have 
the same real or imaginary character. Hence, there was an 
opportunity, perhaps remote, for providing a different 
meaning to time. However, this device was little more 
successful than early attempts of the post- special rela- 
tivity era of using an imaginary time- scale, and no more 
successful in defining the nature of time and space as 
distinct. Professor Born has pointed out the fact that 
the interchangeability of space and time is true only in 
a very restricted sense.27 
Beginning with Hubble's suggestion that the spiral 
nebulae may be receding with a fairly definite velocity, 
Dirac in 1938 provided a more n °tural explanation of the 
distinctive character of time. The fact that such a re- 
cession velocity might suggest a cosmological model wherein 
a material particle had a "natural velocity" led Dirac to 
25. Milne, 22. cit., 44. 
26. 1936 The Relativity Theory of Protons and Electrons, 
53 -75. 
27. 1950 November 14. Lecture at Edinburgh University. 
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postulate a preferred time -axis for each point- particle.28 
This preferred time -axis would be that one with respect to 
which the matter in the immediate neighborhood of the 
point would be at rest. Measurement of intervals along 
this axis would provide an absolute time -measure which he 
called an epoch. However, in view of the postulates of 
impotence respecting location of an observer in time and 
the detection of absolute rest velocity, such a defini- 
tional suggestion would expose itself to a highly pointed 
attack. 
The problem of accounting for the distinctive nature 
of time remains unsolved in most systems, although both 
Milne and Whitehead can lay clam to providing reasonable 
accounts. 
One of the problems arising from the relativity 
writings was the status and interpretation of the critical 
velocity c. It was app ;'sent, by definition in the special 
theory, that it was an absolute quantity equivalent to the 
velocity of light in vacuo --3 x 1010 cm/sec. The general 
theory demonstrated that, in the presence of a gravita- 
tional field, its velocity was altered. Einstein asserted 
that c had a further physical significance: that it was a 
limiting velocity which can be neither reached nor exceeded 
28. "A new basis for cosmology" Proceedings of the Royal 
Society of London, A, 165, 199. 
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by any material particle.29 T:i.lne, on the other hand, de- 
veloped a cosmologiccl theory in which the indefinitely 
large number of particles at the outer surface of the 
spherical t -time universe possess that velocity. White- 
head placed no absolute ::eaning on the velocity.30 A fur- 
ther doubt was cast by de Broglie, who observed that c 
could be considered a limiting velocity only for time -sig- 
nalling mechanisms. Einstein has recently suggested that, 
by appropriate transformations to eliminate the dimensions 
of space and tine, the velocity c is relegated to the sta- 
tus of an apparent, rather than a real, universal con- 
stant.31 Indeed, he has postulated that most likely the 
laws of nature are such as to contain no such arbitrary 
constants in their final formulation,32 a trend not uncom- 
mon in recent theories. This question, too, remains un- 
settled. 
However, the postulation of the nature of c by the 
special theory raised another disturbing consequence which 
has received a tremendous amount of discussion. That is 
the problem of simultaneity. The special theory implied 
29. 1920 Relativity: The Special and the General Theory: 
A Popular Exposition, third edition, translated by 
Robert ST, Lawson, 36. 
30. 1920 The Concept of Nature, 131. 
31. 1949 "Autobiogra.phisches" Albert Einstein: Thilosuher- 
Scientist, The Library of Living Philosophers, 7, 60. 
Translated by T'aul Arthur Schilpp, op. cit., 61. 
32. 1949 " Autobiographisches" off. cit., 62. Translated 
by Faul Arthur Schilpp, 22. c i ., 63. 
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that no absolute significance could be placed upon the 
concept of simultaneity.33 Events which were simultaneous 
in one time- system would not necessarily be so in another. 
Weyl, in his 1917 lectures, hailed this innovation as the 
achievement which would warrant the placing of Einstein's 
name in the category of inventive discovery inhabited by 
Copernicus 
In denying an objective meaning to simultaneity, 
there was a philosophical difficulty. It was one which 
hinged on the relation between measured time in relativity 
and experienced time for an observer. Wildon Carr summa- 
rized the trouble in his opening contribution to the Aris- 
totelian Society symposium in 1923: 
The rejection of simultaneity involves a paradox. 
In regard to time measured any two events which 
for observers in one frame of reference are si- 
multaneous, for observers in other frames are 
before and after. In regard to time lived, they 
are identical for the lives in all systems.35 
However, there is no real paradox; in the first place, 
relativity had demonstrated how, because of the differen- 
ces in the relative motion of observers, light signals 
33. Albert Einstein. 1905 "Zur Elektrodynamik bewegter 
Körper" Annalen der Physik, (4), 17, 897. 
34. Space- Time -Matter, fourth edition, translated by 
Henry L. Brose, 174. 
35. "Symposium: The Problem of Simultaneity: Is There a 
Paradox in the Principle of Relativity in Regard to 
the Relation of Time Measured to Time Lived?" Aristo- 
telian Society, Supplementary Volume III: Relativity, 
Logic, and Mysticism, 25. 
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from two events would not possibly in general reach both 
observers at the same time in both systems. Furthermore, 
the life -experiences of any individu'_1 observers are such 
that the small difference in their relative motion would 
likely not be sufficient to cause any appreciable difference 
within the apparent simultaneity of distant 
ding to two observers. 
However, the problem 
events accor- 
of constructing a public time 
continued to be troublesome, and in 1927 J. L. Synge de- 
fended objective simultaneity once more. Postulating a. 
rigid Euclidean reference -frame which would be isotropic 
with respect to light- propagation, he demonstrated that 
the time of any event could be uniquely determined, 
36 
as 
Milne asserted at a later date. Consequently, simultaneity 
would be a transitive experience. The divergence between 
these treatments and Einstein's occurs at the introduction 
of an isotropic Euclidean space -frame with respect to 
light- propagation. The question is therefore unsettled, 
and the two camps disagree as to its answer. 
Perhaps the guiding spirit of 
scribed as the conviction that the 
the universe could be described in 
relativity may be de- 
material properties of 
terms of the spatio- 
temporal metric. The notion was heralded by Minkowski, 
36. "Time Measurement in an Isotropic Space Frame" Pro - 
ceedings of the Royal Irish Acadery, A, 37, 110, 
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who is more important to the theory of relativity than 
many writers have conceded. In 1908 he prophesied, 
The whole universe is seen to resolve itself in- 
to world- lines, and I would fain anticipate my- 
self by saying that in niy opinion physical laws 
might find their most perfect expression as r - 
ciprocal relations between these world- lines.37 
There is an interesting contrast between this phraseology 
and that of Sir Oliver Lodge, who, it will be remembered, 
was not sympathetic with relativity theory in 1919: "I 
conceive that ultimately all the properties of the materiel 
universe will be expressible in terms of the fundamental 
and omnipresent ether of space.i38 Weyl offered a guiding 
corrective, which might have given rise to a violent 
philosophical controversy, by referring to the spatio- 
temporal framework as giving form to the phenomena in con- 
trast with the classical view.39 
Perhaps one of the most controversial basic questions 
excited by the relativity era was just this attempt to 
geometrize the physical influences being described. Thus 
the metric itself told the story of the gravitational 
field, and a generalized or extended geometry has been 
37. 1909 "Raum and Zeit" Physikalische Zeitschrift, 10, 
104. 
38. "Symposium: Time, Space and Material, Are They, and 
if So, in What Sense, the Ultimate Data of Science ?" 
Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume II: Prob- 
lems of Science and Philosophy, 66. 
39. Space- Time -Matter, fourth edition, translated by 
Henry L. Brose, 227. 
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employed to account for the electromagnetic field. As was 
observed in Chapter III (see page 144 of this thesis), 
Professor Infeld believed the new unification to be 
valuable in its removal of the dualism (geometrical de- 
scription of gravitation -- physical description of electro- 
magnetism) of general relativity. That Einstein's geomet- 
rization of gravitation was the most valuable gain in 
knowledge by general relativity is suggested by Professor 
Finlay- Freundlich..40 But with this assertion. Whitehead 
disagreed. He held that the attempt must be made to de- 
scribe physical influences in terms of physical qualities, 
as Poynting had believed. Sir Edmund Whittaker has re- 
cently suggested an important principle which might give 
pause to the desire to make geometries the vehicle of the 
physical world by pointing out the "fact, which is of 
capital importance throughout natural philosophy, that a 
correct mathematical solution of a phenomenon does not 
necessarily furnish the correct physical description of 
the phenomenon.i41 Because it avoids this danger, White - 
head's relativity may well repay further consideration 
from the :mathematical physicist. It is not suggested that 
Whitehead's relativity is the most correct, but by avoiding 
certain basic philosophical difficulties, as well as for 
40. 1950 August 28. Letter to the author. 
41. 1946 Saace and Spirit: Theories of the Universe and 
Arguments for the Existence of Goa, 77-57. 
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its own merits (discussed in Chapter VI), it seems to be 
entitled to a more persistent examination. 
The scientific controversy is extended to include the 
question whether a description of the properties of the 
material universe in terms of differential equations pre- 
supposing a continuous background is possible. The pre- 
sent impasse arises from quantum mechanics, whose results 
indicate that such a description of subatomic phenomena is 
impossible. 
The problem leads n- tura.11y to another impasse in re- 
cent physics, with quantum mechanics on one side and rela- 
tivity physics on the other. The problem is that of de- 
terminism. Perhaps Russell was the earliest post- relativity 
philosopher to support the quantum indeterminism in a co- 
gent argument. "I do not know," he insisted, "whether 
there is a persistent entity, but I do know that my expe- 
riences can be explained without assuming that there is. "42 
Eddington had in 1920 suggested that certainly the most 
important law in the external world was the law of atomi- 
city,43 but this admission should probably be taken in 
conjunction with his sttement of the same year to the ef- 
fect that there was an intrinsic orderliness in nature.44 
42. 1927 An Outline of Philosophy, 125 -126. 
43. "The Meaning of Natter and the Laws of Nature Accor- 
ding to the Theory of Relativity" Mind, new series, 
29, 156. 
44. Space, Time, and Gravitation: An Outline of the 
General Theory of Relativity, 54. 
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The two statements, when reconciled especially in the 
light of field theories implied by the last statement, 
would not represent a case for indeterminism. Further- 
more, it was not until after Heisenberg's announcement of 
the Principle of Indeterminacy that the situation was more 
completely clarified. 
Professor Born has quoted from a letter which he re- 
ceived from. Einstein, and which localizes the divergence 
in regard to determinism among contemporary physicists. 
Dated in December of 1947, Einstein's letter reads, 
I see of course that the statistical inter- 
pretation has a considerable content of truth. 
Yet I cannot seriously believe it because the 
theory is inconsistent with the principle that 
physics has to represent a reality in space and 
time without phantom actions over distances. I 
am absolutely convinced that one will eventually 
arrive at a theory in which the objects connec- 
ted by laws are not probabilities, but conceived 
facts.45 
Certainly Einstein has the ordinary experience of men 
in his favor: events in the external world apparently oc- 
cur in a continuous sequence. Furthermore, the individual 
has the impression of a continuous existence, at least in 
his conscious states. 'It is not clear whether a metaphysics 
dominated by indeterminism would be able to explain ade- 
quately the macroscopic realm. For each theory there remains 
45. Quoted in 1949 Natural Philosophy of Cause and Chance, 
123. 
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the duty of explaining the phenomena of the rival realm. 
Quantum mechanics holds the statistical method to he the 
only possible answer; relativity theorists have adopted 
various deterministic means of explanation. The method 
intrinsic to Whitehead's treatment belongs to the side of 
the defenders of determinism and field theory. 
The problem of perception presents itself. Early af- 
ter the publication of the general theory, de Sitter ob- 
served that what is perceived would be the intersections 
of world- lines.46 But then the question called into con- 
sideration is whether the point -event representing those 
intersections can be existentially perceived. Apparently 
a certain extension in both space and time is necessary in 
order for perceptual experience to take place. It might 
conceivably be urged that a certain hierarchy of intersec- 
ting world -lines need to intersect in order that perception 
can take place. This sort of postulate is reminiscent of 
Whitehead's linear objective reals of the 1905 memoir. 
But the same difficulty arises. Are these intersections 
really the sensed data? An affirmative answer is by no 
means appF.rent. 
Inasmuch as the laws of the physical world and the 
laws of perception refer to a common set of entities, they 
46. 1916 "On Einstein's Theory of Gravitation, and its 
Astronomical Consequences --I" Monthly Notices of the 
Róya l Astronomical Society, 76, 700. 
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must be in some sense related. This fact would lead, in- 
sisted Russell in 1927, to an interpretation of physics 
which would be more idealistic than previously, and to an 
interpretation of perception which would be more materialis- 
tic than before.47 Just such a solution appeared in 
Whitehea.d's philosophy of organism, 
Philipp Frank has, however, thrown doubt upon car- 
rying this method of thought too far. He has insisted 
that one of the greatest causes of philosophical misinter- 
pretations of physical science is that there is a tendency 
to make statements about observable processes in the ex- 
ternal world assertions about a real metaphysical world.48 
Such a statement in the tradition of Yách would render 
meaningless any metaphysical propositions of any sort. In 
such a case, however, metaphysics as a philosophical in- 
quiry would be succeeded by scientific cosmology. Further- 
more, inquiries indispensable to metaphysics would be rele- 
gated to inquiries such as psychology and biology. Even- 
tually another field known probably as the philosophy of 
nature would be necessary to give a coherent account of 
the various results of its subsciences. This is the situa- 
tion as Dingle believes. In the opinion of this thesis, 
however, another step, that toward metaphysics, or an 
47. The Analysis of Matter, 7. 
48. 1749 Modern Sae-rice and Its Philosophy, 160. 
181 
equivalently directed inquiry, is necessary. 
One of the greatest philosophical misinterpretations 
which quickly followed in the wake of relativity was the 
assertion that relativity presupposed an idealistic inter- 
pretation of the universe. Probably the outstanding cause 
of this misunderstanding lay in the confusion oI the con- 
notations of "observer." The shadings are immediately re- 
moved by the substitution of "observer's body" for "obser- 
ver." No harm is done to relativity theory, and no 
idealistic implications can then be attached to that po- 
tentially dangerous point. 
However, the Aristotelian Society again sponsored a 
symposium on relativity, this time in 1922 on the idealism- 
relativity relation. The thesis that there was a neces- 
sary connection between the two was maintained by H. 
Wildon Carr49 primarily on very shaky grounds. Einstein's 
theories, Carr insisted, are based on the recognition that 
the phenomena of the physical world are presented to an 
observer only in the form of sense -experience. Further, 
these entities are inseparably related to the minds per- 
ceiving them. This state of affairs he found to be consis- 
tent with neo- idealism, which he defined as "the philo- 
sophical standpoint that reality in its fundamental and 
49. "Discussion: The Idealistic Interpretation of Ein- 
stein's Theory" Proceedings of the Aristotelian So- 
ciety, 22, 123 -127. 
. 
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universal meaning is mind or spirit. X50 Neo- realism he 
defined to be the view that 
knowledge requires us to presuppose existence, 
and that in some sense a universe exists in 
space and time, the entities within which are 
discoverable by minds, which are themselves ac- 
corded a place therein on e,ual terms with the 
entities they discover.51 
Now there is no reason in the entire scientific litera- 
ture of relativity for believing that any of its conclu- 
sions consistent with neo- idealism (or any kind of idealism) 
would not be equally consistent with neo- realism (or any 
kind of realism). Reality, either observable or meta- 
physical, is rendered no more idealistic by relativity. 
If there is to be a selection between realism and idealism 
the impetus must come from another region, and not from 
physical cosmology. Although the metaphysics will pro- 
vide the background for physical cosmology, the physical 
universe of relativity gives no preference between realism 
and idealism. 
The three other contributors to the discussion52 
agreed that there was no necessary connection between 
relativity and either the older or newer idealisms. 
Wilhelm Wirtinger, who wrote of generalized geometry 
50. Ibid., 124. 
51. =T., 124. 
52. T. F. Nunn, 22. cit. , 127-130. A. N. Whitehead, 22. 
cit., 130-134. Dorothy 1rJrinch, op. cit., 134-138. 
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with a view to offering the mathematical framework for 
unified field theories, suggested that a reconciliation 
might be effected between the new geometries and the Kan - 
tian a priori space and time.53 However, again it must be 
insisted that although such a view may be possible, it is 
by no means necessary, and the connection would be diffi- 
cult to demonstrate. 
The methods of relativity are of great interest to 
philosophy. Essentially the methods are of the axiomatic- 
deductive rather than the inductive type. The method con- 
sists of defining certain entities having certain proper- 
ties and of postulating certain relationships among those 
entities as valid. In practice, certain intermediate hy- 
potheses are introduced, and the deductive consequences of 
the postulates and their implied relations are found. 
These deductive consequences, interpreted in terms of the 
fundamental definitions, are then tested for correspondence 
to observed facts and relations. In essence the theoriew 
of relPtivity are axiomatic- deductive systems whose conse- 
quences will lead only to a description of relations be- 
tween entities. This method is exactly that which White- 
head employed in his "On Mathematical Concepts of the Ma- 
terial World." In that case, a set of entities were 
53. 1922 "On a General Infinitesimal Geometry, in Reference 
to the Theory of Relativity" Transactions of the Cam- 
bridge Philosophical Society, 22, 448. 
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defined, and a polyadic relation of order postulated. 
Then deductions of the implications of the properties of 
the entities themselves were made. The third stage repre- 
sented the selection of the group of the appropriate hy- 
potheses or axioms. The fourth step was the examination 
of the deductive consequences of the first, second, and 
third stages.54 The final stage was the comparison of the 
deductive results with the known experiential facts of the 
area investigated. Psychologically, Whitehead observed, 
the order is usually inverted.55 
In the case of the relativity theories, a similar 
procedure can be traced. The entities assumed are the ma- 
terial point -events. The axioms introduced are the spe- 
cial and general principles of relativity defining the re- 
lationships between those point- events when considered in 
uniform or accelerated motion. Unified field theories 
represent a more generalized description of those laws of 
relations among event -particles. The final stage is the 
comparison of results with the observed phenomena due to 
the operation of the fields. 
In Whitehead's 1905 memoir the comparison was between 
the results of his own axiomatic-deductive system and the 
theorems of Euclidean geometry. A further stage was the 
54. =W, 469-470. 
55. MCMW, 470. 
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definition of material entities in terms of the deductive 
superstructure. The intermediate hypotheses necessary for 
the description of the actions of the material entities 
were only briefly indicated. 
Weyl was of the opinion that when the experiential 
fact that the gravitational field is r;ov erned by the dis- 
tribution of matter was used as one of the axioms relating 
the entities, it was of more importance than the principle 
of irnra:ria:nce.56 The question of the relative importance 
of these principles is perhaps pointless at present. If 
either, when generalized to the point necessary, is shown 
to be more instrumental in accomplishing further unification 
in physics, that one may have a right to be considered 
more "important." It has been seen that Professor Born 
considered at one time that the touchstone to the unifica- 
tion of relativity and quantum mechanics lay in the in- 
variance hypothesis.57 The invariance principle also has 
a venerable history of providing possible touchstones in 
Dirac58 and in Eddington.59 Einstein himself has suggested 
that this may be the key postulate for further attempts at 
56. 1922 Space -Time -]Matter, fourth edition, translated by 
Henry L. Brase, 226 -227. 
57. 1938 "A suggestion for unifying quantum theory and 
relativity" Proceedinmrs of the Royal Society of Lon- 
don, A, 165, 291. 
58. kited indington. 1936 The Relativity Theory of 
Protons and Electrons, 1. 
59. Off. cit. 
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unit'ication.ó0 He has, however, also indicated that the 
limiting case of the pure gravitational field and its re- 
lation to the metric of space may have an additional claim 
to final significance.61 
Additional applicants for inclusion as basic axioms 
in relativist cosmologies are the epistemological prin- 
ciples invoked by Sir Arthur Eddington. 
That the axiomatic method derives its authority from 
inductive experience, Einstein has denied. An important 
point is that he has also denied that concepts originate 
from experience through the road of abstraction, but ra- 
ther nre free inventions which are then compared with the 
experience. This "free invention" conception of scien- 
tific method is the object of much of the attack of the 
quantum physicists. 
The question as to the comparative usefulness of in- 
duction and axiorratics in preparing a physical cosmology 
constantly recurs and has had a long history. It seems 
that both methods are necessary for a successful elabora- 
tion of the "laws of nature." Without the inductive me- 
thod, there would be a barren desert with which axiomatics 
60. 1949 "Autobiographisches" 
Scientist, The Library of 
Translated uy Faul Arthur 
61. 1949 "Autobiographisches" 
by Taul Arthur Schilpp, 22 
Albert Einstein: Philosoaer- 
Lí._._. ThiIósóhers , 7, 68. 
nchilpp, . cz.;-69T 
22. cit.,-74. Translated 
. eft:, 75. 
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would need to compare its results. Without the inductive 
method, a-xiom';tics would lack direction. But without 
axiorratics, the results of the inductive method would be 
no more than a catalogue of recorded data. The two methods 
cannot be at war with each other; they need to complement 
each other in order to achieve the optimum_ results. Those 
o timiim results would, be the presentation of a system 
which would describe the full operation of the universe, 
and the precise chain of connection from principles to 
nieaifestation in "nature" would be apparent. Relativity 
theory attempted to present a system doing; just that for 
the gravitational and electromagnetic fields. It has been 
partially successful, but the system is not large enough . 
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Cii'rLrTEH ±'IVE 
DATA .ili'!.:} ::E`l'HODS IN 7;71-1-.ITEIiL- J'S I'HII,O3OFHY OF NATURE 
The publication or the s ecia.l and general theories 
of relativity and the commentaries on then, aroused an ac- 
tive interest in Whitehead, who had been collaborating 
with Bertrand Russell on Trincipia flathe iatica. Dissatis- 
fied with the interpretations placed on relativity, and 
sensing an inadequacy in the epite iological foundations 
of relativity, Whitehead began a period or prolific 
writing on the subject. In the years between the publica- 
tion of Trincipia 'lathematica and the appearance of 
Science and the - `odern World in 1925, he offered no fewer 
than iiiteen articles which dealt directly with the sub- 
ject, includin the famous three mture- philosophy books 
or 1919 -1920 -1922. Short articles on education also ap- 
peared frequently during this period, but it was primarily 
one of production in the philosophy of science, and culmi- 
nated in the presentation or a theory of relativity which 
might have been a serious rival to the Einsteinian theory, 
and which still has a strong,, claim for acceptance. 
Observing, then, diiiiculties mentioned above, White- 
head concentrated his attention on examining certain pos- 
tulates in the axiomatic -deductive method of relativity. 
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That he was concerned also with the e:- pirice.l veriiicetion 
or the consequences oi the axioms is shown by an early 
warning: "Our problem is, in fact, to tit the world to our 
perceptions, and not our perceptions to the world. "1 It 
is in the papers published that many oi the objections 
raised to An Enquiry Concerning the Trinciples oz Natural 
tsnolaedge, The Concert of Nature, and The P.rincile of 
Relativity are answered. It would have indeed been better 
for him to discuss those questions at greater length in 
the three main books of the period, but they had been con- 
sidered elsewhere, and their republication would have 
represented much unnecessary reduplication. However, 
references in the three volumes to these other papers are 
sparse: there are none in the Enquiry, two in the ConceQt, 
and'none in Relativity.Thurthermore, the papers immediately 
prior to the three main "nature" volumes show how certain 
ideas in those volumes evolved; succeeding papers and 
Science and the Modern world exhibit the trend from 
science to metaphysics. The entire sequence shows a con - 
stant development of cosmology from an attempt to sta- 
bilize the philosophical foundations of relativity to an 
attempt at showing the derivation of the whole of the 
1. 1916 "Space, Time and Relativity" proceedings of the 
Aristotelian Society, 16, 129. Henceforth this 
memoir will be designated in footnote references as 
STR. 
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cosmological theory from metaphysics. It is certain that 
Whitehead himself sensed many of the objections to the re- 
sults of the various stages of his progress. Otherwise 
the development would seem to have culminated in his three 
companion volumes of the turn Of the decade. The develop- 
ment undoubtedly reached fruition there, but it also drew 
into bold relief the challenge from metaphysics. A marked 
change was apparent in Science and the Modern World (1925) , 
and the matured product was crystallized, with some few 
exceptions, in 'Process and Reality in 1929. 
It is therefore one of the opinions urged here that 
Wh.itehead's relativity writings can be successfully con- 
sidered only in conjunction with. the shorter memoirs of 
the twenty- three year period, and with the philosophy of 
organism in mind. 
As early as "Space, Time and Relativity" Whitehead 
pointed to the fact that "fragmentary individual experien- 
ces are all that we know, "2 and insisted that it must be 
from this basic givenness of atomicity that a meaningful 
theory of the external world must be constructed. Atomic 
entities are thus the basic building bricks of the world. 
At that time he was unwilling to allow that a percipient 
is directly aware of a uniformity of texture as a natural 
background. It was only because a deductive superstructure 
2. STR, 122. 
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could be synthesized to describe these "atomic" experien- 
ces that a uniform background could be supposed to exist. 
One year later, he was willing to concede that fragmentary 
continuity might be an immediate fact of experience, but 
still insisted on the "radically untidy, ill adjusted "3 
nature of experience. In the year 1919 Whitehead reasser- 
ted that perception consisted of an awareness of events,4 
but did not explicitly reaffirm its untidy character. 
However, it is apparent that the swing to postulating an 
immediate experience of uniformity did not approach the 
other extrerie, for in The Principle of Relativity the ob- 
servation was made that without the atomicity of percep- 
tive experience, particular problems could not be isolated. 
By thus combining the undeniable fact of disjointed ex- 
periences with the suggestion of a background fabric of 
uniformity, Whitehead has escaped one of the fundamental 
difficulties in the postulates of many philosophical sys- 
tems. 
By way of further analyzing the suggested background 
3. 1917 "The Organisation of Thought" Proceedin s of the 
Aristotelian Society, 17, 61. Henceforth this mermoir 
wwill be designated as ÓT. 
4. 1919 An Enquiry Concerning; the Principles of Natural 
Knowl730.e, 68. This volume wi1Tierea.fter be referred 
to as PNK. Awareness of events was also suggested in 
STR, 107, and was later repeated in The Concept of Na- 
ture, 15. The Concept of Nature wilrereafter 167 
known as CN. 
5. 1922 The Principle of Relativity with Applications to 
Phuica.l Science, 73. This volume will be referred fo 
as REL. 
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connecting the events, in "Space, Time and Relativity" it 
was the changing relations between events which were per- 
ceptually distinguished,6 thus foreshadowing the postula- 
tion of the adjectival character of matter. The situation 
was clarified in Whitehead's contribution to the symposium, 
"Time, Space and Material," mentioned in the preceding 
chapter. Here the awareness beyond fragmentary events is 
that of a temporal, durational whole of neture.7 Further, 
in the passing fragmentary events there are certain re- 
peated permanent components which might be designated by 
the name, "object. "8 But the ultimate fact for observa- 
tional knowledge is the apprehension of an event, which 
occupies a duration of a "tem_.:oral slab of nature. "9 An 
event which is perceived is to be known as being cogredient 
with that one duration.10 But for any duration there may, 
for instance, be the following events cogredient with it: 
a small child bouncing a ball, the chirping of a bird, the 
rumble of a distant tram, etc. On the appearance of The 
rrincigle of Relativity, Whitehead repeated that this 
6. STR, 107. Clarified to mean spatio- temporal relations 
in a note, 121. 
7. 1919 "Symposium: Time, Space and I.laterial, Are They, 
and if So, in What Sense, the Ultimate Data. of 
Science ?" Aristotelian society, Supplementary 
Volume II: rroblems of Science and rhilosothy, 46 -47. 
Whitehead's contribution tó tas symposium will be 
known as TSî1. 
8. TSM, 51. 
9. nNK, 69. CN, 53. REL, 7. 
10. INK, 70. 
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background exhibits itself as a uniform spa:tio- temporal 
relational frame highly analogous to, but not exactly that 
of, general relativity.11 
Furthermore, he was prepared to assert a dual consti- 
tution of the nature of perception. Cognizance of a 
recognizable recurring constituent, such as a patch of red 
color, would be known as cognizance by adjective. Know- 
ledge of the interrelationships of nature via the spatio- 
temporal frame would be called cognizance by relatedness. 
The two cognizances in summation, would be equated with 
perception.12 The division is almost that of the objects 
of mental and physical prehensions in Process and Reality. 
In thus attempting to explain the natural world in 
terms of the sensible experiences oT it, Whitehead has 
laid himself open to a criticism by Northrop, who believed 
the attempt would prove weakened because Whitehead deman- 
ded more intelligibility in sense -experience than it war- 
rants.13 Northrop suggested instead a two- termed episte- 
mie correlation of the immediately sensed and the postula- 
tionally prescribed components of human experience.14 
11. REL, v, 14. Originally suggested in STR, 121. 
12. REL, 62 -64. 
13. 1941 "Whitehead's Philosophy of Science" The Philoso- 
phy of Alfred North Whitehead, The Library of-D777- 
Philosophers, 3, 205. Repeated iñ 1946 The Xeetin¢ 
of East and West: An Inquiry ConcernLa World Under - 
sta.ñaiñg, 442. 
__.. 
14. 1946 The Meeting of East and West: An Inquia Con - 
cerning' World Understanding, 443. 
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Whitehead's response would necessarily be tn.at tae postu- 
lationally prescribes component is in Borne nanner inaica- 
ted in the its ediately sensed component. Tnis would not 
necessarily be so with. Einstein. However, it iF1 un.e 
opinion or the present writer that unless sense- awareness 
is found to supply some basis for the construction of a 
metaphysical or even a cosmological eairice, resulting 
superstructures will tend to be unnecessarily rictional. 
Whether sense experience exhibits a suggestion of underlying 
uniformity is apparently a point of divergence, and is not 
without poweriul adherents on either side. But this has 
received implicit criticism by Einstein, who holds that to 
imagine concepts to originate from experience is abortive.15 
B. Mayo has recently reaffirmed the position that events 
are directly sensed, and that in some way there is also an 
experienced sense of duration.16 
Thus, Whitehead was convinced that of the events con- 
stituting human perceptions of the external world some- 
thing significant could be said as a whole, and he be- 
lieved that spatio - temporal properties would be the terms 
of at least some of those statements. The task of science 
would be the refinement of concepts deriving from the 
15. 1944 "Bemerkungen zu Bertrand Russells rke nntnis- 
Problem" The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell, The Li- 
brary of Living Philosophers, 5, 278 -291. Translated 
by Faul Arthur Schilpp, 22. cit. 
16. 1950 "Is There a Sense of Duration?" Mind, new series, 
59, 71 -78. 
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the experiential data. As the refinement increases, 
generalized concepts exhibiting uniformity appear, of 
which one example is mathematical time. 
In attempting to formulate the general relations 
existing in a spatio- temporal frame, Whitehead in 1914 
suggested a spatial relation which he called "inclusion. 017 
Proceeding in a method familiar to students of Trincipia 
Ma them ti ca , Whitehead postulated a world founded on a 
class of relations, which is then specialized to the rela- 
tion of "inclusion." It may be that the impetus for se- 
lecting this particular relation arose from the 1905 
memoir, to which he here referred.18 Victor Lowe has also 
suggested that particularly the Theory of Interpoints may 
represent the germ of the Method of Extensive Abstraction,19 
which will be discussed later in the chapter. 
In the 1914 analysis, points, lines, and surfaces 
were defined in terms of the fundamental relation of in- 
clusion, and are known as material T- points, material T- 
lines, and material T- surfaces corresponding to those geo- 
metrical entities occupied by material entities.2° The 
17. 1916 "La Theorie Relationniste de l'Espace" Revue de 
T4taphysique et de Tiorale, 23, 440. This memoir will 
hereafter be referred to as TRE. 
18. T -r], 435. 
19. 1941 "The Development of Whitehead's Thilosophy" The 
Thilosophy of Alfred North Whitehead, T' .e Library of 
Living Philosophers, 3, 39. 
20. THE, 441. 
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class of objective reals is not necessarily linear, but 
any spatial entity at all. The important similarity to 
observe is that the final geometrical entities are derived 
from complexes of the classes of the spatial entities. 
The outcome was a definite preference for a relational 
theory of space, just as there was an implicit preference 
for the relational theory in "On Tithematical Concepts of 
the ì]a te ri a: l :Tor ld . " 
In the symposium on "Time, Space and ?terial" White- 
head introduced the notion that time does not consist of a 
series of instants, and that Nature at an instant is an 
abstraction.21 Neither corresponds to any direct know- 
ledge on the part of an observer. Any apprehension of na- 
ture requires a discrimination of various events and an 
awareness of the temporal duration of Nature. 
The basic facts in physical nature, the events, are 
connected by two fundamental relations known as "exten- 
sion" cnd "cogrèdience. ì22 The continuity of nature then 
arises purely from the extensional property of events.23 
Now when the termini of sense -awareness, called facts, 
possess certain characteristics they are known as "events. 
These characteristics are known as the "constants of 
21. TST, 45. 
22. TSM, 47. PNK, 4, 61, 86. CN, 75. 
23. quoted in TSM, 55. Further similar statements appear 
in PNK, 67. CN, 76. REL, 67. 
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externality, 924 and -re really examples of the "interme- 
diate axioms" habitually assumed in the axiomatic Ilethod. 
These constants include the promise of apprehended enti- 
ties to provide a definite complex of entities available 
for knowledge. A second constant is the assertion that 
the relation of extension holds. It is a derivative 
meaning of this constant that infinitesimal bits of space 
and time are abstractions from this rela.tion.25 The third 
constant is that the apprehended event is related to the 
complete scheme of nature by the fact that the duration of 
nature extends over that apprehended event. Furthermore, 
the duration of the percipient event is also the duration 
which extends over the event as apprehended. The fourth 
constant expresses the relation between the apprehended 
and the percipient event. The fifth constant is the fact 
that there exists a relation of a percipient event to its 
duration. The sixth constant expresses the fact that the 
fragmentary apprehended events are related to a community 
of nature. 
With these constants of externality it would be im- 
possible to find any fact for apprehension which does not 
in some sense exhibit relatedness to other facts. This 
indicating process is known as the "significance of 
24. PNK, 71-72. 
25. l'NK, 75. REï,, 21. 
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factors. "26 Each event therefore in some sense signifies 
the entire structure of events contributing to the opera- 
tion of nature.27 Thus an event occupies a four -dimensional 
hyper -volume in the spatio- temporal continuum, which must 
be uniform. Within nature any given number of events will 
be parts of and signify, some larger event. 
There is a possible objection which might be urged 
against this doctrine, as against Einstein's. That objec- 
tion is that no knowledge of the natural universe is pos- 
sible until each and every event and every member con- 
tributing to the significance of factors is known. However, 
':Thitehe,'d forestalled the objection by distinguishing be- 
tween essential and contingent relations. The essential 
relations are those which give the status of an entity to 
a factor, While contingent rel tions are those which are 
not essential to the being of the factor qua factor.- 
28 
It 
will then become the duty of science to discover essential 
relations within the natural universe, and to limit the 
sphere of contingency.29 
By the time Whitehead was preparing a second edition 
of The Principles of Natural Knowledge, he was convinced 
26. REL, 18. 
27. 1923 "Uniformity and Contingency" Froceedins of the 
Aristotelian Society, 23, 4. This paper will be re- 
ferred to as UC. 
28. REL, 22 -23. 
29. REL, 29. Cf. UC, 1. 
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that extension was not the fundamental relation in "Nature." 
Instead, it was derivative from the fundamental notion of 
+'process, "30 a selection which caused much displeasure on 
the part of many of his readers. Science and the Modern 
World in 1925 gave further voice to Whitehead's assertion 
that process was the really fundamental idea at the base 
of natural operations.31 
Braithwaite's review of Science and the Modern World 
asserted that the new volume tended towards a monism, be- 
cause every event was made to require every other event 
for its full existence.32 However, as has been demonstra- 
ted, this is not something peculiar to Science and the 
Modern World. Whitehead had been urging such a mutual 
significance of events since the appearance of The Prin- 
ciples of Natural Knowledge. Victor Lowe h: -s pointed out 
that the notion of significance is basic to the cosmology 
that Whitehead was expounding.33 That this significance 
beyond elements must not be forgotten, even by the sciences, 
has been emphasized by Professor Finlay- Freundlich.34 
Inextricably related to the mutual significance of 
30. 1925 PNK, second edition, 202. 
31. Science and the Modern World, 90. The book will 
hereafter be-noted SMW. Page references to SMW are 
to any of the Cambridge University Press editions of 
1932 to 1946. 
32. 1926 "Critical Notice: Science and the Modern World, 
by Alfred North Whitehead" Mind, new seríés,35, T71. 
33. Victor Lowe, 2E. cit., 76. 
34. 1950 August 28. Letter to the author. 
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events is the necessity for requiring the essential rela- 
tions between those events to be internal. 
A common view that Whitehead's work of this period 
was essentially critical in nature arose primarily from 
two sources, and is not strictly true. It derived its 
limited meaningfulness from j Jhitehe ̂ d's repented assaults 
on what he called the fallacy of the "bifurcation of na- 
ture." A second factor was his repeated reference to Ein- 
stein's relativity in contrast to his own. The relativity 
contrast will be more appropriately postponed until the 
next chapter. With respect to the bifurcation of nature, 
however, the quarrel was also with older notions which 
formed the basis of classical physics and pre-relrtivity 
metaphysics. 
The criticism is no longer an implicit one of limited 
applicr,bility and cumbersomeness, as in the 1905 memoir. 
It is here an explicit accusation of incoherence. As 
early as "Space, Time and Relativity" the rebellion clearly 
appeared without attaching the descriptive name connected 
with the fallacy exposed by The Concept of Nature. Essen- 
tially the fallacy centers in the fact that two real 
worlds are assumed to exist with no direct means of com- 
munication between the two. The one world is the world of 
the postulated scientific entity, which is the ultimate 
fact for knowledge. The other world is the perceived 
world, whose relations to the first are highly indeterminate, 
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and which is conceived to have its reality in the perceiver's 
nind.35 On the one side there is the world of "hurrying 
electrons," instants of time, and extensionless points of 
space. On the other is the world of sensed macroscopic 
objects, the specious present, and extended space. 
In "Space, Time and Relativity" there is the suggestion 
that it would be better to define the particles of matter 
in terms of the data of experience, and then to define 
space in terms of the rel<tions between these prticles.36 
Most of Whitehead's later comments on space can be con- 
veniently considered a clarification of this assertion. 
Furthermore, it is pointed out that the percipient 
lives in extensions and not in points; in temporal dura- 
tions and not in instants. It must then be assumed that 
the fallacy of bifurcation was fully under fire at this 
early period. The implication of avoiding bifurcation is 
the basic conviction that science has objectively real da- 
ta for investigation and not merely constructions of the 
human mind. Whitehead believed that Berkeley was at- 
tacking just this sort of bifurcation, but that his solu- 
tion was not one which accounted for the observed facts in 
"Nature. "37 
35. CN, 30. 
36. STR, 124. 
37. CN, 28. 
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Northrop, in analyzing \hitehead's physical theories, 
believed he had detected several instances in which that 
philosopher fell prey to the very procedure he had so vio- 
lently condemned. There were two kinds of bifurcation, 
one of which was a necessary bifurcation in scientific 
thought, argued Northrop.38 The first is the bifurcation 
between object as sensed and object as postulated, and is 
required in scientific reasoning. The second bifurcation 
was a fallacy, and was the one Whitehead was really at- 
tacking. This was the distinction between object and ob- 
server. 
With reference to the interaction of the findings of 
the axiomatic method and of the inductive method, it might 
be noted that a certain amount of divergence between 
sensed object and postulated object will probably result. 
However, the whole aim of the axiomatic method is the se- 
lection of basic axioms and definitions so that this di- 
vergence will be abolished. With respect to the inductive 
method, ':Thitehead's assertions appear to be valid, and the 
most successful inductive theory will be that which de- 
scribes the sensible object in terms indicated by that 
sensed object itself. This characteristic will reappear 
at frequent intervals throughout the thesis. Again, the 
38. 1941 "Whitehead's Philosophy of Science" The Fhiloso- 
211y of Alfred North Whitehead, The Library of Livid 
Philosophers, 3, 206. 
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difficulty in reconciling the view proposed here with 
Northrop's lies in the question whether the sense data of 
experience indicate any relatedness of texture in their 
background. Accordingly, both species of bifurcation as 
listed by Northrop would be considered fallacies. In 1938 
Herbert Dingle also endorsed the need for a Lockeian sub- 
ject- object bifurcation.39 
One of the difficulties in the relatioì-i of extension 
was on the question of its fundamental importance, and 
this importance was discussed by Whitehead himself in the 
second edition of The Principles of Natural Knowledge.40 
The appearance of the "process" motif, so import^nt in the 
W iteheadian metaphysics of 1927, was not sudden, but had 
developed steadily throughout the relativity writings as 
the problem of the final coordination of the events into 
changing universe assumed more importance. 
The earliest appearance of what might be considered 
the ancestor of process is in "Time, Space and Material," 
a paper which Broad has wisely declared to be a sketch of 
The Principles of Natural Knowledge.41 Examining the pos- 
sibilities of the various time -systems to account for what 
he called the "creative advance" (or "passage" 
39. "The Rational and Empirical Elements 
losophy, 13, 148 -165. 
40. FNK, second edition, 202. 
41. C. D. Broad. 1920 "Critical Review" 
29, 232. 
42. TSM, 49. Cf. WM, 152 -154. 
)42 of 
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nature, tlhitehe>d had begun to direct attention to the 
problems of process and its associated notion of creativi- 
ty. The thing which seemed to attract him -.t the time was 
that the multiple time -systems (one for each observer) al- 
lowed a broader interpretation of this "creative advance" 
of nature. On this relativistic theory no duration was 
corplete in itself; the entire set of time series was 
necessary for the full description of the total advance. 
Because of the incompleteness of each duration, no begin- 
ning or end should be assigned to any one ti_e series, 
otherwise the creative advance would be precluded, he ar- 
gued. This satisfied a desire for a metaphysical postu- 
late which would exclude a beginning or an end of nature 
in time. 
In The rrinci ,ples of Ntural Knowledge certain st. °te- 
ments occur which are more representative of the notion of 
process: "Nature is ever originating its own development, "43 
and "one side (of nature] is development in creative ad- 
vance, the essential becomingness of nature. "44 A second 
terminological innovation of The Concept of Nature was the 
appearance of the word "process" itself. Nature here was 
definitely conceived to be a process; it is exhibited by 
the fact that each duration happens and passes.45 
43. TNIr, 14. 
44. FTTK, 98. 
45. CN, 54. 
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One of the major metaphysical novelties for White - 
head's works was also the consideration of the possibility 
of a. teleological fact implicit in n-ture. Victor Lowe 
has suggested that teleology is compatible with the works 
of the peri_od, but has remarked that Lhhitehead's philoso- 
phy of nature makes "no attempt to assess the degree or 
state the kind of teleology that exists. "46 However, 
these sentences in The Concept of Nature seem to indicate 
in a vague way both the degree and the kind of teleology 
which would need to exist. 
The passage of nature which is only another name 
for the creative force of existence has no nar- 
row ledge of definite instantaneous present 
within which to operate. Its operative presence 
which is now urging nature forward must be 
sought for throughout the whole, in the remotest 
past as well as in the narrowest breadth of any 
present duration. Perhaps also in the unrealized 
future. Perhaps also in the future wh gh might 
be as the actual future which will be. 
Its kind, then, is apparently both efficient and final. 
Idealistic or theistic origins of the teleology are not 
considered, partly because such a development would repre- 
sent a divergence from the question at hand, and partly 
because the relations between process and God were apparent- 
ly not clear at that time. Its degree is further indica- 
ted as being great, because, when taken in conjunction 
46. Victor Lowe, op. cit , 87. 
47. CT?, 73. - 
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with the following statement, such a creative urge would 
lie at the roots of the then fundamental relation of ex- 
tension. 
Nature develops, in the sense that an event e 
becomes part of an event e' which includes48 
(i. e. extends over) e and also extends into the 
futurity beyond e. 
An event in passing becomes part of larger 
events; and thus till ,passage of events is exten- 
sion in the making." 
With the publication of The Principle of Relativity 
another fundamental change in the status of process, this 
time epistemological, appeared. Here process was itself 
available to direct experience.50 The denial of any 
idealistic origin of the process, or any idealistic inter- 
ference, was specifically a.sserted51 in a contribution to 
the Aristotelian Society in the same year. 
Science and the Nodern World introduced another term 
which was fundamental in ;Jhitehead's later works; the no- 
tion of "prehension." Rejecting "perception" and "appre- 
hension" because of their cognitive connotations, White- 
head defined "prehension" to mean either cognitive or un- 
cognitive apprehension. Frehensions are unifying processes 
In 1925 Whitehead also introduced the idea that 
48. Note the use of the terminology of TRE. 
49. PNK, 62. 
50. REL, 21. 
51. 1922 "The Philosophical Aspects of the Principle of 
Relativity" Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 
22, 221. The letters PAPR will be used to designate 
this memoir. 
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"nature is a structure of evolving processes. The reality 
is the process.... The realities of nature are the pre- 
hensions in nature, that is to say, the events in nature. "52 
However, "event" has here received a different interpreta- 
tion from the "event" of the earlier papers; it is no lon- 
ger a simple chunk of space -time in which action takes 
place. The "event" of 1919 -1922 resembles this event of 
1925 somewhat more than the earlier "event," which is clo- 
ser in connotation to the relativist's "event." It should 
further be noticed that the mutual significance of events 
assumes further meaning in the notion of prehension. This 
insistence on "mutual significance of events" and the uni- 
fying "prehensions" again accents Whitehead's acceptance 
of the statement by Tech that nature does not start from 
simple, independent elements. This doctrine of the inter- 
dependence of the components of the natural world is one 
of the primary postulates of the philosophy of organism, 
developed as an axiomatic system in Process and Realm. 
A further terminological change in Science and the Modern 
World is the dropping of the word "passage," perhaps be- 
cause it had colorless connotations which "process" did 
not possess. 
It has been seen that for Whitehead the fundamental 
facts of nature are events, which are mutually significant 
52. SA11, 90. 
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of each other by means of the internal relatedness ex- 
pressed in terris of spatio- temporal extension. Events, 
however, represent only one of sever,-,1 "-',odes" of diversi- 
fication of nature; there are four important other modes, 
all of which are known as objects of different species.53 
Perception of events must be assumed to take place 
internal to nature, and not as though the observer were 
exploring the operations of nature fro ,, without.54 The 
definite name given to the perception of an event is to be 
known as "apprehension, "55 an innovation of The Trinci les 
of Natural Knowledge, after the initial use of "distin- 
guishing," as in "Sp'ìce, Time and Relativity. 
"56 
An event whose dimensions are ideally restricted, 
somethinR; comparable to the classical instantaneous points, 
is to be known as an event- particle,57 but has no direct 
perceptual significance as such. If an event -particle is 
a member of two events, those two events are said to in- 
tersect. When event -particles are common to the bounda- 
ries of two events, those events are said to be "in con- 
tact. "58 Furthermore, the event- particles forming the to- 

























An event having only three of its di mensions ideally 
restricted is known as a route or path;6Q if the spatial 
dimensions are the restricted ones, they are known as "his - 
torical routes ,"61 a term borrowed by Whitehead from C. D. 
Broad. 
Every event is said to extend over some other event. 
Furthermore, there is no maximal event, since each event 
forms a part of a larger event.62 In corenting on the 
fact that there is for TThitehead, no re= l lówer limit, 
Russell suggested that such a condition may prevent ,the 
method of extensive abstraction from applying to the realm 
of quantum physics, where a certain minimal event is ne- 
cessary for its manifestation.63 Russell's elaboration o`' 
Whitehead's extensive abstraction provided fcr a finite, 
rather than an infinite, containing of events by a given 
event. This would lead to Russell's "minimal event. 64 
However, Whitehead later admitted that a certain minimal 
duration and volume would be a necessity. 
That an event is cogredient with a duration expresses 
the condition that that event occupies a place within that 
duration such that the duration is sufficient to cover it. 
Cogredience is thus, Whitehead argued, an immediate 
60. FINK, 124. REL, 29. 
61. REL, 68. 
62. PINK, 61. 
63. 1927 The Anal sis of ]Tstter, 292. 
64. Ibid. ,78$.- 
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ingredient of experience.65 
One of the fundamental properties of events is that 
they can be in only one place at any time.ó6 This is to 
be contrasted with the classical scientific notion that a 
material particle can be in only one place at a time. Ila- 
terial particles were, for Whitehead, in space and time 
only derivatively, by reason of the fact that events are 
connected by .gip -ce and time. Relations in sp -ce and time 
are properties of events, not obj ects.67 
Tiller ,end Gentry have criticized Whitehead's analy- 
sis of events with respect to space- time.ó8 Are not 
events abstractions from the spatio- temporal continuums? 
If so, then the characters of events cannot be experienced 
empirically. Thus Whitehead is believed to be wrong. 
In response to this criticism, it should be noted 
that events are indeed abstracted from space -time in the 
sense that they form the basis of the continuum and are 
pmts of it. However, they are not abstractions in the 
sense that they form conceptual constructs from some other 
data of experience. Events are directly experienced. The 
65. TSM, 50. 
66. TNK_, 65. 
67. LNX, 65. CN, 24. REL, 58. 
68. David L. Miller and George V. Gentry. 19758 The Thi- 
loso h, of Alfred North Whitehead, 7. This volums 
ille wiTli-UT5TFuTTive criticism, much of which is 
based purely on equivocation. 
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spatio -temporal continuum is an expression of their re- 
latedness. It cannot be imagined that such an assertion 
as trade by Miller and Gentry is really damaging to the in- 
ternal consistency of Whitehend f s analysis, centering as 
it does on an equivocal use of the term "abstraction." 
Events are one of the basic modes of diversification; 
the other four are species of objects, to be known as 
sense -objects, percipient objects, perceptual objects, and 
scientific objects.69 
Sense -objects are the fundamental objects in nature, 
and are specific sense -data located in an external event, 
such as definite colors or tastes, and represent a type of 
permanence disclosed in nature.70 The relation of object 
to event is that of "ingression. "71 All other objects in 
nature presuppose the sense -object, and there is no appre- 
hension of nature apart from recognizing the relation of 
sense -object to event. As contrasted with the external 
event there is the percipient event which is the awareness 
of a polyadic relation of sense- object to nature, and ex- 
presses an awareness of the permanence to the sense -object. 
This permanence is to be known as the percipient object.72 
It is distinguished from the sense -object in that the 
69. PNK, 60. 
70. TSM, 51. FNK, 83. ON, 149. 
71. CN, 144. UC, 8. 
72. FNK, 83. 
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latter is included in the external event of nature. Al- 
though the sense -object is permanent, it is the percipient 
object which recognizes that permanence and expresses the 
rel tedness of the sense- object to nature. 
Perceptual objects are the ordinary common-sense 
thins. They represent the permanence of a configuration 
of sense -objects throughout durations of time.73 They 
might be the blueness of e ch -ir, its softness to the 
touch, etc. The perceptual object is ''conveyed" to the 
mind by the sense- object. Because the sense- object con- 
veys the perceptual object, there is a reasonable basis 
for delusion on the pert of a percipient. 
Scientific objects are the entities conceived by 
science to be responsible for the physical world, and are 
electrons, protons, etc.74 Any single scientific object 
is in some sense related t.: every event which contributes 
to the cr. eetive advance of the universe. There -1re the 
occupied events, which express the fact that the basis of 
the existence of the electron is 'here- now." The unoccu- 
pied event expresses the fact that the field associated 
with the electron exerts an influence "here -now. "75 The 
theory of scientific objects as developed here by 'dhitehead 
7 . 'ISM, 5'. 
74. TS:a, 55. 
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CN, 159. 
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h ¡ s been declared inadequate by Northrop.76 
Perceptual objects are ordinarily "recognized" (a . 
term._ for the perception of an object, similar in usage to 
the "apprehension" of an event) 77 as being uniform objects. 
That is to say, the perceptual object endurin :; throughout 
a duration A will exhibit the same characteristics in any 
shorter duration i within the larer duration.78 It is 
interesting to note that, whereas in The Princi 21es of 
Natural Knowledge and The Concept of Nature the perceptual 
object is considered as the summation of sense object, 
with the appearance of The Principle of Relativity it is 
described as an adjective pervading its route.79 White- 
head, however, recognized the possible objection from 
Quantum physics that there are reasons to assume that per- 
ceptual or scientific objects ,re not uniform. In fact, 
this sort of reason was the one expressly _,iven for al- 
lowing the existence of non-uniform objects ,80 and in his 
writings the extension of this notion of non -uniformity 
for. ed the basis of a tentative inclusion of quantum 
physics. It will be seen that in its fully a ture form, 
it is not sufficient to account for quantum mechanics. 
76. Northrop, cit. , 205. 
77. 715E, 67. 
78. TSM, 56. INK, 167-168. 
79. A divergence first noted by L. Susan 3tebbing. 1926 
"Professor Wh.iteheacits Perceptual Object" J ournal of 
PhilosoEhy, 23, 198-199. 
80. TSM, 57. PNK, 189. 
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Had Whitehead been as productive in searching the ground- 
work of quantum mechanics (for it must be remembered the t 
relativity is the last scientific subject written about in 
scientific form by him), he might have admitted the insuf- 
ficiency of that allowance. Non- unifor :_ objects are held 
to be operative against the continuous spatio- temporal 
background. It is this predictable uniformity on which 
quantum mechanics throws serious doubt. Sir Edmund 
Whittaker has pointed out that this may represent a 
serious objection to Whiteheadts method of extensive ab- 
straction.81 Victor Lowe has considered the danger to be 
not a real one,82 nor would _,ny other writer who considered 
quantum mechanics to be explainable in terms of field 
theory. But it is just the point that quantum mechanics 
may not be thus explicable which is important. Thus, 
Whiteheadts method of extensive abstraction is under fire 
from quantum mechanics along with every other scientific 
or philosophical theory grounded in a conviction of the 
fundamental uniformity and determinate continuity of nature. 
In The Principles of Natural Knowledge Whitehead al- 
lowed that molecules are non -uniform objects, and pointed 
81. 1948 "Alfred North Whitehead" Obituary Notices of 
Fellows of the Royal Societ , 6, 295. 
82. 1950 April 28 and 1950 Oc o er 8. Letters to the au- 
thor. 
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to the fact that the essential notion behind non -uniform 
objects is that of rhythm. In the case of electrons and 
molecules the rhythm is essentially very simple, but 
Whitehead does not indicate what its nature might be. To 
solve the problem of the n ture of the rhythm of the sub- 
atomic particles would be to solve for determinism the 
present deadlock in physical theory and pave the way to 
a possible unification. 
The life -bearing object, however, is the mast out- 
standing type of non- uniform object. `,Thitehead's asser- 
tion that objects can be represented in simple extensive 
elements of instantaneous space, and the subsequent state - 
nent that the life-bearing object needs more than an in- 
stantaneous space to assert its life- character,8` leads to 
the notion of Russell that a mini gal event may be neces- 
sary for a coherent account of nature. 
Whitehead later specifically mentioned the possibili- 
ty that minimum quanta of extensive time may be necessary 
for the realization of the non -uniform obj ects,84 and con- 
sidered the idea as in no sense inconsistent with the fact 
that any event must contain an infinite number of sub - 
events. This is possible on the grounds that the objects 
merely represent characters of the events, and in no way 
83. TN-11,7, 196. 
84. CN, 162. 
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damage the existence of the event by their continssent 
chary cter.85 
These rhythms exhibited by non -uniform objects are 
due to the impression of a pattern on those selected ele- 
ments,ß6 and the example which occurs torAnd is the no- 
tion of wave- form, simple or complex. Quantum researches 
such as those of Dirac in 1928 lend credibility to such an 
interpretation, but there are many researches which are 
more consonant with forgetting the wave aspect completely 
and introducing fundamental discontinúity. The life of an 
individual person is an example where the pattern assumes 
a more complex nature, because those persons may build an 
additional rhythm from the aggregate of the earlier rhythms.87 
Russell, enlarging the 'Ihiteheadia:n treatment of rhythms, 
suggested that there may be three primary types of objects, 
in contrast to Whitehead's uniform and non -uniform divi- 
sion. The occupied events would then be steady events, 
rhythmical events, and transactions.88 The latter was 
specifically designed to describe quantum changes, and 
represents a more acceptable solution than Whitehead's 
rhythms. Russell admitted that transactions could be con- 
sidered as the sudden substitution of one rhythm for 
85. This is a point on which Whitehead was accused of in- 
consistency by Miller and Gentry, 22. cit., 40. 
86. FNK, 198 -199. 
87. fl!K, 197. 
88. 1927 The Analysis of tatter, 355. 
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another.80 
With the publication of Science and the Modern World, 
time was considered fundamentally as a succession of 
epochs, rather than as subject primarily to the relation 
of extensiveness. This was necessitated by the condition 
that the completion of a rhythmical pattern required a du- 
ration of a definite time- lapse, called an epoch.90 The 
realization of the complete event required by the pattern` 
thus has need of an epochal, rather than an extensive, 
analysis of time. The substitution of this new theory of 
time represents a possible advance and makes Whitehead's 
scientific thought more amenable to interpreting quantum 
mechanics. 
In order, however, to explain quantum actions more 
successfully, it will be necessary to consider more expli- 
citly the nature of the objects involved in them. 
A uniform object, it has been said, continues un- 
changed throuq;hout the exhibition of its character along 
its historical route. When, therefore, the uniform object 
is considered, it will be found to be capable of defini- 
tion as a pervasive adjective,91 since its nature pervades 
the entire stretch of that route. '.iaterial bodies, being 
adjectival to the routes of the event -particles in which 
89. Ibid., 402. 
90. SM, 157. 
91. REL, 32. 
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they are located, cannot have the character of being the 
ultimate data of physics. Nor will they be the source of 
the spetio- temporal relation of extension, "or then space- 
time would depend on the contingent appearance of the ob- 
jects. 92 In reviewing The Principles of Natural Knowledge 
Theodore de Laguna singled out this assertion as unsound.97) 
It is explicitly the doctrine of E4 nstein that the material 
objects will be the relata, producing one of the fundamen- 
tal points of divergence between Einstein and Whitehead. 
Whitehead had, therefore, frankly admitted the adjec- 
tival character of ratter in the philosophy of nature 
period. ,But with respect to the question of whether ma- 
terial particles are really adjectival, it seems that Tro- 
fessor de Laguna has a highly defensible objection. By 
using this device, Whitehead seems to have placed his cos- 
mology just outside the range of experiential verification, 
thus making precise scientific investigation at least 
highly improbable. For the purposes of physical science, 
therefore, the bifurcated cosmology of Einstein seems 
preferable to the unified cosmology of Whitehead at this 
point; the adjectival nature of matter must be postulated; 
it is not found. At this point, Professor van Melsents 
92. REL, 58, 72. 
93. 1920 "Review of An Enquiry Concerning the Principles 
of Natural Knowlëëe" The Philosophical Review, 29, 
272. 
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observation that Whitehead needs something to "do the 
eventing1494 becomes highly pertinent. Professor George 
Tel ple, who attempted > generalization of ?:Thitehead's 
relativity, has also noted the scientific difficulty; 
"...the method 
[of 
extensive abstraction] comes right out- 
side the demand of our i:cLaediate sense observations." 95 
Causality is thus an operation erroneously ascribed 
to objects;. that property belongs only to events, which 
may be called "conditioning events" in their function of 
efficient causation. If a. conditioning event is active, 
it is the direct cause of the occurrence of a given sense- 
object in its proper situation. The other events of na- 
ture are passive with respect to that sense- object, and 
allow it to participate in a percipient event.96 Thus the 
laws of nature are a description of the operation of the 
active conditioning events and the percipient events; 
their discovery depends on the repitition of the character 
of the active conditioning events.97 Hence, objects cause 
events only insofar as they supply the characters of ante- 
cedent events which furnish the conditions which will 
characterize a future event.98 It is because a physical 
object must be located in an active conditioning event 
Letter to the author. 94. 1950 December 4. 
95. 1950 July 14. Letter to the author. 
96. TNK, 86. 
97. FNK, 87. 
98. Fla, 73. 
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that it is considered to be the cause. Northrop has de- 
clared this doctrine to be one of the places where White- 
head has fallen prey to bifurcation.99 It is not alto- 
gether clear that Whitehead has escaped an object -event 
bifurcation here, and the difficulty is even more glaring 
than a possible actúal entity- eternal object bifurcation 
in the philosophy of organism. 
In reviewing The Principles of Natural Knowledge, 
C. D. Broad suggested that Whitehead's objects could be 
looked upon as analogous to the philosophical "univer- 
sals "; events were the particulars.100 However, Professor 
Stebbing, in discussing this particular.suggested rela- 
tion, has reminded those who favor the identification, of 
a crucial point. The notion of universals and p-rticul -ìrs 
is derived from the acknowledgment of the existence of 
substance- quality as the basic category of physical na- 
tu-re.101 It is to just this 'division which Whitehead was 
objecting under the accusation that it represents the 
"fallacy of misplaced concreteness. "102 
Professor Stebbing further pointed out that an 
99. Northrop, 2. cit'. , 186. 
100. 1920 "Critical Notice of Alfred North Whitehead's An 
Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Natural Know- __
ledge" hind, new series, 29, 218. 
101. 1925 "Universals and Professor Whitehead's Theory of 
Objects" Troceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 
25, 326 -327. 
102. SMIT, 66. 
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identification of Whitehead's "object" with -Fussell's 
physical object as the class of its appearances is incor- 
rect.103 Whiteheac's objects have aspects too far- 
reaching in their unoccupied events to admit the meaning- 
fulness of such a c1 ̂ssification. In 1927 Russell himself 
decl- -red the divergence to exist: "... that 'aspects' may 
be not quite alike, and yet may be in some sense numeri- 
cally one. To my mind, such a view, if taken seriously, 
is incompatible with science, and involves a mystic pan- 
1,104 
Trofessor Weiss, criticizing Whitehead's notion of 
the passage of nature and its connection with objects, be- 
lieved he had found a discrepancy. If things are but mo- 
mentary adjectives of events, then even the oldest of ob- 
jects must be constntly new. 105 In response to this 
challenge it must be pointed out that there is a persis- 
tence of the same object throughout the route it pervades. 
The newness of the object is really the newness of the 
event; the newness is due to the fact that the characters 
describing the old object are located in a new conditioned 
event. Nevertheless, it does not seem that Whitehead ac- 
counts for persistence in nature as easily as he accounts 
103. L. Susan Stebbing, 22. cit., 308. 
104. The Analysis of Natter, 340 -341. 
105. Faul Treiss. 1936 The Nature and Status of Time and 
Passage" Philoso.hical Essays for Alfred North 
Whitehead, 172. 
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for. change. This is a criticism which will continue in 
the next part of the thesis on the philosophy of organism. 
In connection with the persistence of an object, it 
is well to note an innovation in Science and the Modern 
World. There an "eternal object" is introduced.106 A 
color, for example, is an eternal object. Eternal objects 
are thus recognizable without reference to any one par- 
ticular event. An eternal object has, however, a particu- 
lar method of ingression into that event without losing 
its individuality. Using language with a definitely meta- 
physical flavor, Whitehead said, "each eternal object is 
an individual which, in its own peculiar fashion, is what 
it is. This particular individuality is the individual 
essence of the object.... "107 An eternal object was also 
described as having the metaphysical statu of "a possi- 
bility for an actuality. "108 It is certain, however, that 
Whitehead did not imply thereby the problems associated 
with the problem of universal -particular. Furthermore, 
eternal objects were described as being relatéd by the 
term "ingression" to what was now an "actual occasion." 
It must therefore be necessary to assume that sense- objects 
have their roots in the eternal object. Apparently it is 












object has its ingression into an event. 
On two grounds, A. 0. Lovejoy found the eternal ob- 
jects to be undesirable components in a nature philosophy.109 
In the first ple ce, Lovejoy denied that an eternal object 
which is ingredient in an event can regain the same after 
its ingression. The difficulty carries over into the phi- 
losophy of organism, and a suggestion for the possible im- 
provement of the situation will be ::;aide in Chapter X. The 
second ground for Lovejoy's objection was that if eternal 
objects were timeless, they again should have no proper 
function in nature. This argument, it seems, should be 
tempered to the point of making it an assertion of unveri- 
fiability. The revised argument then joins those ques- 
tioning the experimental value of +lhitehead's cosmology. 
In its original form, a much more debatable ontological 
question is invoked. 
Santayana has found Wh.itehead's treatment of sense- 
objects and scientific objects reminiscent of his own es- 
sences, and haw used the definition of an eternal object 
from Science and the Modern World as a documentation of 
the fact that essences had been clearly distinguished. 
Santayana further opined that Whitehead did not call them 
essences because of the circumstances in which he approached 
109. 1930 The Revolt Against Dual ism, 111. 
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metaphysics: that of English realism of the 1920' 5.110 
By examining the fundamental relation of extension 
expressed in the symbolic form a K_ b,111 Whitehead intro- 
duced his method of extensive abstraction proper. As in 
the 1905 memoir, -Thitehead seemed to be searching for the 
"forms in the facts," as did Flato. The method centered 
primarily around the use of what he called abstractive 
sets or cl_sses.112 These classes had the property of 
having each of its members extended over, and was itself 
extended over by, other members of the set. Furthermore, 
there was to be no smallest member of the set. However, 
inasmuch as certain boundaries of certain types of events 
were clearly defined so that the event was of a certain 
size, exceptional abstractive classes zust exist which 
converge to the boundaries of the given event rather than 
to an extensionless, ideally restricted me -ber of the or- 
dinary abstractive class . 
113 
In terms of extensive abstraction, the moment was de- 
fined to be that minimum duration which could extend over 
elements of all types of abstractive sets: spatial or tem- 
poral.114 This definition gives rise to the existence of 
110. George Santayana. 1928 The Realm of Essence: Book 
First of Realms of Being, 169 -171. 
111. Read, "a ex-` teWas overÚ" 
112. PNX , 104. 
113. T-NK, 107 -108. 
114. PJK, 109 -111. CN, 57. 
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many alternative time-systems, each of which was capable 
of possessing its own peculiar spatial system, which for 
that time- series was absolute.115 This accounts for the 
fact that an individual does, in fact, use one determinate 
measure system. 116 Moments in the same time -system were 
defined to be parallel; those which were in different 
time- systems were accordingly non -parallel. When moments 
of different time-systems intersected, different spatial 
elements called levels, rects, and puncts could be de- 
fined, and would be analogous to planes, lines, and points 
of the ordinary three -dimensional Euclidean space.117 
Using a technique inspired by Wilson and Lewis ,118 
Whitehead defined congruence in terms of parallelism. Thé 
particular novelty of the treatment was not only spa- 
tial, but also temporal, congruence was uniquely defined.119 
Because of the fundamental nature of moments in a 
time- system, spatial order in one time- system was defined, 
and derivatively coordinated with the spatial order in 
other time- systems.120 The assumption that the spatial 
115. CN, 106. 
116. Cf. STR, 126. 
117. PNK, 116. CN, 91 -92. 
118. Edwin B. Wilson and Gilbert N. Lewis. 1913 "The 
Space -Time Manifold of Relativity. The Non- Euclidean 
Geometry of Mechanics and Electromagnetics" Pro- 
ceedings of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 
389 -507. 
119. PNK, 141. CN, 137. REL, 52. 
120. PNK, 119. REL, 60. 
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order of two time -systems are extre::-ely closely coordina- 
ted accounts for the fact that, in the main, the measure 
systems of different individuals appear to agree within 
the limits of obs ervn ti on.121 It must be remembered that 
this method of extensive abstraction depen''_s finally upon 
the uniform reltedness exhibited as being the texture of 
nature. At this point of development, James Johnstone 
called a halt because of his conviction that the . o'.ients 
of nature did not exhibit o unifor:riity of passage, and 
therefore were not amenable to the method.122 This, of 
course, is e point of funda: rental divergence, and is pore 
consistent with Einstein's xaethocl (Ps Johnstone has of- 
fered it), as well as foreshadowing T..Thitehe^d's own later 
epochal theory of tisle. 
'.Tith respect to the fund - mental relation of exten- 
sion, Theodore de Laguna offered the suggestion th t the 
notion of "contoining" could be substituted, P,ryl the me- 
thod would thereby gain in si. 1plicity. 
l s 
A further novelty of extensive abstraction was one 
due pri.a' rily to Bertrand ?ussell, and was known n.s "par - 
tial overlapping. "1` 4 By the time that the notion appeared 
121. Cf. STI , 126. 
122. 1922 "On the Limitations of a Knowledge of Nature" 
Troceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 22, 48. 
123. 1921 "Extensive Abstraction: A Su- gestion "The 
ThilosórhicP1 7eview, 30, 216. 
124. 1927 The ArLlysis of botter, 294. 
231 
from Russell's hand, Whitehead had finished the works of 
this period. Even Russell did not csrry the investigation 
further because of its limited value in physics. He sug- 
gested, however, that it may prove useful in psychology. 
Miller and Gentry have suggested that there exists an 
am.bi.Tuity in this stage of Thitehead's development con - 
cerning abstract methods, to ical concepts, and potentiali- 
ty, as in the case of the ingression of sense -objects into 
events.125 This char _ °e see_ :s defensible, and perhaps was 
one of the reasons tor the adoption of process as the f un- 
dar.menta.l reality in nature with the appearance of Science 
and the Modern ':: orld, and tor its ti nal refinement in Tro- 
cees and Reality. 
In IThitehea.d's treatment of the sp^tio- temporal con - 
tinuum, another of the desirable consequences was that 
passage along a spatial route has a different character from 
passage along a historical route, thus giving a somewhat 
different status to time and space.126 This, as has been 
seen, was one of the philosophical disadvantages of many 
of the relativity theories, where space and time were com- 
pletely homogeneous. 
One of the characteristics of a particle pursuing a 
purely historical route (at rest) in one time- system, is 
125. 1938 The Thilosophy of Alfred North '.'Thitehead, 33. 
126. J L, 68. 
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that the same apparent particle will be moving in another 
time -system with uniform velocity.127 A further conse- 
quence of the nature of durations is related to this situa- 
tion. Inasmuch as a duration is im-!ediätely tied to one 
spatio- temporal system, it would of necessity fail to in- 
clude all the aspects of nature in othar spatio- temporal 
systems. Accordingly, no single duration can be conceived 
to represent the whole of nature without any omissions; 
nature is larger than any one of the spatio- temporal sys- 
tems contributing to its entirety.128 
One of the convictions .[hi teheJ: d upheld, which was 
closely associated with the problems of relativity, was 
the belief in the objective meaning of simultaneity. This 
disagreement formed a third major area of contention with 
the orthodox relativists. The first two areas, it will 
be remembered, center around the homogeneity of space -time 
and the status of rrterial particles as substantial or ad- 
jectival to events. 
Such a statement is made possible by the fact that 
the elements which may lay claim to simultaneity have the 
co[amon property of being components of the sa: e duration. 
Accordingly, there is an empirical basis for the obj ective 
simultaneity of two events.129 The solution of the 
127. REI., 70. 
128. FNY, 81. 
129. CN, 56. 
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problem, however, of establishing the sirlultaneous recep- 
tion of one given event by two observers, i. e., the estab- 
lishment of a public time, is not a-parent in '.Ihitehead's 
writings. It was specifically on this point that Northrop 
criticized Whitehead, and quoted a statement arising in an 
interview with Einstein, who was of the sa je opinion.130 
There is no reason to assume that the events cogredient 
with the duration A in time- system a( a: e going to be co- 
gredient with the duration 3 in tine -system/ . The solu- 
tion in The 221122,2t of Nature is far from satisf:-*ctory; 
For two minds, the discerned components of 
the general facts exhibited in their respective 
acts of sense -awareness must be different. or 
each mind, in its awareness of nature is aware 
of certain complex of related n-.tural entities 
in their relations to the living body as a focus. 
But the associated durations may be identical. 
Here we are touching on that character of the 
passage [ of) n., tune which issues in the spatial rely ti ons of simultaneous bodies. This possible 
identity of the durations in the case of the 
sense -awareness of distinct minds is what binds 
into one nature the private experiences of sen- 
tient beings. ß,1e are here consia ering the spa- 
tial side of the passage of nature. Passage in 
this aspect of tt also seems to extend beyond 
nature to mind.-"1 
Here there is postulated the possible identity of the du- 
rations of two time -systems. However, such a postulate is 
by no means warranted by the rest of the treatment of the 
time-series. It seems scarcely possible to postulate 
130. orthrop, op. cit., 200-204. 
131. 55-56.-- 
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public time merely on the basis of a contingent identifi- 
cation which is not intrinsic to the structure of the 
analysis. The introduction of the relationship of time 
to "mind" does not help solve the problem. Ushenko has 
roundly criticized Northrop on the grounds of misrepresen- 
ting Whitehead to Einstein.132 However, Ushenko does not 
himself consider the problem of how Whitehead does account 
for public time, and cannot really be considered to have 
demonstrated Northrop incorrect. The opinion presented 
here concurs with Northrop against Ushenko on the criti- 
cism that there is not an ade'uate basis for accounting 
for the existence of a public time. 
As the writings of this period progress, there is an 
increasing reference to the role of mind as än ingredient 
in nature. In 1916, Whitehead's reference to mind oc- 
curred in the comment that the world of scientific thought 
was a world of ideas, of relationships between abstract 
concepts.133 As to the dependence of nature on mind, 
Whitehead was not prepared to assert a positive relation 
between the two; surely it was not of such importance to 
warrant attention. 
Two years later, in the Preface to The principles of 
132. 1949 "Einstein's Influence on Contemporary Thiloso- 
phy" Albert Einstein: Philosopher- Scientist, 
The 
Library of Llvznz Pfiilos opher. s , 
7762e. 
133. OT, 61. 
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Natural Knowlede, Whitehead explicitly denied the value 
of bringing mind into the natural picture: "None of our 
perplexities as to Nature will be solved by having re- 
course to the consideration that there is a mind knowing 
ít.,,134 In The Concept of Nature the swing towards the 
inclusion of mind had begun to manifest itself directly: 
"I a.m not denying that there are relations of natural en- 
tities to mind or minds other than being the termini of 
the sense -awareness of minds. "135 Iurther, Whitehead 
proffered the possibility that "The values of nature are 
perhaps the key to the metaphysical synthesis of exis- 
tence." 
136 Statements of this nature, as well as the 
other innovations already noted easily explain the readi- 
ness on the part of many philosophers to welcome -Thitehead 
as a significant philosopher. 
The publications in the year 1922 exhibit essentially 
two viewpoints which are so:newhat inconsistent, and may 
possibly be an indication of the conflict in Whitehead's 
own mind as to the significance and degree of involvement 
of mind with nature. Each of the three short memoirs of 
that year reject the mutual significance of mind and na- 
ture. In February: "...we know of events whose connexion 
with any mental process, as we know it, appears to be 
134. FNK, vii. 
135. CN, 5. 
136. CN, 5. 
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doubtful, incomplete, and extremely unessential to them. 
That is my reason for being very shy of leaning too heavi- 
ly on mind in any endeavour to express the general charac- 
ter of reality. 437 In July, Whitehead declared, "There 
is a process of nature which is obstinately indifferent to 
mind. "138 In November, in the Presidential address to the 
Aristotelian Society, the position was clarified: "I dif- 
fer from the idealists, so far as they consider such a.n 
external significance [that of the factors of fact] as pe- 
culiar to consciousness and thence deduce that the things 
signified have a peculiar dependence on consciousness. "139 
It is possible that Whitehead was protesting primarily 
against the value for prediction of a nature -mind relation, 
and not against the existence of any such relations. In 
the James -Scott Prize Lecture to the Royal Society of 
Edinburgh in June of that year, Whitehead declared, "I en- 
tirely agree that the factors of nature are also signifi- 
cant of factors which are not included in nature. "140 
With the appearance of Science and the Modern World, 
Whitehead advised, "So far as concerns what will be said 
137. 1922 "Discussion: The Idealistic Interpretation of 
Einstein's Theory" Proceedings of the Aristotelian 
Society, 22, 131. 
138. PAIR, 221. 
139. UC, 12. 
140. REL, 21. 
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in these lectures, your ultimate outlook may be realistic 
or idealistic, 441 but he chose for himself what he called 
a "provisional realism." However, the swing toward inclu- 
ding mind as one important fact had manifested itself; in 
the psychological field, "the mind is the major perma- 
nence, permeating the complete field, whose endurance is 
the living soul." 
142 
The pages of Science and the Modern World contain the 
only discussion of the relation of God to the natural sys- 
tem that Whitehead wrote during the period under considera- 
tion. In the synthesis of an actual occasion, the various 
eternal objects achieve a complex unification, and include 
the relations which produce "memory, anticipation, imagi- 
nation, and thought. "143 The principle which is respon- 
sible for this process of the synthesizing of a complete 
actual occasion is known as the Trinciple of Concretion,144 
which performs a task analogous to that of the Trime Hover 
in the Aristotelian metaphysics. The Trinciple of Concre- 
tion thus represents a part of the nature of God, along 
with the Trinciple of Limitation. This other principle, 
in conjunction with the Trinciple of Concretion, performs 
the selections from among the possible components of a 
141. SNW, 80. 
142. SEW, 251. 
143. SEW, 212. 
144. S EW , 216. 
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complete actu ̂.1 occa'.sion. In making these selections some 
li Tita.tions on the realm of possibility is necessary, and 
God provides the grounds for this process of limit- tion.145 
This function is analogous to God's primordial conceptual 
valuation of the eternal objects in the philosophy of orga- 
nism. Because of the imposition of these li itations con- 
tributing to the concrétion of actual occasions, reasoning 
is made possible, and value emerges with an objective 
reality. God thus provides both the ground of concrete- 
ness and the limitations which form the actual occasions. 
In the evolution of Whitehead's philosophy of nature, 
and in the development of the relativity writings, it h-s 
become apparent that the earlier treatment given in "On 
°athematical Concepts of the TTaterial World" has become 
obsolete. But the method of that memoir has begun to as- 
sume increasing importance. 
With respect to the changes necessary in the light of 
these further discussions, the status of time, for example, 
must be included in the essential relation itself. Fur- 
thermore, as much doubt has been cast on considering rec- 
tilinear extensions in Euclidean space as upon the points 
of space and instants of time, as having a reasonable 
claim to being the ultimate existents in nature. Instead, 
events have become the "ultimate existents" for Whitehead, 
145. S IM , 221. 
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and extension, the "essential Relation." 
Accordingly, in preparing a concise treatment in the 
style of the 1905 memoir, certain basic revisions are 
necessary for a possible Case III. 
The essential relation will be that of extension, and 
t ill be defined by the statement a K b, following Uhite- 
head. Ultimate existents will be four -dimensional events. 
A tentative treatment of the set of axioms might then fol- 
low. 
I Hp R. .3 :a Df 
II Hp .(3x)(a. K x) Df 
III Hp Ft. E : (a,,b):a K b. :).a.# b 7f 
IV Hp Rai : . ( a , b ) : . a K b : =1 : ( 3'~c , d ) Ec I, a . b K d . c ¢ a: . 
bd Df 
V Hp K (c,d,,m) a K (c,d,... 
m,...n):D.a K b ' Df 
DTI Hp R.E : (a,b,c) :a K b.b K c :7.a K c Df 
VII Hp R.E.:(a,c):a K c :7.(3b)(a k b.b I;_ c) Df 
VIII Hp R. ó: (ff c) (c K a.c b) Df 
IX Hp R. _ . a = 4 Df 
Then, defining the moment by ea.ns of the method of exten- 
sive abstraction, and symbolizing it by annexing the sub- 
script k to the letter denoting the 2bstra.ctiv e element, 
moments of the time sys tem v( will be denoted by ak. , bkoc. 
ckac , etc. It will furthermore be true that 
1.01 -:akdl, b, . UUckai f0 . Df 
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X Hp R. _ : (ak , ak ) : akoLil ak 1v 1-,. 4, ivik 
1 
XI Hp R.E:(akd,a ,ak ).akeflak flaky :rct,, 
rctk retkl Df 
XII Hp R.E: :(a., ,akt ,a, ).aket a1 flak/ nakr° 
pctko^pcti _ pctkzi ^ pctks Df 
XIII, XIV, and XV Hps R will establish the punct -order of 
cc-puncts on o(- rects, following the techniqúe of the 1905 
memoir. XVI Hp R will establish the sequence of pr-allel 
moments in the time- syste-Iis. XVII Hp R establishes the 
continuity of abstractive elements in the extensive con- 
tinuum. 
There will then be a series of axio ,s establishing 
the fact that certain types of objects ingress into ;iv en 
abstractive elements. However, a difficulty is encoun- 
tered with respect to assigning minimum limits to the ex- 
ceptional abstractive classes which manifest the charac- 
ters of non -uniform objects. 
Furthermore, additional axioms will be required to 
establish the geometrical relations 'developing from the 
betweenness relation of the 1905 memoir. This can be done 
fairly straightforwardly, using puncts. A relating of 
puncts to points must also be done definitionally. 
Just how the important principles of concretion and 
limitation are to be symbolically expressed is far frofa 
clear. 
As an extraneous relation, a single kinetic axis 
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frame will be necessary to describe motion. 
Definitional =attempts must then be made to related 
this axiomatic system to the described components in the 
external world or to sensed phenomena, depending upon the 
outlook adopted. 
Such a solution as outlined above would apparently 
overcome the difficulties of the 1905 memoir with respect 
to the innovations underlined by Whitehead :rnd by the 
relativistic cosmologies, but it would be subject to the 
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WHI^1i;i i' 'S THEORY OF RELATIVITY 
Whitehead, having finished his collaboration with 
Russell on the first three volumes of rrincaia 3 Tthematica", 
turned his attention to the proble::.Is concerning the rela- 
tions of geometry to space. This was a natural interest, 
since the fourth voluge of T'r. incipia w s planned to cover 
tr.e problems of the foundations of geometry and would 
likely have considered their relation to physical sp =ce. 
(See page 84 of this thesis.) 
T_robably the first attempt in this direction which 
was published was "La Theorie elntionniste de l'Espace" 
which discussed the various kinds of space: physical, ap- 
p rent, and bstract.l The problem was aprorsntly deflec- 
ted into channels leading to rel- tivity, because, in reply 
to P question by Victor Loire, Thitehead remembered that 
what bothered hi-1 at th t ti-- e was "the muddle r;eo ietry 
C) 
had gotten into" in relation to the physical world. 
was convinced that relativity theory was at 
least heading in the proper direction for a solution, for 
1. TRE, 423 -425. 
2. 4,uoted in Victor Lowe, óp. cit., 66. 
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in 1916 he ad 'fitted that it represented a reason ̂ble -nd 
simple solution to the problem of h- ndlin- rel Live ,ioti.on 
and ior tnking into sccount the tact th- -t physicl effects 
required ti7te for their transmission.3 
Convinced th ̂t rel ̂t.ivity theory only weakened, ^nd 
tid not remove, the bifurcation of nature involved in the 
cl -. ssica.l theory,4 ";Thitehea-d proceeded to provide an em- 
pirical basis for a -;lore coherent account of nature which 
would avoid cizurcation. His writinrrs of this period, be- 
cPuse of their philosophical in`,c rest, spre^.d the interest 
in rele tivity to philosophers, 1Tho might ot.'er..ris e h- ve 
continued oblivious to the revolution which had taren 
place in science, or avoided it as lon- as possible. 
T-cGilvary went so far as to hold Whitehead responsible for 
the philosophical interest.5 It is certainly true, how- 
ever, that Eddington rand `usseli mist have played a l.'rge 
rt in drawing syrIpathetic interest to the theories. 
1hitehead r- epea tedly acknowledged indebtedness to 
Einstein and nkowski ior the invention of the theory, 
despite the tact that he had constantly rebelled against 
the interpretation placed on the new theory by Einstein 
3. STR, 127 -128. 
4. ON, 41. 
5. Eva.nder Bradley McGilvary. 1941 "Sp»:ce- Time, Simple 
Location, and Prehension" The Philoso,phy of Alfred 
North T ¶Thitehead, The Library of Livimo. Philosophers, 
77712. 
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and the orthodox rel_:.tivists.6 In an article written for 
the London Tres, Whitehead declared, 
Einstein's work rLy be analyzed into three fac- 
tors--a principle, a procedure, and an explana- 
tion. The discovery of the principle and the 
procedure con= ,titute an epoch in science. I 
venture, howeveb, to think that the explanation 
is faulty.? 
rerhaps one of the two fundamental points of diver - 
ence between ,Thitehea.d's relativity and that of the or- 
thodox re1 tiv ists draws its roots from. ;Thitehead's pereoc- 
cupation with the epistemolo ical problem involved. 
ïhitehea.d's epistemological solution derived its answer 
from the fact that events were mutually significnnt of 
each other, and therefore the spatio- temporal continuum 
must be unifor- :1 , in contra= st to Einstein's demand for non - 
uniform curvature in the general theory. This uniformity 
was 'Tide possible by the internal rel tedness of events in 
contrast to the external relatedness of general relativity. 
It is odd thet probably no other philosopher has taken up 
the challen=;e on the point of external relatedness in or- 
thodox relativity. Perhaps it never occurred because it 
was not emphasized in the relativistic writings. Thus, on 
Witehead's theory, it becomes possible to infer the nature 
6. STR, 126. TNT, vi. REL, 88. 
7. 1920 February 12 "Einstein's Theory: An Alternative 
Suggestion" The Tires Educational Suppler :ent, No. 252, 
83. This'paper 7117 -11777777777 be referred to as ETAS. 
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of the whole of s ace -ti ae on the basis of a small ;_rt of 
the continuu_n. 
On Einstein's theory, however, the inference is im- 
possible. -Tor in orthodox relativity, the nature of space - 
time depends upon the contingent appearance of material 
bodies. Thus no accurate appraisl of vn entire spatio- 
temlioral continuum is possible until the location of every 
3teria.l particle in the universe is knówn. The s=ituation 
is rendered even more difficult in the unified field 
theories based on a pa r-llel transport operation. 
.ussell's comment on the position was that, essential- 
ly, neither side had proved its case, and that he preferred 
the "vgria.ble" geometry of Einstein on the grounds of com- 
prehensiveness,8 althour h it will be seen that 1hiteheacl's 
theory seems equally compl'ehensive. 
'Thitehead was therefore fully in favor of a flat 
space -time, which might be chosen because of its simplici- 
ty. 
9 
He was prepared to accept the notion that the perma- 
nent space for each tirrie- system was uniformly elliptic or 
hyperbolic i' need should be shown for ít.10 
He further explicitly rejected the need for a space - 
time manifold of ore dimensions th:-t found acceptance in 
many theories. The desire for a four -dimensional continuum 
8. 1927 The Analysis of 72-Ater, 79 -80. 
9. 7 L, 777 
10. REL, V. 
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was preferred for epistenolo7icß-1 regsons.11 7e was of 
the opinion, however, that it w .s an indic. tion of an at- 
tem;.t to reintroduce unifor Deity that sore writers had in- 
creased the number of di ensions to fiv e.12 This sugges- 
tion, coupled with Trofessor 'Tilson's "Body :alpha," see 
to i,nply th.r t the classic:: l notions of an absolute Eu- 
clidea n space-tile were so firmly rooted that even the 
relativists were lo,-the to relin,uish the' l entirely. 
Ly use of his r,iethod of extensive abstraction ,nd a 
definition of congruence borrowed from '.;¡ilson <:nd Lewis,13 
`Ihiteheed developed the _lech -.nics o." " r.cment," consi- 
dered as an event -p rticle. Introducing an arbitrary ve- 
locity- squared consta nt k instead of Lorentzts 
city c, -:hitehead demonstrated three types of kinea >!atics 
possible: hyperbolic , elliptic, and parabolic. In the 
hyperbolic type, klm: c2, and the formulae governing the 
'itzercld.- Lorentz transformations f.ollow.14 Elliptic ki- 
ne i:- tics require that k=:-h2, where h is 311. arbitrary con- 
stant. This type, however, ::hakes space - nd completely 
honogeneous, - nd the world of events is not easily intel- 
ligible with such a ho: :10 :eneity. The parabolic 'kinematics, 
using k= a0, presented the li sïtii case of Newtonian 
11. ETAS, 83. 
12. ETAS, 83. 
13. PN , 141. 
14. TIE, 159. 
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mechanics. Accordingly, it is the hyperbolic '.cchnnic 1 
system which is required. In this respect, 'fhitehe,nd 
parallels Lorentz and Einstein. 
One divergence arises, however, in the interpretation 
of the menning of the velocity c. Whitehead repeatedly 
refused to allow it to be interpreted R.s nec nine, the velo- 
city of light in vecuo.Z5 This, he insisted, was an arbi- 
trary designation, and placed a greater burden on a non - 
sensible quantity than it can carry. 
Investigating the possible treatment of an event, 
-hitehead observed that essentially it could be handled as 
a field because of its internal relatedness to all other 
events. Therefore it would be possible to express the 
laws of the physical field in the tensor fora utilized by 
Einstein. However, the tensor for gulae will be different, 
i-a.smuch as the Einstein equations de - nded that the 
physical laws be independent of the circumstances in which 
their measurements are :.a,de. ".Thitehead, an the other 
hand, suggested that the demand was arbitrary, and that 
those very circumstances might affect the mea.surertent it- 
self.16 
15f C11r , 53-54. J1 3, 195. ' E L, 240. 317", { 9{ :J TY 3, írlt.%. 
16. 1924 :Totes recorded by the Secretary on ,`-.;.+ehea.d's 
co :nents in the discussion after the re.. . e._, of the 
by George Te:nple. 1924 "A ,enera.lisa.tion of 
Trofessor 'Ihitehead's ..=.ory of Telativixy" 4ro- 
ceedin,:;s of the fhysic= ' 
; 
iet,;r of Lon'bn, 35, 193. 
Apáa.rentll no other co nnt tor on "1,ï'hitehe1d-Eas no- 
ticed this short, but irZ orna.ti7 A, record. 
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Considering a stretch of the historical route of an 
adjectival particle, Whitehead included an account of both 
the gravitational and the electromagnetic fields.17 Here 
is another essential innovation by Whitehead: a stretch of 
the route traced by an event -particle rather than an 
idealized infinitesimal element of that route is the basic 
unit for the formula. The total impetus of the combined 
fields is described by the formula, 
dI I dJ2 . E driT , 
c 
where is the mass of the particle, dJ is the homogeneous 
first degree expression for the mass- impetus of M along 
the historical route, E is the charge in electrostatic 
units, dF is the homogeneous first degree expression for 
the electromagnetic impetus along the historical route.18 
This adoption of a purely physical quantity, the "im- 
petus," clearly followed the warning of Foynting , arh.o held 
that physical science must describe the sensible in terms 
of the sensible. It represents perhaps the second of the 
na.j or divergences with Einstein. The impetus was a au:,a_n- 
tity trhich should be more attractive to experimental 
physicists than the metric element of Einstein. But, as 
with Trofessor Temple's later contribution in the same 
17. BEL, 78 -79. 
18. BEL, 79 -80. 
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tradition, most of the relativistic physicists seem to 
have bypassed it. But this device, which seeds allowable, 
avoids the physical- geometrical bifurcation which troubled 
Einstein after the introduction of general relativity. It 
avoids the bifurcation even more than do the new unified 
field theories, inasmuch as the physical world is still 
described by unified physical, as opposed to unified geo- 
metrical, concepts. 
The empirical facts expressing a pure gravitational 
field are then given by an equation,19 
dJ2_ dGTT - tn dG2 , 
corresponding to Einstein's expression for ds2. An adjec- 
tival pass- particle in the kinematic element is represen- 
ted by m, and fm represents the gravitational law of di- 
Anishing intensity. The factor 2/c2 accommodates the ex- 
pression to the empirical law of gravitation. The dG's 
are the invariant expressions for the quantitative phe- 
nomena of the advances of the analogous historical passa- 
ges of m and M. The expression %m, defining the di- 
minishing potential of the gravitational field, miPub be 
known by the name given it by Broad, a "retarded poten- 
tial. "20 Whitehead criticized Einstein for misinterpreting 
19. REL, 81. 
20. C. D. Broad. 1923 "Critical Notice: A. N. Whitehead's 
Frincile of Relativity" rind, new series, 32, 219. 
254 
the d32 to be a sp -tio- temporal element. Einstein's hesi- 
tation on this point is shown by the fact that he ad_:Aitted 
it to be the reason for waiting seven years after finding 
the full general relativity theory before publishing it. 
Einstein was then convinced that the ravita.tion:a.l expres- 
sion did coincide with the metric of space -time; -rnitehead 
was not. Again the divergence accents the two .iaj or areas 
of disagreement. 
The two parts of the J's are known as the "potential" 
(roughly analogous to the gravitational potential) and the 
"associate potential. "21 
An advantage deriving from Whitehead's v ¡.rious time - 
stratifications (which give rise to the difficulty of not 
adequately explaining public time) is that four alterna- 
tive renderings of a gravitational law in terms of rela- 
tivity are possible. Of these four, one is the form sug- 
gested by Einstein end another is the form given above by 
Whitehead. The other two are roughly analogous to ;in- 
stein's, but are more complex and are not linear. One of 
the other two alternatives contains a law which might be 
fitted to account for an interaction of the electromagnetic 
and the gravitational fields and introduces a contravariant 
tensor Try to describe the operation of the electromag- 
netic field.- 92 
21. CTT, 183. ETAS, 83. 
22. REZ, 86-87. 
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On the question of the experimental confirmation of 
the law for dJ2, Whitehead's theory is somewhat closer to 
observation than Einstein's. Unfortunately, certain phe- 
nomena considered crucial to confirmation of Einstein's 
theory are equally predicted by the flat space -time solu- 
tion of Whitehead, and may represent as serious an objec- 
tion to Whitehead's flat spice -time solution as To ,in- 
stein's. 
With respect to the advance of ::ercury's perihelion, 
Whitehead's theory provides the identical additional term 
for the advance of Yercury's perihelion, as well as the 
additional terms for the other planets, which, in the 
case of Venus, is an undesirable addition.23 
The deviation of a light ray by a gravitational 
field also follows directly,24 and is subject to the same 
observational uncertainty. 
With respect to the spectral shift of lines in the 
sun, Whitehead is on safer ground. If the assumption be 
made that the static distribution of the electric ch_,rges 
in an atom determine its cohesive forces, Einstein's pre- 
dicted shift would be increased by one- sixth.25 However, 
assuming that the internal forces of a molecule are not 
affected by a gravitational field, a result of about 
23. REL, 105. 
24. REL, 110-111. 
25. REL, 102-103. 
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twa- to three -fifths that of the spectral shift required 
by Einstein will be predicted. Furthermore, there will 
be a broadening of the lines.26 Whitehead's strong point 
is that the molecules are postulated to be oriented in 
every possible manner,27 and that therefore highly dis- 
crepant results may follow. This explains in a more na- 
tural manner the observations on the red -shift. 
A further effect predicted by 'dhiteheEd's theory, 
subject to alteration when more is known oT subato, is 
1,Yrocesses, is that there will be a further red -shift in 
lines on the limb of the sun with respect to those at the 
sun's center.28 This prediction seems to be confir :ed by 
experimental verification when considering the molecule 
to be a vibrating doublet. 
In the case of a nebula, some doublin, or even treb- 
ling of spectral lines is predicted, due to the dizferent 
orientations of the light- emitting molecules.29 This 
prediction is, as the preceding two predictions, subject 
to confirmation of the assumption regarding a vibrating 
molecule. 
With respect to the motion of the moon, Einstein's 
theory is only partially able to deal with certain 
26. ETAS, 83. 
27. REL, 115. 
28. REL, 117-120. 
29. REL, 121-126. 
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irregularities of its motion. /:3hitehead's theory, al- 
lowin,g for vrrying gravitational potentials, can lay a 
claim to attempting an explanation, although it ,flay con- 
ceivably fail as well. The problem was considered by 
Whitehead, but because 1 period of about 250 years was 
necessary to obtain a good degree of prediction, he did 
not advance definite predictions or claim any empiri- 
cal comparison with results in the Lunar Tab_les.30 Of 
course, Eddington's st^ tement of doubt regarding an abili- 
ty or a gravitational theory to explain the moon's irre -u- 
larities may be equally powerful here. 
Considering the effect on a gravitational field of 
the temperature of the attracted body, Whitehead l ound 
that the correcting term ror orainary molecular veloci- 
ties was inappreciable.31 If, however, subatomic veloci- 
ties, which may conceivably be extremely large, are taken 
into account, the temperature correction may be appre- 
ciable. 
It has been mentioned that Whitehead considered the 
possibilities of the interaction of the gravitational and 
electromagnetic fields. However, no attempt was made to 
represent the electromagnetic field by a skew- symmetric 
tensor, as Einstein and others have done. As with the 
30. FIEL, 84, 132 -136. 
31. F.EL, 113. 
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gravitational field, the electromagnetic field would need 
to be described, in Whitehead's theory-, on an empirical 
basis. 
The alternative farm of the gravitational expression 
suggested by Whitehead would possibly lead no further, 
however, than current unified field theories. A worth- 
while subject for further investigation would be the 
elaboration of this :,Iternntive law in order to see if 
any definitive predictions might be made which would 
recori '-end its serious consideration or legislate against 
its acceptance. 
Judging fro î the treatment of the laws of the physi- 
cal field considered here, it is well to remember tht 
Whitehead's alternative theory of gravitational fields 
has at least as much to commend itself to the scrutiny of 
the physicist as any current reltivity theory. It is 
particularly attractive from the point of view of the 
epistemologist, for his problems have by no means been 
solved by the current relativistic theories. Further- 
more, it is possible to provide a straightforward meta- 
physical structure within which this model of the uni- 
verse can operate. 
Trofessor George Temple is apparently the only mem- 
ber of the scientific world who has attempted to consider 
seriously -Y,Jhitehead's relativity. In a memoir offered to 
the Thysical Society of London er: rly in 1924, Trofessor 
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Teple offered a generalization of the 1922 theory offered 
by Whitehead. By introducing the substitution of a space - 
time manifold of uniform and isotropic curvature, Temple 
showed that the deviation of the light rays in a sol=ar 
rravitatiorvl field would be deflected by en inappreciable 
amount --2 x 10 
-8 
of the Einstein value of 1.74 ".32 This 
result would, of course, throw the entire problem of the 
deviation of light rays open to investigation amain. In 
the present state of empirical evidence, however, this 
reopening of the problem may be justified. A further 
conclusion of Professor Templets memoir wes that a space 
of positive curvature possessing the radius of minimal 
value of 1016 km. would be associated with Whitehead's 
cosmological model in "curved" space- time.33 
The substitution of this space of uniform positive 
curvature would bring Whitehead's model more into conso- 
nance with recent investigations. There seems to be no 
reason why Whitehead's cosmological model should not be- 
corne a member of the kinematic family. The prejudice 
against the possibility of the existence of a unique 
tifne- origin at t:=0 would, however, need to be removed. 
With the introduction of the epochal theory of time, the 
32. George Temple. 1924 "A Generalisation of Professor 
Whitehead's Theory of Relativity" TroceedinFs of the 
Physical Society of London, 36, 191. 
33. Ibid., 191. 
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prejudice would seem capable of being abolished. A 
change (with respect to the possibility of the existence 
of a maximum event which would represent all of nature in 
one time- system) in the abstractive sets would be necessi- 
tated if the epochal theory were not assumed. Whitehead's 
time in the old extensive theory closely resembles 1lne's 
'C -time. 
In Whitehead's theory, the creation of new matter 
would not be a point of inconsistency,on the ¿rounds that 
new adjectival particles would not appear without the 
proper active conditioning events to provide them. There 
is the possibility that -natter would be capable of crea- 
tion in time on the grounds that, in the act of the con- 
cretion of an actual occasion, the eternal objects may 
conceivably provide a new configuration which would be 
responsible for the creation of new edj ectivsl particles. 
At any rate, creation of new matter would not represent a 
challenge as serious to Wh.itehead's relativistic model as 
to ?rilne's. The objection to considering matter as adjec- 
tival remains, however. 
The conclusion of this chapter, then, is that the 
ZThiteheadian relativity theory may well repay further at- 
tention from the physicists as having a claim. to relia- 
bility and comprehensiveness. It seems that Professor 
Temple's generalization utilizing space -time of uniform 
positive curvature is preferable in view of the present 
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stete of empirical evidence. A fuller explanation of the 
phenomenon of the apparent displacement of a light ray in 
a gravitational field may possibly be expected in consi- 
dering the full effects of the electromagnetic impetus. 
It 11.,y be that the prejudice against a uniform space-time 
is not so well- grounded as is presumed by many relativists. 
In support of this argument, a recent observation by Pro- 
fessor Temple may be cited: 
I still think that Whitehead's alternative rela- 
tivity theory has a great deal to recommend it, 
and I a.: certainly not prepared to agree that 
it has any less valiçty than the theories put 
forward by Einstein.` 
;Thitehead had then presented a complete cosmolo.;ical 
theory in the period immediately after the introduction 
of relativity. In considering its metaphysical meaning, 
however, he found it necessary to provide more altera- 
tions because of the evolution of the concept of process 
as being at the roots of reality. ".Thitehead's serious 
purely scientific writing was at an end; metaphysics now 
assumed the central. preoccupation. But his was a meta- 
physics grounded in the physical sciences, and he had yet 
many suggestions to offer to cosmology which were to be 
perhaps among the most important additions to cosmology 
since the rise of the scientific method. 
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